In a deregulated electricity market, auction serves as a primary pricing tool in various segments of the market including day-ahead, real time, ancillary services markets, and Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) market. Deregulated power markets around the world use different auction strategies that exist in the literature, since very little comparative guidelines exist as to the relative merits of these strategies. In this thesis, a computational methodology and its solution framework are developed to evaluate the impact of an auction strategy on the equilibrium prices in a constrained network with multiple generators at nodes, and where transactions are settled using the optimal power flow (OPF) program. The methodology is tested on a power market represented by a sample 12-bus IEEE network available in the MATPOWER software, which is reconfigured to allow multiple generators to supply power at a bus. The network is used as a platform to comprehensively assess the performance of uniform price auction, discriminatory auction, and second-price uniform auction. Auction rules are used to update generator costs, which are then introduced into the OPF program for obtaining optimal price and quantity allocations. This Auction-OPF procedure is embedded within a game theoretic model that obtains the equilibrium bidding strategies and the corresponding prices and quantities for the network. A detailed comparison of the auction mechanisms is carried out using different measures of performance such as revenue, average prices, and quantity weighted average prices. The comparison shows that there is, perhaps, an appreciable difference among the auction mechanisms. However, to statistically confirm the impact of auction choices, a mixed level factorial experiment is designed with auction strategy, network load, and congestion as three different factors and a closeness measure (defined as the difference between average total revenue and the average total cost of generators in the network per hour) as the responsible variable. An analysis of variance conducted on the experimental outcomes indicates that the load level and the auction strategy significantly affect the network performance. The presence market power under the auction strategies is examined through two well known indices, Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) and Lerners Index. It is concluded from the HHI values that all three auction strategies allow the market to be moderately competitive. The Lerners index values show that, while discriminatory auction results in highest bid markup, second price uniform auction induces bidding at or close to the marginal cost.

By the emergence of electronic commerce and low transaction costs on the Internet, an interest in the design of new auction mechanisms has been arisen. Recently many researchers in computer science, economics, business, and game theory have presented many valuable studies on the subject of online auctions, and auctions theory. When faced from a computational perspective, combinatorial auctions are perhaps the most challenging ones. Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-item multi-unit situations where the agents&rsquo / valuations of the items are not additive. However, determining the winners to maximize the revenue is NP-complete. In this study, we first analyze the existing approaches for combinatorial auction problem. Based on this analysis, we then choose three different approaches, which are search approach, descending simultaneous auctions approach, and IP (Integer Programming) formulation approach to build our models. The performances of the models are compared using computer simulations, where we model bandwidth allocation system. Finally a combinatorial auction tool is built which can be used for online auctions and e-procurement systems.

Submitted by Guilherme Martins Pellegrini (guilherme.m.pellegrini@gmail.com) on 2018-07-01T20:19:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação_guilherme_martins_com_ficha_para_entrega.pdf: 1698373 bytes, checksum: 2c4b7395fa068a8fe9254091fed87d00 (MD5) / Rejected by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br), reason: .... on 2018-07-10T18:36:09Z (GMT) / Submitted by Guilherme Martins Pellegrini (guilherme.m.pellegrini@gmail.com) on 2018-07-10T18:52:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO_GUILHERME_MARTINS_COM_FICHA_PARA_ENTREGA.pdf: 778166 bytes, checksum: 8d4a5f7f6742afe99f338683ede31760 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2018-07-10T18:55:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO_GUILHERME_MARTINS_COM_FICHA_PARA_ENTREGA.pdf: 778166 bytes, checksum: 8d4a5f7f6742afe99f338683ede31760 (MD5) / Rejected by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br), reason: Prezado Guilherme, Acusamos a postagem do seu trabalho na biblioteca digital, porém sua submissão foi rejeitada pois é necessário realizar um ajuste. Na folha que corresponde a ficha catalográfica deverá colocar exatamente como a biblioteca lhe enviou; a informação sobre o responsável pela elaboração da ficha catalográfica deve constar no trabalho, como por exemplo, “Ficha catalográfica elaborada por: Isabele Oliveira dos Santos Garcia CRB SP-010191/O. Biblioteca Karl A. Boedecker da Fundação Getulio Vargas – SP.” Assim que for realizada a correção favor submeter novamente seu trabalho. Quaisquer dúvidas entre em contato pelo telefone 11 3799-7732. Atenciosamente, on 2018-07-11T13:38:51Z (GMT) / Submitted by Guilherme Martins Pellegrini (guilherme.m.pellegrini@gmail.com) on 2018-07-11T22:13:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO_GUILHERME_MARTINS_COM_FICHA_PARA_ENTREGA.pdf: 778668 bytes, checksum: c2e7a9fc154e3402ef1776b7531481d6 (MD5) / Rejected by Thais Oliveira (thais.oliveira@fgv.br), reason: Guilherme, boa noite, Para que possamos aprovar o seu trabalho, será necessária mais uma alteração. A contagem de páginas começa na capa, porém começa a aparecer a partir da Introdução. Por gentileza, corrija para que possamos aceita-la. Obrigada. on 2018-07-13T22:17:21Z (GMT) / Submitted by Guilherme Martins Pellegrini (guilherme.m.pellegrini@gmail.com) on 2018-07-13T22:38:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO_GUILHERME_MARTINS_COM_FICHA_PARA_ENTREGA.pdf: 778800 bytes, checksum: abd1af0ff0730bab2c999d9451cbed9c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Thais Oliveira (thais.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2018-07-13T22:45:32Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO_GUILHERME_MARTINS_COM_FICHA_PARA_ENTREGA.pdf: 778800 bytes, checksum: abd1af0ff0730bab2c999d9451cbed9c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-07-16T13:58:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO_GUILHERME_MARTINS_COM_FICHA_PARA_ENTREGA.pdf: 778800 bytes, checksum: abd1af0ff0730bab2c999d9451cbed9c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-16T13:58:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO_GUILHERME_MARTINS_COM_FICHA_PARA_ENTREGA.pdf: 778800 bytes, checksum: abd1af0ff0730bab2c999d9451cbed9c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-06-19 / Muitas licitações públicas podem ser processadas sob um formato multiunitário, com a divisão de um objeto de características similares em diversos lotes ou mediante a reunião de diferentes bens em um mesmo procedimento. Desse modo, o presente trabalho busca refletir acerca da racionalidade que deve guiar a decisão sobre o fracionamento da licitação sob o prisma da análise econômica do direito. Valendo-se dos resultados teóricos obtidos pela Teoria dos Leilões, busca-se entender qual o comportamento esperado dos licitantes em diferentes tipos de leilões e como a referida teoria pode ser útil para estruturar da melhor forma possível as contratações públicas no Brasil a partir das regras postas para tanto. Com um diagnóstico em relação às principais características dos leilões multiunitários, é realizada uma análise dogmática de modo a concluir quanto à viabilidade de adoção de cada tipo no âmbito do direito brasileiro e quais cuidados devem ser tomados para uma correta implementação prática de cada modelo. O objetivo é identificar as situações em que cada tipo de leilão se torna mais recomendável e como configurar adequadamente os lotes postos à disputa, tudo de modo a otimizar os objetivos pretendidos pela contratação pública. A principal conclusão é a de que o modelo adequado de leilão, bem como a determinação e caracterização dos lotes, deve seguir os objetivos pretendidos pelo administrador. Outrossim, para além de modalidades tradicionais de licitação multiunitária, é possível implementar no Brasil modelos inovadores, tais como o leilão aberto simultâneo e o leilão combinatório, os quais, sob certas circunstâncias, tendem a trazer resultados melhores. / Many public procurement can be processed in a multi-unit format, by dividing an object of similar characteristics into several lots or by assembling different goods in the same procedure. In this way, the work aims to reflect on the rationality that must guide the decision regarding the fractionation of the bidding under the view of law & economics. Taking the theoretical results of Auction Theory into account, the goal is to understand the expected bidders’ behavior in different types of auction and how the theory can be useful to design public contracting in the best possible way based on the current applicable rules. With a diagnosis on the multi-unit auctions main features, a dogmatic analysis is carried out in order to conclude on the feasibility of each type under Brazilian law and what cautions should be observed for a correct practical implementation of each model. The objective is to identify the situations in which is recommended the adoption of each auction type and how to design correctly the lots put into auction, all in order to optimize the objectives intended by public contracting. The main conclusion is that the proper auction model, as well as the determination and characterization of lots, should follow the objectives intended by the administrator. Moreover, in addition to traditional multi-unit bidding modalities, it is possible to implement innovative models in Brazil, such as the simultaneous ascending auction and the combinatorial auction, which, under certain circumstances, tend to produce better results.