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My goal for this paper can be presented as follows: I will attempt to show that objections to intuitionism, although they are serious, do not undermine entirely its fertility for knowledge and moral reasoning. This is probably the perception of contemporary philosophers like David Enoch, Robert Audi, Russ Shafer-Landau or John McDowell. In order to fulfill the objective mentioned above, I will do the following. First, I will outline broadly two of the paradigmatic features of moral intuitionism in order to identify it as a particular metaethics doctrine. Secondly, I will summarize some of the main objections that have been raised in order to discredit the value of moral intuitionism as a source both of moral knowledge and of valid support for moral reasoning. In third place, I will try, also briefly, to explain some of the possible (not all of course) answers to the objections previously mentioned in the paper. Fourth, I will recapitulate the more fruitful aspects of intuitionism, especially in regard to moral reasoning. / Mi objetivo para este trabajo puede presentarse de la siguiente forma: se intentará mostrar que las objeciones al intuicionismo, si bien son serias, no minan en forma absoluta su fertilidad para el conocimiento y el razonamiento moral. Probablemente esta sea la percepción de filósofos contemporáneos como David Enoch, Robert Audi, Russ Shafer-Landau o John McDowell. Para poder cumplir con el antes dicho objetivo, en este trabajo haré lo siguiente. En primer lugar, esbozaré, a grandes rasgos, dos de las características paradigmáticas del intuicionismo moral a fin de que podamos identificarlo como una corriente metaética particular. En segundo lugar, sintetizaré algunas de las principales objeciones que, por diversos conductos, han buscado desacreditar el valor del intuicionismo moral como fuente de conocimiento moral y también de apoyo válido para el razonamiento moral.En tercer lugar, intentaré, también de manera sumaria, explicitar algunas de las posibles (no todas, desde luego) respuestas a las antes mencionadas objeciones. En cuarto lugar, recapitularé los aspectos rescatables del intuicionismo, especialmente en lo que atañe al razonamiento moral.

Moral vagueness is encountered when the alethic value of some moral statement containing a moral predicate is deemed to be vague. One such statement could be “abortion in week 22 is permissible”. Given the metaethical framework of moral realism, there are three standard approaches to understanding the ontology of such vagueness. The semantic approach states that the vagueness is due to our language not being able to adequately refer to the moral reality. The ontic approach states that the vagueness is an intrinsic feature of the moral reality, and as such it will always persist. The epistemic approach states that the vagueness is due to subjects not being able to know the moral reality. In effect, there are things about morality we cannot know, because of our epistemic disposition. In this thesis, I investigate arguments in favor of all three approaches and find that of the three, the epistemic approach – here named moral epistemicism – has the best chances of succeeding. / Moralisk vaghet uppstår när sanningsvärdet av ett moraliskt uttalande, innehållandes ett moraliskt predikat, anses vara vagt. Ett sådant uttalande kan vara "abort i vecka 22 är tillåtet". Givet moralisk realism som metaetiskt ramverk finns det tre vedertagna tillvägagångssätt för att förstå ontologin hos en sådan vaghet. Det semantiska tillvägagångssättet hävdar att vagheten beror på att vårat språk inte kan referera till den moraliska verkligheten på ett adekvat sätt. Det ontiska tillvägagångssättet hävdar att vagheten är en inneboende egenskap hos den moraliska verkligheten, det är verkligheten själv som är vag. Det epistemiska tillvägagångssättet hävdar att vagheten beror på att vi som subjekt inte kan veta allt om den moraliska verkligheten. Det finns moraliska sanningar som vi inte kan veta på grund av vår epistemiska disposition. I denna avhandling undersöker jag argument till förmån för alla tre tillvägagångssätt och finner att det epistemiska tillvägagångssättet – här benämnd moralisk epistemicism – har störst chans att lyckas.

This dissertation is a critique of synthetic ethical naturalism (SEN). SEN is a view in metaethics that comprises three key theses: first, there are moral properties and facts that are independent of the beliefs and attitudes of moral appraisers (moral realism); second, moral properties and facts are identical to (or constituted only by) natural properties and facts (ethical naturalism); and third, sentences used to assert identity or constitution relations between moral and natural properties are expressions of synthetic, a posteriori necessities. The last of these theses, which distinguishes SEN from other forms of ethical naturalism, is supported by a fourth: the semantic contents of the central moral predicates such as 'morally right' and 'morally good' are fixed in part by features external to the minds of speakers (moral semantic externalism). Chapter 1 introduces SEN and discusses the most common motivations for accepting it. The next three chapters discuss the influential "Moral Twin Earth" argument against moral semantic externalism. In Chapter 2, I defend this argument from the charge that the thought experiment upon which it depends is defective. In Chapters 3 and 4, I consider two attempts to amend SEN so as to render it immune to the Moral Twin Earth argument. I show that each of these proposed amendments amounts to an abandonment of SEN. Chapter Five explores Richard Boyd's proposal that moral goodness is a "homeostatic property cluster." If true, Boyd's hypothesis could be used to support several metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic claims made on behalf of SEN. I advance three arguments against this account of moral goodness. In the sixth chapter, I argue that moral facts are not needed in the best a posteriori explanations of our moral beliefs and moral sensibility. Because of this, those who accept a metaphysical naturalism ought to deny the existence of such facts or else accept skepticism about moral knowledge. In Chapter 7, I consider a counterargument on behalf of SEN to the effect that moral facts are needed in order to explain the predictive success of our best moral theories. I show that this argument fails.

本文旨在探討加拿大哲學家泰勒(Charles Taylor)的政治思想。泰勒政治思想深受個人身為英裔魁北克人、英加兩地學術薰陶、以及參與加拿大新民主黨活動等因素所影響，並與其亟欲建構哲學人類學之鴻圖，有著緊密的關係。泰勒反對笛卡兒式與洛克式的心靈理論，卻採取梅洛龐蒂的觀點，主張感知性知識乃是一種行動者知識的樣態，感知的內容從不是偶然地與世界連結，感知的主體是世界的化身，其身處的困境無法置外於其行動者的結構。泰勒更進一步抨擊當代自然主義假設背景祇不過是我們認知的因果性前提的看法，他主張背景乃是知識之先驗性、超越性的條件，但它不能完全地客體化，因為任何客觀的知識宣稱要被理解，其本身必需具備背景預設，這種反思之先驗性、超越性的層次充份顯示出客體化、表徵化世界的限制。泰勒遂借用加達瑪的視域融合概念來說明社會科學的詮釋邏輯，與自然科學的邏輯大異其趣。他更抨擊行為主義過度簡化人類的行為，竟將價值和實踐分離，導致價值和行動在具體生活經驗中的關聯性遭受排拒。泰勒更明確地批評原子式個人主義者的信念，也拒斥工具理性。泰勒因此提倡善的客觀性，強調人們與其道德經驗，從而建構其道德實在論。泰勒的政治理論則係挑戰現代以普遍主義為基礎的憲政民主制度之合理性，其批駁當代程序式的自由主義者對個人自主性之錯誤理解，並提出本真肯認之理論。從宗教、經濟、政治與道德等多元角度，泰勒爬梳西方現代性的源流，就中探討宗教在俗世政治中所扮演的角色，它竟成為政治認同的關鍵。他也追尋現代社會想像如何崛起，預視多元現代性的到臨。面對俗世時代人類處境，泰勒則導正孤傲人文主義之偏頗，企圖拯救大眾虛空無聊的生活。最後，本文對泰勒的理論在道德視域、政治哲學及現代性加以檢討，並以臺灣經驗的反省作結，期收他山之石，可以攻錯之效。

This dissertation evaluates the recent academic consensus on liberal multiculturalism. I argue that this apparent consensus, by subsuming religious experience under the general category of culture, has rested upon undefended and contestable conceptions of modern religious life. In the liberal multicultural literature, cultures are primarily identified as sharing certain ethnic, linguistic, or geographic attributes, which is to say morally arbitrary particulars that can be defended without raising the possibility of conflict over metaphysical beliefs. In such theories, the possibility of conflict due to diverse religious principles or claims to the transcendent is either steadfastly ignored or, more typically, explained away as the expression of perverted religious faith. I argue that this conception of the relation between culture and religion fails to provide an account of liberal multiculturalism that is persuasive to religious believers on their own terms. To illustrate this failing, I begin with an examination of the Canadian policy of official multiculturalism and the constitutional design of Pierre Trudeau. I argue that the resistance of Québécois nationalists to liberal multiculturalism, as well as the conflict between the Québécois and minority religious groups within Quebec, has been animated by religious and quasi-religious claims to the transcendent. I maintain that to truly confront this basic problem of religious difference, one must articulate and defend the substantive visions of religious life that are implicit in liberal multicultural theory. To this end, I contrast the portrait of religious life and secularization that is implicit in Will Kymlicka’s liberal theory of minority rights with the recent account of modern religious life presented by Charles Taylor. I conclude by suggesting that Kymlicka’s and Taylor’s contrasting conceptions of religious difference—which are fundamentally at odds regarding the relation of the right to the good, and the diversity and nature of genuine religious belief—underline the extent to which liberal multicultural theory has reached an academic consensus only by ignoring the reality of religious diversity. / text

L’impartialité constitue une condition et un élément essentiels du concept de justice ; mais en quoi consiste-t-elle précisément ? Les théories de justice contemporaines tendent à l’aborder en termes strictement politiques, en laissant de côté ou en limitant ses aspects épistémologiques et moraux. Ce travail se propose d’exposer, d’analyser et de discuter de manière critique la manière dont Thomas Nagel aborde à nouveaux frais, à partir de sa thèse du conflit des perspectives, l’idée d’impartialité en termes à la fois épistémologiques, moraux et politiques. L’impartialité est en effet d’abord une affaire de jugement objectif et rationnel ; mais un tel jugement doit aussi tenir compte de la division des points de vue personnels et impersonnels en nous, ainsi que du pluralisme des raisons et des valeurs qu’elle engendre. Le concept d’impartialité requiert alors un examen attentif de cette division des perspectives, et des types ou degrés d’objectivité qui seraient possibles dans les débats tant moraux que politiques. Peut-on dégager des critères, des conditions, une méthode de l’impartialité ? Comment la garantir, au niveau moral mais aussi en termes politiques et distributifs ? Et quels principes, raisons ou valeurs une justice pleinement impartiale peut-elle avancer et promouvoir de manière cohérente et légitime ? À travers notre examen des thèses, originales et hybrides, de Thomas Nagel, nous défendons la nécessité de remonter à ces conditions et questions fondamentales afin d’élaborer une conception satisfaisante et réaliste de la justice impartiale. Une telle conception prend avec Nagel un visage libéral, démocratique, pluraliste et fortement égalitarien, qui est certes proche des théorisations de Rawls ou Scanlon, mais est façonné à partir de thèses originales et hybrides offrant des alternatives novatrices. Ces thèses, affinées et modifiées par Nagel au cours des années et souvent non encore traduites en français, n’avaient encore pas fait l’objet d’une étude francophone et spécialisée dans les débats contemporains autour des théorisations de la justice. Dans notre travail, nous en analysons les facettes épistémologiques, métaéthiques, éthiques, politiques et économiques, en mettant en perspective les conceptions de Nagel par rapport à celles des penseurs modernes et contemporains dont il se démarque, et en dégageant la manière dont ces thèses se combinent, se complètent, se limitent respectivement aussi parfois. À partir de l’analyse de ces différentes thèses, nous avançons des éléments de discussion critique et des prolongements du concept d’impartialité qui en résulte, ainsi que du type de justice sociale – libérale, pluraliste, fortement égalitarienne – qu’il porte. Nous défendons la perspective réaliste et rationaliste de Nagel, son refus de toute forme d’utopie et sa conception plurielle, hybride mais exigeante de l’impartialité, tout en prenant au sérieux les difficultés que ces thèses soulèvent et les points de blocage auxquels Nagel se heurte. Mais nous considérons que ces difficultés peuvent trouver, dans les options envisagées par Nagel et dans les éléments de critique que nous avançons dans notre thèse, des solutions ou du moins des pistes de résolution qui constituent autant de perspectives stimulantes pour prolonger l’effort philosophique au sujet de la justice, de l’impartialité et de l’équité, dans et pour le monde d’aujourd’hui. / Impartiality is an essential condition and element of the concept of justice. But what exactly is impartiality in itself? Contemporary theories of justice tend to approach it in strictly political terms, and to leave aside or to limit its epistemological and moral aspects. This work offers to expose, analyse and critically discuss the way Thomas Nagel, from his conception of the conflict of perspectives, renews the approach to the idea of impartiality in epistemological, moral and political terms. Indeed impartiality is first a matter of objective and rational judgment; but such a judgement must also take into account the division of personal and impersonal points of view within us, as well as the pluralism of reasons and values it creates. The concept of impartiality then requires a scrutiny of this division of perspectives, and of the types or degrees of objectivity that could be possible in both moral and political debates. Can we determine impartiality’s criteria, conditions or method? How are we to guarantee it, morally but also politically and distributively? Which principles, reasons or values can a fully impartial justice consistently and legitimately advance or promote? Through our examination of Thomas Nagel’s original and hybrid conceptions, we defend the necessity of going back to these fundamental conditions and questions in order to elaborate a satisfying and realistic conception of impartial justice. Such a conception takes in Nagel’s approach a liberal, democratic, pluralistic and strongly egalitarian shape. It is surely close to Rawls’ or Scanlon’s theorizations of justice, but it is based on original and hybrid theses that offer innovative alternatives. These theses, which Nagel refined and modified over years and which, for most of them, have not yet been translated into French, had not until then been studied in France with a specialized focus on contemporary debates around theories of justice. In our work, we analyse their epistemological, metaethical, ethical, political and economic aspects, while putting into perspective Nagel’s conceptions in relation to those of modern and contemporary thinkers whom he stands out. We also show and explain how his theses combine, complete but also sometimes limit each other. With this analyse, we offer elements of critical discussion and possible extensions of the concept impartiality hence built, as well as of the type of social justice – liberal, pluralist, strongly egalitarian – that it carries. We defend the realist and rationalist perspective of Nagel, his refusal of any form of utopia and his plural, hybrid but demanding conception of impartiality. We also take seriously the difficulties his theses raise and the blockings Nagel faces. But we consider that these difficulties can find, in the options he explores and in the critical elements we suggest in our dissertation, solutions or at least possible resolutions that constitute as many stimulating perspectives to pursue the philosophical effort about justice, impartiality and equity, within and for our actual world.

Notre pratique morale ordinaire, l’éthique normative ainsi que l’éthique appliquée présupposent que nos questions morales sont décidables non arbitrairement. Autrement dit, ces activités présupposent qu’il existe des réponses non arbitraires à nos questions morales. Le présent travail de recherche vise à questionner ce présupposé en explorant les réponses des trois principales familles de théories métaéthiques, soient le réalisme moral, l’antiréalisme moral et le constructivisme métaéthique, à la question « Les questions morales sont-elles décidables de manière non arbitraire? ». Notre but n’est pas de déterminer quelle théorie métaéthique est la meilleure, mais plutôt d’évaluer la possibilité que les questions morales soient décidables non arbitrairement. Nous défendrons que le réalisme moral semble compatible avec la décidabilité des questions morales et qu’au contraire, l’antiréalisme ainsi que le constructivisme semblent plus difficilement compatibles avec la décidabilité morale. Nous défendrons également que l’indécidabilité des questions morales, un problème pratique engendré par ces cadres métaéthiques, implique une aporie bien gênante. Si a priori on admet que ces trois familles de théories métaéthiques sont équiprobables, on pourrait alors affirmer grossièrement que nous avons deux chances sur trois de faire face, en pratique, au problème de l’indécidabilité morale et donc à l’aporie qu’elle implique. Cela justifiera pour nous l’intérêt d’explorer la possibilité d’une solution à cette aporie. Nous proposerons donc l’hypothèse selon laquelle la pratique du questionnement moral de manière aporétique, considérée comme une activité non cognitive, implique une certaine manière d’être qui n’est pas arbitraire. / Our ordinary moral practice, normative ethics and applied ethics presuppose that our moral questions are decidable non-arbitrarily. In other words, these activities presuppose that there are nonarbitrary answers to our moral questions. This very research aims to question this presupposition by exploring the answers of the three main families of metaethical theories, namely moral realism, moral antirealism and metaethical constructivism, to the question "Are moral questions decidable non-arbitrarily?". Our goal is not to determine which metaethical theory is the best, but rather to assess the possibility that moral questions are decidable non-arbitrarily. We will defend that moral realism seems to be compatible with the decidability of moral questions and that, on the contrary, antirealism and constructivism seem less compatible with moral decidability. Also, we will argue that the undecidability of moral questions, a practical problem generated by these metaethical frameworks, would involve a troublesome aporia. If a priori we admit that these three families of metaethical theories are equiprobable, we could then roughly affirm that we have two out of three chances to face the problem of moral undecidability and therefore the aporia it implies. This will justify for us the interest of exploring the possibility of a solution to this aporia. We will therefore propose the hypothesis according to which the practice of moral questioning in an aporetic way, considered as a non-cognitive activity, implies a certain way of being that is not arbitrary.

Underneath the romance, comedy and exoticism, South Pacific is a story that questioned core American values, exploring issues of race and power at a time when these topics were intensely relevant-the original opened just four years post WWII, on the heels of Roosevelt's aggressive expansionist response to domestic instabilities. Much has been written about the depiction of war and racial prejudice in South Pacific. However, examining such topics in the context of their cultural and political moment (both in 1949 and 2008) and through the lens of Terry Eagleton's unique take on morality, is not only a fascinating study, but an intensely relevant and unchartered endeavor. This work concerns the evolution of an American code of ethics as it has been reflected and constructed in both Broadway productions of Roger and Hammerstein's South Pacific (c.1949, 2008). Specifically, it examines the depiction of WWII, America's imperialistic foreign policy, and the function of American patriotism in light of Terry Eagleton's theories surrounding an evolving code of ethics in 20th/21st century America. By so doing, this thesis uncovers answers to the following questions: What were the cultural and political forces at work at the time South Pacific was created (both in 1949 and 2008), and how did these forces influence the contrasting depictions of war, imperialism and patriotism in each version of the musical? In what ways were these productions reflective of a code of ethics that evolved from what Eagleton would classify as moral realism (prescriptive of behavior) to moral nihilism (reflective of behavior)? How did the use of this increasingly reflexive moral code make this politically controversial musical more palatable, and therefore commercially viable during the contrasting political climates of WWII and the recent war on Iraq? Determining answers to questions such as these enables us as a society to look back on our history-on our mistakes and triumphs-and recognize our tendency to find pragmatic justification for our actions rather than acknowledging the possibility of the existence of objective truth, which remains unchanged through time and circumstance.