現今，世界經濟脈動迅速，科技發展日新月異，如何在瞬息萬變的趨勢洪流中掠取先機，端賴自身競爭力強弱而定。然而管理當局短視行為的發生，卻易損及企業的競爭優勢，甚至對企業未來有不利影響。造成管理當局短視之因源於多方面，來自資本市場投資人的影響即為其一。而資本市場中，機構投資人往往是大家注目的焦點，因此本研究乃對機構投資人持股比例與管理當局短視行為的關係進行探討，並期望能對公司治理制度的擬定上有所助益。 本研究以民國八十四年至民國九十年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例間的關係，並探究在電子與非電子產業間兩者關係是否相同。此外，本研究亦比較機構投資人與個人投資者，各自持股比例與管理當局短視行為的相關情形，進以探尋真正能發揮監理機制的投資人類別。 實證結果顯示：(1)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例高低有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例間則有顯著的正向關係。(2)在非電子產業中，機構投資人持股與管理當局短視行為呈顯著負向關係，而電子產業中兩者則無顯著關係。(3)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例變動的幅度有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例變動則有顯著的正向關係。(4)在非電子股產業方面，機構投資人持股比例變動幅度與管理短視行為間無顯著關係；但在電子產業中，則兩者間呈現顯著之負向關係。 / Nowadays, the economy situation is changing so fast and the development of new technology has altered with each passing day. To be ahead of their competitors, firms must sharpen their competitive edge. However, management myopia often damage their competitive advantages and would do harm to the firms in the future. The phenomenon of management myopia is derived from many reason, one of them is the effect of the investors in the capital market. Furthermore, participants in the capital market always pay attention to the behavior of institution investors. Thus, this research explores the relationships between the ownership of institution investors and management myopic. We hope it would be beneficial to the enactment of the system of corporate governance. This research focuses on the relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2001. It also explores if the relationship is the same in both electronic industry and non-electronic industries. Besides, the study also compares the effect of the ownership of individual or institution investors on the management myopia in order to point out the type of investors that can provide monitory function clearly. The empirical study indicates that (1) there is a significant negative relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors. Conversely, there is a significant positive relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of individual investors. (2) In the electronic industry, the relationship between the ownership of institution investors and the myopic behavior of management is not significant. However, it is significant negative in other industries. (3) The change of percentage of ownership of institution investors has significant negative relationship with the management myopia. However, it is opposite to the individual investors. (4) No significant relationship between the institution investors and the management myopic in non-electronic industries. But in the electronic industry, it is significant negative.

Scheduling policies adopted for statistical multiplexing should provide delay differentiation between different traffic classes, where each class represents an aggregate traffic of individual applications having same target-queueing-delay requirements. We propose scheduling to optimally balance weighted mean instanteneous queue lengths and later weighted mean cumulative queue lengths as an approach to delay differentiation, where the class weights are set inversely proportional to the respective products of target delays and packet arrival rates. In particular, we assume a discrete-time, two-class, single-server queueing model with unit service time per packet and provide mathematical frame-work throughout our work. For iid Bernoulli packet arrivals, using a step-wise cost-dominance analytical approach using instantaneous queue lengths alone, for a class of one-stage cost functions not necessarily convex, we find the structure of the total-cost optimal policies for a part of the state space. We then consider two particular one-stage cost functions for finding two scheduling policies that are total-cost optimal for the whole state-space. The policy for the absolute weighted difference cost function minimizes the stationary mean, and the policy for the weighted sum-of-square cost function minimizes the stationary second-order moment, of the absolute value of the weighted difference of queue lengths. For the case of weighted sum-of-square cost function, the ‘iid Bernoulli arrivals’ assumption can be relaxed to either ‘iid arrivals with general batch sizes’ or to ‘Markovian zero-one arrivals’ for all of the state space, but for the linear switching curve. We then show that the average cost, starting from any initial state, exists, and is finite for every stationary work-conserving policy for our choices of the one-stage cost-function. This is shown for arbitrary number of class queues and for any i.i.d. batch arrival processes with finite appropriate moments. We then use cumulative queue lengths information in the one-step cost function of the optimization formulation and obtain an optimal myopic policy with 3 stages to go for iid arrivals with general batch sizes. We show analytically that this policy achieves the given target delay ratio in the long run under finite buffer assumption, given that feasibility conditions are satisfied. We take recourse to numerical value iteration to show the existence of average-cost for this policy. Simulations with varied class-weights for Bernoulli arrivals and batch arrivals with Poisson batch sizes show that this policy achieves mean queueing delays closer to the respective target delays than the policy obtained earlier. We also note that the coefficients of variation of the queueing delays of both the classes using cumulative queue lengths are of the same order as those using instantaneous queue lengths. Moreover, the short-term behaviour of the optimal myopic policy using cumulative queue lengths is superior to the existing standard policy reported by Coffman and Mitrani by a factor in the range of 3 to 8. Though our policy performs marginally poorer compared to the value-iterated, sampled, and then stationarily employed policy, the later lacks any closed-form structure. We then modify the definition of the third state variable and look to directly balance weighted mean delays. We come up with another optimal myopic policy with 3 stages to go, following which the error in the ratio of mean delays decreases as the window-size, as opposed to the policy mentioned in the last paragraph, wherein the error decreases as the square-root of the window-size. We perform numerical value-iteration to show the existence of average-cost and study the performance by simulation. Performance of our policy is comparable with the value-iterated, sampled, and then stationarily employed policy, reported by Mallesh. We have then studied general inter-arrival time processes and obtained the optimal myopic policy for the Pareto inter-arrival process, in particular. We have supported with simulation that our policy fares similarly to the PAD policy, reported by Dovrolis et. al., which is primarily heuristic in nature. We then model the possible packet errors in the multiplexed channel by either a Bernoulli process, or a Markov modulated Bernoulli process with two possible channel states. We also consider two possible round-trip-time values for control information, namely zero and one-slot. The policies that are next-stage optimal (for zero round-trip-time), and two-stage optimal (for one-slot round-trip-time) are obtained. Simulations with varied class-weights for Bernoulli arrivals and batch arrivals with Poisson batch sizes show that these policies indeed achieve mean queueing delays very close to the respective target delays. We also obtain the structure for optimal policies with N = 2 + ⌈rtt⌉ stages-to-go for generic values of rtt, and which need not be multiple of time-slots.

Section 33(1)(b) is fraught with borrowed provisions. The end-product marries German and Canadian features. The failure of the German Constitutional Courts to interpret the "essential content of a right" precipitated the adopted infant's bumpy landing in South Africa. That the sibling still lacks identity is evidenced by our Constitutional Court's evasive and superficial treatment of the clause. Section 33(1)(a) - proportionality prong enables judges to justify their neglect of Section 33(1)(b). The opinion is expressed that Section 33(1){b) demands interpretation but to date it has been shrouded in vagueness. After all without demarcating boundaries with sufficient precision and highlighting where the State may not tread the State may trespass. Alternatively the limitable nature of human rights could become a myth as Section 33(1)(b) could be transformed into an insurmountable hurdle for the State, rendering every right absolute in practice. A workable conceptual framework proposes an inverted, porous and value imbibing solution. / Law / LL.M.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T21:00:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 martincasalsturma2003.pdf.jpg: 11517 bytes, checksum: 930c75c74ff8269d877983110854646d (MD5) martincasalsturma2003.pdf: 975293 bytes, checksum: f41cfd3a5f3e659d07e2861acf4e23d4 (MD5) martincasalsturma2003.pdf.txt: 107784 bytes, checksum: e96ad0fb809a12f13ba7d3f08e24c1ee (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-02-15T00:00:00Z / O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a alocação de investimentos no mercado acionário brasileiro, utilizando a teoria do prospecto de Tversky e Kahneman (1979) e o conceito de Aversão a Perdas Míope (Myopic Loss Aversion) proposto por Benartzi e Thaler (1995). Foram levantados através de experimento de laboratório os parâmetros da função de valor e da função de ponderação de probabilidades da teoria do prospecto e foi verificada a alocação de investimentos entre ações e renda fixa que maximizam a utilidade. Chegamos à conclusão que o total de recursos atualmente direcionados ao mercado de ações no Brasil, que é de aproximadamente 2,7% para pessoas físicas e de 6,0% para pessoas jurídicas, é compatível com a teoria do prospecto. / The objective of this study is to analyze the investment allocation in the Brazilian stock market, using Tversky and Kahneman’s prospect theory (1979) and the concept of myopic loss aversion proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). We run a laboratory experiment to obtain the parameters of the value function and the probability weighting function of the prospect theory and identify the allocation that maximizes utility in the Brazilian Market We conclude that the actual allocation of investment in the stock market, of around 2.7% for individuals and around 6% for all the segments, is in accordance with the prospect theory.

Section 33(1)(b) is fraught with borrowed provisions. The end-product marries German and Canadian features. The failure of the German Constitutional Courts to interpret the "essential content of a right" precipitated the adopted infant's bumpy landing in South Africa. That the sibling still lacks identity is evidenced by our Constitutional Court's evasive and superficial treatment of the clause. Section 33(1)(a) - proportionality prong enables judges to justify their neglect of Section 33(1)(b). The opinion is expressed that Section 33(1){b) demands interpretation but to date it has been shrouded in vagueness. After all without demarcating boundaries with sufficient precision and highlighting where the State may not tread the State may trespass. Alternatively the limitable nature of human rights could become a myth as Section 33(1)(b) could be transformed into an insurmountable hurdle for the State, rendering every right absolute in practice. A workable conceptual framework proposes an inverted, porous and value imbibing solution. / Law / LL.M.