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Afghanistan ist seit über 30 Jahren ein von Kriegen geschütteltes Land. Ende 2014 soll der Einsatz der ISAF-Truppen dort beendet werden, doch erscheint dieses „Manöver“ eher wie ein Abbruch denn wie ein geordneter Abzug nach erfolgreicher Mission. Die Sicherheitslage vor Ort ist weiterhin instabil. Das bedeutet auch Instabilität für die Region. Deutsche und internationale Experten ziehen die ernüchternde Bilanz eines militärischen Abenteuers, die bei zukünftigen Auslandseinsätzen - auch der Bundeswehr - bedacht werden sollte.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Reissued 30 May 2017 to correct misspelled name of Dept. Chair on title page. / The Black Sea historically was the theater of rivalry between great powers, mainly the Ottoman Empire and Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, rivalry on the Black Sea became much less intense as Russia weakened and NATO was not paying much attention to it. After the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea, NATO gradually resumed activity on the Black Sea, sending warships of non-littoral NATO members and conducting joint maritime exercises. Russia built a robust anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble in Crimea and responded to NATO activation with provocative actions against NATO ships. At its most recent summit in Warsaw in 2016, NATO paid quite a lot attention to the Black Sea issue and committed to increase NATO presence in the area; nevertheless, the organization shared no signs of a clear strategy. This thesis discusses a potential alternative strategy for NATO, which is based on using its own strategy against Russia—with littoral NATO members and partners building a couple of A2/AD bubbles around the Russian one. The suggested strategy consists of the creation of a Black Sea defense coordination center, an integrated network of all source data exchanged, and the combined capabilities of robust land-based mobile anti-ship missiles, mobile air defense systems, and sea and air surveillance radars, as well as aviation and naval assets. / Civilian, Ministry of Defence of Georgia

The current situation in the world has forced many states to have a look at their security policy in a more demanding way. The instability around the world has become harder to prevent and for the states to protect their citizens, which requires efficient work from the states. Therefore, this paper is going to have a look at the security policy that Finland and Sweden are performing currently, to give us understanding of their current situation. To do that, it is necessary to have a look at their backgrounds as well. The aim of this paper is to understand security policies of these countries, and how that have effected to their choices that are done today. After that, new future possible choices will be analysed based on the given information. Since the instability has also reached these two countries, we shall have look what could be their choices in improving their current policies.   Theories that will be used in this paper, are playing important role in achieving the selected aim of this paper. Throughout this paper, theories are tools for us, guiding us to focus on the arguments that are supported by these theories. These different points of views will be collected from arguments that are presented about the security policy of these countries and are supporting theories Liberalism and/or Realism. Theories are also allowing us to use our method, argument analyse, by working as a great instrument in finding arguments that are relevant for the paper. Since this paper will not aim to give any specific idea of good security policy, the focus is to look the things where Finland and Sweden could improve their policies, and/or to have a look into new possibilities. Since the world is changing rapidly, also the security policies of countries have to keep up with the new challenges.

This analysis examines and explains the emergent model of crisis management manifest at the end of the first decade of the post-Cold War era. The end of the Cold War heralded fundamental and widespread changes in many ways but it did not, as events continue to demonstrate, confine to history the phenomenon of international crises. Indeed, evidence suggests that the post-Cold War period has witnessed an increase rather than a decrease in the incidence of crises. However, what has changed is what constitutes a crisis, the range of responses available to those who manage them and the criteria by which a successful outcome may be gauged. Changes too are apparent in time-scales and attitudes of decision-makers. These changes are not constants in all crisis situations: moreover, their impact varies. Whilst this transition is evolutionary and incremental, it is nonetheless fundamental and real. The transition from the Cold War model of crisis management to the post-Cold War model has not been smooth or by deliberate design: it has evolved somewhat haphazardly. Using the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as a template of Cold War crisis management, comparison and contrast is made with the three post-Cold War crises in which the major powers became entangled; the 1990-91 Gulf War, the Bosnian crisis which lasted from 1991 until 1995, and the 1998-99 Kosovo crisis. This analysis examines what has changed, whilst assessing any change in import of what has not. To do this necessitates drawing upon a variety of topics that merited detailed study in their own right. However, this paper does not seek to provide a history of UN operations, nor is it an analysis of pure strategic theory or a treatise on United States foreign policy. The most obvious differences between the two eras are to be found in the changed relationship between the United States and Russia, formerly the USSR, and consequently the significant reduction in the likelihood of global nuclear conflict. With the nuclear threshold so dramatically raised and the starkness of strategic superpower stand-off removed, other features of crises have been afforded commensurately greater prominence. Indeed the removal of restraint conditioned by the certain knowledge of mutual destruction has coincided with an increase in the incidence of crises.

Russia’s recent increase in acts of aggression against bordering nations is concerning. After Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, many wondered if the world should anticipate a Baltic intervention. This paper seeks to analyze this question through a comparative study of Russia’s recent interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, an analysis of the Estonian and Latvian Russian-speaking population, and an analysis of the NATO alliance’s strengths and weaknesses in deterring a possible Russian threat. From my analysis, I conclude that a conventional Baltic intervention is unlikely. However, I also conclude that the NATO alliance is not prepared to counter non-conventional acts of aggression and that these tactics could become more common in international conflicts. Therefore, I also conclude that a non-conventional Baltic intervention from Russia is possible and, consequently, the alliance should re-examine its framework.

<p>The Swedish Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, made a speech on the 22 of August 1961 in which he dismissed speculation that Sweden was seeking to abandon its neutral stance and non-alignment in foreign policy with a view to requesting membership of the European Economic Community. The reason was that the EEC was supposed to have a political part where a connection with NATO should have existed. This speech led to a domestic discussion which has been called the most intense debate of foreign affairs in recent history. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the reactions of the other parliamentary parties to Erlander’s speech. The theoretical points draw from social constructivism, which is being operationalised into states’ identity and interests. These interests are states’ physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being. All of these three interests were present in Erlander’s speech.</p><p>The study shows that the Centre Party (Centerpartiet) was in agreement with Erlander’s stance and coincided that it was impossible to reconcile membership of the EEC with the state’s neutral stance. Both the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna) and the Centre Party gave priority to the interest of autonomy over economic well-being. However, there were aspects of the interest of physical survival in the opinions of the Social Democrats, which might be connected with their role as the government party and therefore having the ultimate responsibility. The biggest critics were the non-socialist parties: the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) and the Conservative Party (Högerpartiet). The latter two believed that the country should seek the oppurtunity to make an exception to the neutral stance when applying for membership and then evaluate whether it would be possible to reconcile it with non-allignment. They both had economic well-being as their major interest. Further criticism came from the Communist Party (Kommunistpartiet), who were opponents of any aspect of European cooperation. They even drew parallels between the EEC and Hitler’s vision for Europe. The Communist Party included interests of physical survival and autonomy in their argumentation. All parties were consistent in keeping to their interests throughout the period of this research.</p>

The Swedish Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, made a speech on the 22 of August 1961 in which he dismissed speculation that Sweden was seeking to abandon its neutral stance and non-alignment in foreign policy with a view to requesting membership of the European Economic Community. The reason was that the EEC was supposed to have a political part where a connection with NATO should have existed. This speech led to a domestic discussion which has been called the most intense debate of foreign affairs in recent history. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the reactions of the other parliamentary parties to Erlander’s speech. The theoretical points draw from social constructivism, which is being operationalised into states’ identity and interests. These interests are states’ physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being. All of these three interests were present in Erlander’s speech. The study shows that the Centre Party (Centerpartiet) was in agreement with Erlander’s stance and coincided that it was impossible to reconcile membership of the EEC with the state’s neutral stance. Both the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna) and the Centre Party gave priority to the interest of autonomy over economic well-being. However, there were aspects of the interest of physical survival in the opinions of the Social Democrats, which might be connected with their role as the government party and therefore having the ultimate responsibility. The biggest critics were the non-socialist parties: the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) and the Conservative Party (Högerpartiet). The latter two believed that the country should seek the oppurtunity to make an exception to the neutral stance when applying for membership and then evaluate whether it would be possible to reconcile it with non-allignment. They both had economic well-being as their major interest. Further criticism came from the Communist Party (Kommunistpartiet), who were opponents of any aspect of European cooperation. They even drew parallels between the EEC and Hitler’s vision for Europe. The Communist Party included interests of physical survival and autonomy in their argumentation. All parties were consistent in keeping to their interests throughout the period of this research.