How do security communities develop in and through practice? For more than forty years, security relations between Russia and NATO member states were structured by the spectre of mutual assured destruction as symbolized by thousands of nuclear missiles targeted at each other. Less than a generation after the end of the Cold War, the possibility of military confrontation between these former enemies has considerably receded. Taking inspiration from Pierre Bourdieu, this dissertation develops a theory of practice of security communities that argues that on the ground of international politics, the social fact of peace emerges when security practitioners come to debate with diplomacy—the non-violent settlement of disputes—instead of about diplomacy. It is doxa, a relationship of immediate adherence to the order of things, that makes such a peaceful practical sense possible. In the empirical analysis, the dissertation reveals an intriguing paradox in the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship. On the one hand, over the last fifteen years Russia and NATO member states have solved each and every one of their disputes, including fierce ones over the double enlargement, by nonviolent means. Such a track record of peaceful change is testimony to security-communitybuilding processes. But on the other hand, diplomatic success was often bought at the price of a growing mistrust on the Russian side. As the Russian Great Power habitus resurfaced, hysteresis—a disconnect between players’ dispositions and their positions in the game—steadily increased to the point of inconclusive symbolic power struggles over the rules of the international security game and the roles that each player should play. A decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, Russian-Atlantic relations have left the terrain of military confrontation but have yet to settle on that of mature peace. Building on several dozen interviews with Russian and NATO security practitioners, the dissertation discovers that diplomacy has become a normal though not a self-evident practice in Russian-Atlantic dealings.

This essay is a type of case study, it examines if intervention in Kosovo were in accordance with humanitarian intervention criteria. This study gives an understanding that intervention may sometime worsen condition for the people it wants to rescue, and that inability to address humanitarian intervention prevails in diffuse victory. The purpose of this essay is to examine the Kosovo conflict and the approach of humanitarian intervention in 24 March, 1999.  The approach made by NATO was seen as a new international phenomenon that sought to protect values of human rights. The results of this study pose doubt to this notion; it reflects that the intervention rested not only on humanitarian grounds. The most important aspect of humanitarian intervention is promoting security for the people it wants to rescue. The results shows that NATO’s intervention in short term failed to provide security; it is shown that the air campaign had little impact at the beginning prevailing only after much damage and suffering has been done. The result also shows that failure to adopt the issue of Kosovo more adequately at an earlier stage on the international agenda resulted in the ''welfare'' of NATO's intervention. Despite the consequences of NATO’s action, situation prevailed for the better outcome for the Kosovar-Albanian people than what might have been has intervention been absent. FRY: s deliberative plan of expelling the Kosovo-Albanian to the last one would have been finalized if intervention would have been absent.

NATO was a powerful geopolitical force during the twentieth century. And their activity has increased after the Cold War. However, many problems have emerged and NATO's future seems uncertain. This essay is a critical look into the history and possible future of NATO.

How do security communities develop in and through practice? For more than forty years, security relations between Russia and NATO member states were structured by the spectre of mutual assured destruction as symbolized by thousands of nuclear missiles targeted at each other. Less than a generation after the end of the Cold War, the possibility of military confrontation between these former enemies has considerably receded. Taking inspiration from Pierre Bourdieu, this dissertation develops a theory of practice of security communities that argues that on the ground of international politics, the social fact of peace emerges when security practitioners come to debate with diplomacy—the non-violent settlement of disputes—instead of about diplomacy. It is doxa, a relationship of immediate adherence to the order of things, that makes such a peaceful practical sense possible. In the empirical analysis, the dissertation reveals an intriguing paradox in the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship. On the one hand, over the last fifteen years Russia and NATO member states have solved each and every one of their disputes, including fierce ones over the double enlargement, by nonviolent means. Such a track record of peaceful change is testimony to security-communitybuilding processes. But on the other hand, diplomatic success was often bought at the price of a growing mistrust on the Russian side. As the Russian Great Power habitus resurfaced, hysteresis—a disconnect between players’ dispositions and their positions in the game—steadily increased to the point of inconclusive symbolic power struggles over the rules of the international security game and the roles that each player should play. A decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, Russian-Atlantic relations have left the terrain of military confrontation but have yet to settle on that of mature peace. Building on several dozen interviews with Russian and NATO security practitioners, the dissertation discovers that diplomacy has become a normal though not a self-evident practice in Russian-Atlantic dealings.

In 1952 Turkey was invited to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This study examines the context of the Turkish demand for an American security guarantee and of American and British security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in the late 1940s in the light of Cold War developments. The postwar weakness of Great Britain, who had until then guarantied the status quo in the area induced Ankara to tum to the United States as a guarantor of Turkish political independence and territorial integrity against a powerful Soviet Union. The Turks asked for a formal alliance with the Americans, but this proved to be a difficult task. In the eyes of American military and State Department officials Turkey was a barrier against Soviet penetration in the Middle East. Hence, it was thought necessary to strengthen her resistance to the Soviets through the provision of American military aid. However,, Washington was reluctant to stretch the United States' resources by extending its commitments to this area which was still thought to be a British military responsibility. Britain for her part responded to Turkish demands in accordance with her general interests in the Middle East. London regarded Turkey as a part of Middle East defence: hence, it favoured an American commitment to Turkey, but mainly as a means of getting the Americans involved in the area as a whole. The evolution of American military thinking regarding Europe and the Middle East in 1951, made Washington to revise its policies towards Ankara. The realisation of Turkey's importance for the organisation of defence both in Western Europe and the Middle East along with the fear that Turkey might turn neutral in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union induced the Americans to meet Turkish demands in what appeared to be the easiest way, that is, inviting Turkey to join the Atlantic Alliance. The study concludes that in the late 1940s Ankara followed a pragmatic foreign policy. Turkish leaders had a clear perception of their country's interests and were particularly alert at exploiting the circumstances which would promote them. In contrast, the foreign policy of the United States towards the Eastern Mediterranean was still developing and lacked the determination of a great power. Britain, on the other hand, continued to plan like a great power although it was obvious that she was not in a position to do so any more.

Afghanistan steht vor einem Wendepunkt. Die Lage beim Abzug der NATO/ISAF-Truppen gibt wenig Anlass zum Optimismus. Zwar wurden gewisse Fortschritte bei der Entwicklung des Landes erreicht, insgesamt ist die Lage jedoch hinsichtlich Sicherheit, politischem System und Wirtschaft beunruhigend. Afghanistan gehört nach wie vor zu den ärmsten Ländern der Erde und ein anhaltender Frieden ist nicht in Sicht. Im Gegenteil: Die Mehrheit der Afghanen fürchtet die Zukunft.

Polens Sicht auf die Ukrainekrise ist von dessen geopolitischer Lage geprägt. Als Teil der EU und NATO grenzt das Land unmittelbar an die Krisenregion. Sowohl die Parteien als auch die öffentliche Meinung in Polen verteidigen übereinstimmend die territoriale Integrität der Ukraine und halten deren staatliche Unabhängigkeit für einen unentbehrlichen Faktor der politischen Ordnung in Europa. Vor allem die Frage nach den künftigen Möglichkeiten einer weiteren Ostausdehnung der EU steht daher aus Warschauer Sicht auf der Agenda.

Zugl.: Graz, Univ., Diplomarbeit, 2005 u.d.T.: Kramer, Sandra: Die Entwicklung der Konzepte verstärkter, strukturierter und enger Zusammenarbeit in der GASP im Rahmen des Verfassungskonvents und der Regierungskonferenz

Diss. Stockholm : Stockholms universitet, 2007.

Zugl.: Frankfurt (Main), Univ., überarb. Diss., 2003