No description available.

Inhalt: Die Logik der Macht und die Macht der Logik Konturen einer reflexiven Außenpolitikdebatte

Inhalt: Zivilgesellschaftliche Teilhabe fördern Öffentlichkeit von unten

Inhalt: Fremdbestimmung oder nationale Eigeninteressen? Schein und Sein der Kritik am außenpolitischen Konsens

Inhalt: Interessen, Werte und Normen bedingen sich wechselseitig! Werte und Normen lassen sich als Interessen definieren! Debattenkultur gegen das Informationsdefizit! Was ist deutsch an deutschen Interessen?

This dissertation investigates the emergence and evolution of United States' national interests in the Arctic region, as well as examines the factors that influence how the U.S. engages in cooperative endeavors in the region with other Arctic states. Though geographically located on the periphery of broader global politics, the region nevertheless is geopolitically situated at the convergence of three continents—North America, Asia, and Europe—in an area historically significant to, but often underappreciated by, the U.S. Government. Two research questions frame this study. The primary research question asks: How have U.S. national interests in the Arctic region evolved over time, and what factors help explain the evolution of U.S. engagement in the region? U.S. perceptions of the region's geopolitical significance gives rise to a subsidiary question: To what degree has the U.S viewed the Arctic region as a zone of competition or a zone of cooperation? Drawing on a range of archival sources, academic literature, historical and contemporary U.S. Government documents—including several declassified documents, as well as personal interviews of key Arctic experts, this study analyzes the development of U.S. interests in the Arctic over four distinct time periods, collectively spanning over a hundred years. These time periods are pre-World War I to the end of World War II (1906-1945); the first half of the four-decade-long Cold War (1945-1967); the second half of the Cold War (1968-1989); and the post-Cold War period (1990-2017). The study produces three major findings. First, U.S. overall interest in the Arctic region increased and decreased in conjunction with how the U.S. perceived the region's overall geopolitical significance. This waxing and waning of U.S. involvement in the polar north generally aligned with the U.S. viewing the Arctic as either a zone of insignificance, competition, or cooperation at different phases over the study's time period. The study's second major finding is that U.S. security interests in the Arctic singularly dominated and shaped America's overall set of national interests that emerged in the region, particularly since World War II. While constituting a number of issues, the most important U.S. security interest in the Arctic has been ensuring freedom of navigation in and through the Arctic. The region's overwhelming maritime composition, along with freedom of navigation's centrality to America's broader global power and interests, ensures the security-driven focus of America's overall Arctic national interests. The final key finding reveals that U.S. Arctic cooperative engagement is conditional. Geopolitical perceptions of the Arctic as either a zone of competition or a zone of cooperation conditions America's willingness to engage with other Arctic states in the region. Since the end of the Cold War and the ensuing period of circumpolar cooperation, U.S. participation in Arctic cooperative arrangements has been conditioned on how much it perceives such arrangements intrude on U.S. autonomy and freedom to act in and through the region. / Doctor of Philosophy / The Arctic is a vast and sparsely populated region that historically has been viewed geographically and geopolitically peripheral to the rest of the world. The United States has not always considered the region important, even though it has territory there. This study asks two questions. First: How have U.S. national interests in the Arctic region evolved over time, and what factors help explain the evolution of U.S. engagement in the region? Second: To what degree has the U.S viewed the Arctic region as a zone of competition or a zone of cooperation? Three major findings emerge from this study, which covers the early 20th century to the second decade of the 21st century—more than a hundred years. First, the evolution of U.S. interests in the Arctic region have waxed and waned in concert with how important the U.S. perceives the region. Second, America's security interests in the Arctic region dominate and drive its overall approach to the region. Finally, U.S.'s willingness to cooperatively engage with other Arctic states in the region depends on how the U.S. believes such engagements effect its ability to act in and through the Arctic region. The Arctic region is becoming more geopolitically important than at any time since at least the Cold War. Rapid global warming could potentially make the region's historically inaccessible shipping routes and vast natural resources accessible by 2050. With Russia already the largest Arctic presence, and China's increased focus on the Arctic, the region could become a space for strategic competition that could threaten U.S. national interests. This study provides the policy community the background and context to navigate the geopolitical challenges and opportunities being unleashed in the Arctic region.

<p>During the Cold War era, the edifice of the world configuration was built on a bipolar structure. The security of west European countries was not only important in the eyes of the Europeans but also in the American ones. But the end of this era in 1989-91 also put an end to this world structure and brought it into a unipolar one. The US became the world hegemon and Europe started to fear that US security priority would not remain Europe in the awakening of this structure. Therefore, some improvements occurred in terms of EU cooperation security in the framework of the conflict in Kuwait, but the main change happened because of the conflict in Ex-Yugoslavia. Especially Great Britain and France became aware of the need to develop an EU military capability in order to handle autonomous peace-keeping operations, outside of the NATO framework. The EU understood that any action developed by NATO was reliant on the US and without the support of the US the possibility to operate was restrained.</p><p>The move towards a more autonomous European security from the cooperation within NATO created a fear of loss of American influence over European politics. However, when the EU stated that NATO would remain the primary organisation to handle European security matters and that the CFSP would only reinforce the European pillar of NATO, the US appeared to support the cementation of this pillar.</p><p>France, Germany and Great Britain are contributing actively to the development of this pillar and they have all their reasons to support it. Germany is self-committed to the European integration process and cooperation in order, on one hand, to inhibit the raise of nationalism into Germany and on the other hand, to use it as a mean to play a major role in the international arena. France is a medium size power trying to keep its voice in the world arena. Its presence in the EU is marked by its strong link with Germany to enhance its role internationally. France uses the EU in order to promote its national interests. Great Britain maintains special relations vis-à-vis of the US and has not the desire to commit to any European cooperation that could hurt or threaten this link. But Great Britain changed its attitude towards its foreign and security policy due to its new interpretation of the structure during the Ex-Yugoslavian conflict. Therefore, its policy shifted in the need to develop a closer EU cooperation within the security, even if they stated that NATO still remains the primary organisation to handle European Security. This change is also strategic because Great Britain is motivated to become a EU leader instead of a spoiler.</p><p>The EU has to face a number of issues in different areas before it will be able to implement an efficient CFSP. First of all, the military capability gap that has widened the dependence on NATO military assets. Secondly, the difficult decision making process that has to deal with the domestic demands of all MS generated by a reluctance in ceding sovereignty of security matters to a qualified majority vote.</p><p>The development of the CFSP has electrified the transatlantic relations creating tensions but nothing that will damage the transatlantic link between the EU and the US. The CFSP will become complementary of NATO and not a competitor at all. The military capabilities and the domestic demands of all EU MS will guarantee this statement. The US will remain an unenthusiastic global actor in a unipolar world, pushing the international agenda in favour of a unilateral approach.</p>

The inclusion of human rights in Canadian foreign policy is typically rationalized as corresponding to the fundamental Canadian value of respect for human rights; however, Canada’s limited appeals to human rights, couched in the rhetoric of values, altruism, and morality, have not produced a substantive policy that adequately considers or sufficiently protects human rights. Although human rights are generally considered subordinate to security, economic, and other national interests, this thesis will argue that these are mutually inclusive concepts that serve to support each other. By examining Canadian engagement in Afghanistan through the theoretical perspective of the English School solidarists, this thesis contends that Canada national interest can be realized through a commitment to a human rights foreign policy, thereby providing concrete justification for the inclusion of human rights in Canadian foreign policy. The objective of such an approach is to improve Canada’s ability to protect and promote international human rights, leaving little doubt in the minds of Canadian foreign policy-makers that there is undeniable value in a human rights foreign policy and that such a policy will produce national interest ends.

The inclusion of human rights in Canadian foreign policy is typically rationalized as corresponding to the fundamental Canadian value of respect for human rights; however, Canada’s limited appeals to human rights, couched in the rhetoric of values, altruism, and morality, have not produced a substantive policy that adequately considers or sufficiently protects human rights. Although human rights are generally considered subordinate to security, economic, and other national interests, this thesis will argue that these are mutually inclusive concepts that serve to support each other. By examining Canadian engagement in Afghanistan through the theoretical perspective of the English School solidarists, this thesis contends that Canada national interest can be realized through a commitment to a human rights foreign policy, thereby providing concrete justification for the inclusion of human rights in Canadian foreign policy. The objective of such an approach is to improve Canada’s ability to protect and promote international human rights, leaving little doubt in the minds of Canadian foreign policy-makers that there is undeniable value in a human rights foreign policy and that such a policy will produce national interest ends.

East Turkestan is a geographical term and refers to Xinjiang in China. East Turkestan independence movement aims to unite the races that speak Turkestan and believe in Islam and establish a political and religious East Turkestan republic. Since 1990, East Turkestan independence movement groups have launched all kinds of violent activities in and out of Xinjiang, seriously threatening Xinjiang¡¦s social stability and Chinese Communist government. As terrorism has spread around the world since 9-11 Event, Chinese Communist government has regarded East Turkestan independence movement as a term for terrorism. Through participating in the International Anti-terrorism league, Chinese Communist government suggests East Turkestan independence movement as a target for anti-terrorism. Meanwhile, international terrorism has not been ended by the International Anti-terrorism league led by the USA, and instead terrorism has continued to spread around the world. Since 9-11 Event, anti-terrorism has become an important mission for China due to its territory completeness and national security. China carries out anti-terrorism campaign due to its national interests in a domestic political sense as well as its national interests in an international political sense, such as interests of politics, security, economics, diplomacy, and so on. In order to cope with domestic and international anti- terrorism situations, China not only takes measures in policy, law, military, diplomatic cooperation and Olympic Games, but also dominantly establishes Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) , aggressively participating in international counter-terrorism ,having an equivalent position with Russia and USA in central Asia, creating a subtle relationship of cooperation and competiveness with these two superpowers in the aspects of counter-terrorism.