The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the often-ignored inherent philosophical connection between Charles Taylor¡¦s ontological argument (philosophical anthropology) and his political scheme. Taylor articulates a moral realist understanding of the plurality of values and an ontological statement of human agency, and tries to demostrate a possibility of reconciliation between essentially conflicting values and cultures. In Taylor¡¦s view, ¡§the many¡¨ does not necessarily entail tragical choices among values, as Isaiah Berlin famously asserted, but can be possibly mediated through the common human agency with the hope that we can eventually reach one true consensus. Based on this uniquely Taylorian understanding of human condition, Taylor¡¦s political scheme can be seen as an effort to ameliorate the deep-rooted malaise within Western modernity, and find a common ontological ground among community members and citizens by which deliberations can be facilitated. The thesis will go on to examine Taylor¡¦s two most inspiring political assertions, namely, the polilics of recognition and civic humanism, in detail. I will argue that although Taylor optimistically believes that a common moral and cultural understanding can help forming and be transformed into a common political common good within a given community, the connection between these two levels of commonality is fairly weak. Moreover, what liberals object is precisely Taylor¡¦s attempt to equate cultural common understanding with a form of political common good.

The dissertation explores the question of the possibility of a moral theory compatible with common sense morality. Common sense morality is limited to its two fundamental features, or suppositions: moral judgements are truth apt and practical, i.e. they are at the same time in some sense objectively right or wrong and necessarily action guiding. In contemporary philosophy, the two fundamental features of common sense morality seem to be incompatible: only descriptions can have truth values, but descriptions are not prescriptions, or, to put it otherwise, from the way the things are, it does not follow straightforwardly how the things should be. However, analyses of the methodological, ontological, epistemological and semantic possibilities of moral theories enable a positive answer: a moral theory which embodies the two fundamental features of common-sense morality is possible, only if it makes coherence its constitutive value and uses the approach of rationalist internalism. In this research, the main controversies and distinctions of contemporary meta ethics (moral realism/anti realism, motivational internalism/externalism) are discussed and an account of rationalist internalism is explicated and enforced. / Disertacijoje nagrinėjama su sveiko proto morale suderinamos moralės teorijos galimybė. Sveiko proto moralė apribojama dviem pamatinėm prielaidom, arba savybėm: moraliniai sprendiniai turi teisingumo reikšmes ir yra praktinio pobūdžio, t.y. jie yra kažkuria prasme objektyviai teisingi arba klaidingi ir būtinai kreipia mūsų veiksmus. Šiandienėje filosofijoje šios dvi pamatinės sveiko proto moralės savybės atrodo esančios nesuderinamos: juk teisingumo reikšmes gali turėti tik deskripcijos, o deskripcijos nėra preskripcijos, arba iš to, kaip yra, tiesiogiai neseka tai, kaip turėtų būti. Vis dėlto nagrinėjant metodologines, ontologines, epistemologines bei semantines moralės teorijų galimybes, disertacijoje į pagrindinį klausimą atsakoma teigiamai: abi pamatines sveiko proto moralės savybes įkūnijanti moralės teorija yra galima, tik jei ji padaro koherentiškumą savo konstituojančia vertybe ir naudoja racionalistinio internalizmo prieigą. Darbe aptariamos pagrindinės šiandienės metaetikos kontroversijos bei skirtys (moralinis realizmas/antirealizmas, motyvacinis internalizmas/eksternalizmas), išskleidžiama bei papildoma racionalistinio internalizmo teorija.

Disertacijoje nagrinėjama su sveiko proto morale suderinamos moralės teorijos galimybė. Sveiko proto moralė apribojama dviem pamatinėm prielaidom, arba savybėm: moraliniai sprendiniai turi teisingumo reikšmes ir yra praktinio pobūdžio, t.y. jie yra kažkuria prasme objektyviai teisingi arba klaidingi ir būtinai kreipia mūsų veiksmus. Šiandienėje filosofijoje šios dvi pamatinės sveiko proto moralės savybės atrodo esančios nesuderinamos: juk teisingumo reikšmes gali turėti tik deskripcijos, o deskripcijos nėra preskripcijos, arba iš to, kaip yra, tiesiogiai neseka tai, kaip turėtų būti. Vis dėlto nagrinėjant metodologines, ontologines, epistemologines bei semantines moralės teorijų galimybes, disertacijoje į pagrindinį klausimą atsakoma teigiamai: abi pamatines sveiko proto moralės savybes įkūnijanti moralės teorija yra galima, tik jei ji padaro koherentiškumą savo konstituojančia vertybe ir naudoja racionalistinio internalizmo prieigą. Darbe aptariamos pagrindinės šiandienės metaetikos kontroversijos bei skirtys (moralinis realizmas/antirealizmas, motyvacinis internalizmas/eksternalizmas), išskleidžiama bei papildoma racionalistinio internalizmo teorija. / The dissertation explores the question of the possibility of a moral theory compatible with common sense morality. Common sense morality is limited to its two fundamental features, or suppositions: moral judgements are truth apt and practical, i.e. they are at the same time in some sense objectively right or wrong and necessarily action guiding. In contemporary philosophy, the two fundamental features of common sense morality seem to be incompatible: only descriptions can have truth values, but descriptions are not prescriptions, or, to put it otherwise, from the way the things are, it does not follow straightforwardly how the things should be. However, analyses of the methodological, ontological, epistemological and semantic possibilities of moral theories enable a positive answer: a moral theory which embodies the two fundamental features of common-sense morality is possible, only if it makes coherence its constitutive value and uses the approach of rationalist internalism. In this research, the main controversies and distinctions of contemporary meta ethics (moral realism/anti realism, motivational internalism/externalism) are discussed and an account of rationalist internalism is explicated and enforced.

In metaethics, moral irrealists argue that moral facts are neither ontologically real nor mind-independent. In moral semantics, irrealists who are descriptivist error theorists argue that typical moral claims attempt to report descriptive moral facts but that such facts do not exist, so typical moral claims are descriptively false or erroneous. Moral irrealists who are non-descriptivists, such as Mark Timmons, argue for a different function of moral claims. Timmons argues that moral claims attempt to guide action. He further maintains that moral claims can be true or false, but not according to a descriptivist function (he affirms cognitivism but denies descriptivism). I lay out Timmons‘ semantics and grapple with a number of objections to his view. I conclude that Timmons ought to discard his contextual truth-apt semantics and his non-descriptivism; instead he should defend the prescriptive, or evaluative, function of moral claims within an overarching descriptivist error theory. / Graduate / 0422

At its core, this book represents an attempt to outline and clarify a concept of ‘wisdom’. Building upon an established tradition of ‘philosophy as a way of life’ the discussion focuses on an understanding of a model of philosophy which sets a union of the virtues as its ultimate goal (finding models of non-ethical and primarily academic philosophy to be lacking). Aristotle’s practical wisdom and Plato’s humble, human wisdom are found to be complimentary in certain key respects and useful (in conjunction) in describing the nature of this ‘wisdom’ as a state of moral expertise and broad insight (an understanding of, and action according to, that which is most important). An account is given of the kind of moderate moral realism which is able to account for the ‘moral facts’ which are necessary to render this sort of moral knowledge viable. This moderate realism is founded upon a similarly moderate or compromising epistemology which will itself constitute a recurring theme of this ‘wisdom’. Moving from this metaethical and epistemological fuondation, some account is given of the sort of practical means by which this moral knowledge might be arrived at with the suggestion that traditional analytic and cogitative practices must be combined with far more anthropological ‘living-with’ practices in order that this moral learning can be plausible. Further to this suggestion of an amalgam of philosophy and anthropology, an effort is made to describe the sense in which aesthetic and ethical insight converge in this process of recognising moral knowledge and that, as such, ‘true philosophy’ must also allow for artistic (particularly narrative and poetic) methods. Having made a case for the practice of philosophy to move substantially away from its conventional means, the latter half of the book sets out a specific model of ‘living-with philosophy’ in an attempt to demonstrate this novel model of philosophy and the more detailed nature of wisdom. This ‘case study’ takes the shape of living-with other living things and the stories and lessons which have unfolded through the author’s own life with the non-human world. Due to the fundamental (practically, emotionally and conceptually fundamental) and particularly varied nature of living with (by and through) non-human life, organic vegetable gardening is taken as a good (if not the best) means of realising this process of moral learning. This discussion focuses upon the way in which close living with non-human life can and should highlight the manner in which various virtues which are fundamental to a union of virtue can appear to be in conflict (particularly what might be called ‘compassion’ and ‘prudence’). Ultimately an attempt is made to describe the way in which these conflicts can and should be found to be complimentary to the realisation of wisdom through a subtle, complex but intuitive process of balancing. The book concludes with an examination of this act of balancing, particularly ‘in the face of death’, and the way in which it is commensurate with moods and attitudes of quietness, poignancy and good humour. It is found that wisdom, the union of virtues, is more than the sum of its parts, that it is characterised particularly by these kinds of attitude (echoing the moderation and humility explored at the outset).

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

In this essay, I examine the interplay between history, progress, and morality, as it is discussed explicitly or implicitly in the metaethical literature. At first sight, it is perhaps intuitive that these three are necessarily intertwined and mutually dependent, as if they were casually connected. For instance, few would deny that moral progress has occurred throughout history. The abolishment of slavery and the political emancipation of certain groups are seen as obvious signs that morality does indeed progress. Those who believe in de facto moral progress would point to such 'facts' by comparing two states of affairs according to their moral status. Moral progress thus occurs when we move from a "worse" state of affairs to a "better". However, this simple algorithm becomes increasingly untenable once we ask what it means for something to be "better". Better by what measure, better according to whom, better in what sense? Some – moral realists– will argue that as we become increasingly aware of moral truths and as these truths steadily accumulate, progress occurs. Others will argue that there are no moral truths and no moral facts, and a comparison between different states of affairs is impossible because it involves a sort of moral 'historical imperialism' in which we assert our convictions and prejudices upon a time and culture with completely different beliefs. Taken to the extreme, this view gives rise to the idea that moral progress is nothing but a mirage, a psychological necessity without justification. I conclude the essay by arguing that several positions fall short when addressing questions regarding moral progress, and that there are other ways of discussing it which might be more fruitful.

Moral realism is the view that there are such things as moral facts. Moral realists have attempted to combat the skeptical problem of relativism, which is that the truth of an ethical value judgment is often, or always, subjective, that is, relative to the parties it involves. This essay presents, discusses, and criticizes Hilary Putnam’s attempt at maintaining moral realism while at the same time maintaining a degree of epistemological relativism. Putnam’s positive account originates in moral epistemology, at the heart of which lies truth, as idealized rational acceptability or truth under ideal conditions. The bridge between moral epistemology and normative ethics stems from Putnam’s disintegration of facts and values. His theory is finalized in the construction of a normative moral theory, in which the central notion is incessant self-criticism in order to maintain rationality. After presenting Putnam’s core thesis, the criticism raised by Richard Rorty, is deliberated upon. Rorty is critical of Putnam’s attempt at holding on to objectivity, because he does not understand how objective knowledge can be both relative to a conceptual scheme, and at the same time objective. The conclusion is that Putnam is unable to maintain his notion of truth as idealized rational acceptability and is forced into epistemological relativism. Putnam’s normative ethics has characteristics in common with virtue ethics, and is of much interest regardless of whether it can be grounded epistemologically or not.