The problem contained in this study was Stendhal's use of the Napoleonic myth in his novel The Red and the Black. This study dealt primarily with Stendhal's purpose in using the myth as a basis for his novel and with the extent to which the principal character, Julien Sorel, patterned himself after the myth.

This thesis will view the Napoleonic War from three distinct angles. Firstly, as a world war that was fought beyond the narrow confines of Europe where events on other continents were as important as those taking place in Europe. Secondly, the thesis will view the war from an Anglo-Swedish angle with an emphasis upon the northern and Baltic regions of Europe. This region of Europe is often forgotten when the Napoleonic War is written about despite the fact it was of vital economic and strategic importance to Britain. Thirdly, this military contest between the Great Powers will be viewed from 'below' or in other words from the perspective of a minor power unable to influence events as much as these powers. One good reason for Anglo-Swedish friendship was the strong trade links between the two countries, which led to their successful but neglected economic sabotage of Napoleon's Continental system. Yet economic factors, though vital, did not primarily account for the creation and continued life of the 'common cause'. Instead geopolitical and ideological factors gave rise to the 'common cause'. Firstly, although seeing themselves as nations apart from the continent Sweden and Britain's independence and strategic security depended upon no one power being able to upset or usurp the European balance of power. Secondly, in the eyes of Swedish and British conservatives (they ruled both countries for most of the alliance's life) Napoleonic France was not only a direct threat to their external security but Napoleon also came to symbolise everything they disliked about the new European order. To the architect of the alliance, Gustavus IV , and his fellow conservatives, Napoleon had to be defeated at all costs if Sweden, Britain and all of Europe was to survive. But the conservatives had a monopoly on neither political power nor the truth, for powerful groups in both countries opposed the war with Napoleon. These groups, in opposition during most of the war in both countries,believed an accommodation with Napoleon was possible. In 1806 the British Whigs tried and failed to find a peaceful accommodation with Napoleon. Following defeat at Russian hands and the diversion of British interest to the Iberian peninsula, the Anglo-Swedish alliance was almost dead when in early 1809 the Swedish opposition took power through a coup. They managed, unlike their British colleagues, to get peace with Napoleon, but at a high price. Defeat, despair and domestic turmoil the following year led to the election of marshal Bernadotte as ruler of Sweden. Within two years Bernadotte had begun rebuilding the 'common cause' with Britain, and in 1814 Sweden finally saw its great protagonist Napoleon defeated. The pro-war line had showed itself to be the only realistic and viable long-term option for either country.

No / Joseph Lainé contribua de façon remarquable à la chute du Premier Empire – et à deux reprises. Premièrement, il dénonça la politique guerrière de Napoléon et prôna la paix immédiate comme député au Corps législatif en décembre 1813. Deuxièmement, ayant en conséquence encouru la fureur de l’empereur et revenu à sa Gironde natale, il collabora activement à la Déclaration de Bordeaux en faveur des Bourbons en mars 1814. Il faut constater, cependant, que l’action de Lainé en 1814 n’eut pas l’importance de premier plan que celle du comte Lynch et des Chevaliers de la Foi ; sa contribution vint après, avec l’organisation de la nouvelle administration royaliste dans la ville et dans le département. Ce que je soulignerai ici, par contre, c’est l’opposition très significative et bien courageuse de Lainé à Napoléon au sein du Corps législatif l’année précédente, qui marqua une étape majeure dans l’écroulement du régime impérial.

Thesis (Doctorwürde)--Universität Freiburg i.B., 1907. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis is a study of the novelists of the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns (veterans and non-veterans), the novelists of the naval war, and the novelists of the home front in the Napoleonic Wars.

No description available.

This thesis deals with the political, military and social aspects of the volunteer movement in Great Britain during the wars against revolutionary and Napoleonic France. It explores the nature and purpose of the volunteer infantry, yeomanry cavalry, and armed associations: their organisation, administration, membership, and political adherences. Several questions concerning the political nature of volunteering are addressed, and it is shown that both the volunteers' motivation and the government's reasons for raising a voluntary force were more closely related to military than to political considerations. The occupational structure and political allegiances of several corps are analysed, revealing a broad range of political allegiance. The conclusion is drawn that the volunteers were more a 'constitutional' force than a partisan one. This thesis also investigates the ways in which the volunteer movement posed a challenge to the established social and political order, particularly in its autonomy and 'democratic' organisation. The central government and local authorities were, however, well aware of the potential threat, and precautions were taken against its development. The workings of the volunteer 'system' are explored in order to judge the validity of contemporary criticism of volunteer autonomy, and it is concluded that fears of apparently democratic organisation were exaggerated. The question of volunteer loyalty is investigated by examining the means of selection, individuals' motives, and the response of corps to peace-keeping duties. Finally, an assessment of the position of the movement in contemporary society shows it to have been closely related to the ambivalent concept of the 'citizen-soldier'. Extensive use is made of manuscript sources, particularly the papers of the Home and War Offices held in the Public Record Office, and official and private correspondence in the British Library and several county record offices.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2003. / Advisor: Dr. Donald D. Horward, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of History. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed May 18, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.

The British Army that fought the engagement at Waterloo in 1815, was outwardly little changed from that which was engaged in the initial campaigns of the Wars, twenty-two years previously. Line upon line of red-coated, musket-armed infantry, manoeuvred as chess pieces across open fields, deciding the issue by volley and bayonet, having spent a hungry night exposed to rain and cold. The cavalry were still beautifully and often impractically clad, and were always seeking the decisive charge, on their unfed and often sickly mounts. The Army's commander still viewed his troops as 'the scum of the earth', who were rarely paid, and predominantly enlisted for life. It would therefore appear that little had altered from 1793 to 1815, and that this will be a study of continuity rather than change. However, this thesis will show that despite outward appearances, the Army that took the field at Waterloo was intrinsically different from the one that entered the conflict in 1793, being modernised in line with other institutions of state, and other European armies. This thesis is first and foremost intended to be a contribution to the history of the British Army from the outbreak of war with Revolutionary France in 1793, to the reduction of the forces after the battle of Waterloo in 1815. It proceeds from an assumption that the understanding of not only that history, but the history of the developing British state, will be significantly advanced through a study of the operation of, and the changes which took place within, the Army during the Wars with France.

The story of Prussia's defeat at the Battles of Jena and Auerstedt and subsequent reform has dominated the historiography of Napoleonic Prussia. While Napoleon has received the vast majority of historical attention, those who have written on Prussia have focused on the Prussian reform movement or the Prussian army's campaigns against Napoleon. These historians present the Prussian army before 1807 as an ossified relic, a hopelessly backward and rigid army commanded by a series of septuagenarians. Apart from the 1806 campaign, these scholars scarcely address the field operations of the Prussian army during the French Wars (1792-1801). This thesis seeks to prove that the Prussian army during the War of the Bavarian Succession and the War of the First Coalition was still an effective fighting force by examining the field operation of the Prussian army from 1778-1793 and the reactions of Prussian thinkers to it. The history of the Prussian army from 1778-1806 challenges the narrative of the army as a force in decline. The Prussian army struggled in the War of the Bavarian Succession, and the war revealed two of its weaknesses, the lack of light troops and an uncoordinated strategic approach. However, many of the problems of the war were failures of Fredrick and Henry as generals rather than the army as a whole. The army's performance during the War of the First Coalition against the French proved that it was a highly effective force and able to win even when significantly outnumbered. The existence of the reform movement following the war of the First Coalition and the implementation of some changes demonstrated that the army was far from dormant and its officers still sought ways improve it. While the army did not enjoy commanders of the caliber of Frederick the Great in his prime, before 1806 it retained the discipline and effectiveness in battle it displayed under Fredrick.