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1	The role of emotion in moral decision-making : a comparison of Christine Korsgaard's Kantian position and Peter Railton's neo-Humean position Letton, Jane Elizabeth. 10 April 2008 (has links) No description available. Railton, Peter Albert
2	The Fundamental Naturalistic Impulse: Extending the Reach of Methodological Naturalism Summers, James B 15 March 2011 (has links) While naturalistic theories have come to dominate the philosophical landscape, there is still little consensus on what “naturalism” means. I trace the origins of contemporary naturalism to a view, called the “fundamental naturalistic impulse,” that originates in Quine’s turn against Carnap and which I take to be necessary for naturalism. In light of this impulse, some “substantively naturalistic” theories are examined: a weak version of non-supernaturalism, Railton’s a posteriori reduction of moral terms, and “Canberra plan” conceptual analyses of moral property terms. I suggest that if we take the fundamental naturalistic impulse seriously, then there is no need to differentiate substantive versions of naturalism over and above methodological versions. Substantive thesis in ontology or semantics can be had on account of one’s methodological commitments. This not only cuts against the distinction between methodological and substantive naturalisms, but also demonstrates just how far method can reach. Naturalism W.V. Quine Rudolpf Carnap Peter Railton Conceptual analysis Frank Jackson Meta ethics Philosophical methodology Philosophy
3	Railton's Reductive Moral Realism Rauckhorst, Garrett 22 April 2013 (has links) No description available. Philosophy Railton Parfit Rostai Metaethics Moral Realism value realism nonmoral value reductionism
4	Subjectivity Objectified: A Critical Reflection on Peter Railton Powers, Ryan 16 September 2022 (has links) No description available. Philosophy Ethics metaethics ethics realism naturalism objectivism subjectivism Peter Railton Kate Manne David Sobel philosophy
5	Explanation and deduction : a defence of deductive chauvinism Hållsten, Henrik January 2001 (has links) In this essay I defend the notion of deductive explanation mainly against two types of putative counterexamples: those found in genuinely indeterministic systems and those found in complex dynamic systems. Using Railton's notions of explanatory information and ideal explanatory text, deductivism is defended in an indeterministic setting. Furthermore, an argument against non-deductivism that hinges on peculiarities of probabilistic causality is presented. The use of the notion of an ideal explanatory text gives rise to problems in accounting for explanations in complex dynamic systems, regardless of whether they are deterministic or not. These problems are considered in the essay and a solution is suggested. This solution forces the deductivist to abandon the requirement that an explanation consists of a deductive argument, but it is argued that the core of deductivism is saved in so far as we, for full explanations, can still adhere to the fundamental requirement: If A explains B, then A is inconsistent with anything inconsistent with B. Deductive explanation Statistical explanation Chances Propensities Probabilities Sine qua non Probabilistic causality Indeterminism Ideal explanatory text Explanatory information Explanatory sketches Dynamic systems Chaotic systems Approximate solutions Coffa Salmon Railton Humphreys Kitcher Poincaré Suppes Lorenz Hénon.

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