Thesis (M.A.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-113). Also available via the Internet.

This thesis examines the decision to invade Iraq and the failed planning for the occupation of Iraq. Since Janis introduced groupthink in 1972, the groupthink perspective has been used to explain foreign policy disasters such as the failure to anticipate the Pearl Harbor attack and the Bay of Pigs. However, the groupthink perspective is not universally useful for explaining foreign policy mishaps. While some have attributed the Iraq war to groupthink, the groupthink perspective has not been systematically applied to these events. This thesis will examine Janis's original groupthink theory, and subsequent research that tested the effectiveness of the groupthink perspective. It will apply the groupthink perspective to the events leading up to the invasion of Iraq. It will also examine the failed planning for the occupation of Iraq. The application of the groupthink perspective to both the invasion decision and occupation planning suggests that groupthink was not the primary cause of either event. The thesis will conclude by describing alternative explanations for the decision to invade Iraq, such as ideological agenda setting, and other cognitive errors besides groupthink. / Master of Arts

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar as mudanças institucionais ocorridas no Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos entre 2001 e 2016. Ele se enquadra nas Resoluções nº 114/2014 e 115/2014 da Câmara de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul e, portanto, é dividido em três partes. A PARTE I é composta por uma contextualização do objeto, contendo uma descrição geral do objetivo do trabalho, bem como a delimitação do objeto, marco teórico, e marco temporal. A PARTE II é comporta pelo artigo em si, que analisa as mudanças no sistema do Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos através das administrações dos presidentes George W. Bush (2001-2008) e Barack Obama (2008-2016). O objetivo é demonstrar que mudanças em agencias de segurança nacional podem ser pontuais ou incrementais, dependendo das suas causas e consequências. Para tal, foram utilizadas técnicas de analise qualitativa e teoria do equilíbrio pontuado no exame de documentos oficiais e registros públicos. Primeiro, uma matriz institucional formada por normas, organizações, regras, capacidades e incentivos foi usada para comparar as mudanças no Conselho de Segurança Nacional para comparar as mudanças nas duas presidências. Em seguida, possíveis causas de mudanças selecionadas foram identificadas – design original da agencia, interesses dos atores burocráticos, ou eventos externos –, e finalmente, determinamos as consequências que essas mudanças podem ter para instituições ou politicas. A PARTE III apresenta a descrição da agenda de pesquisa a ser seguida. / This paper aims to analyze the institutional changes that took place in the National Security Council of the United States between 2001 and 2016. It is in accordance with Resolutions 114/2014 and 115/2014 of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, and therefore is divided into three parts. PART I is composed of a contextualization of the object, containing a general description of the objective of the work, as well as the delimitation of the object, theoretical framework, and time frame. PART II is composed by the article itself, which analyzes the changes in the system of the United States National Security Council through the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush (2001-2008) and Barack Obama (2008-2016). The objective is to demonstrate that changes in national security agencies can be punctual or incremental, depending on their causes and consequences. In order to do so we used techniques of qualitative analysis and theory of punctuated equilibrium in the examination of official documents and public records. First, an institutional matrix consisting of norms, organizations, rules, capabilities, and incentives was used to compare changes in the National Security Council to compare changes in the two presidencies. Then, possible causes for selected changes have been identified - original agency design, bureaucratic actors’ interests, or external events - and finally we determine the consequences that such changes can have for institutions or policies. PART III presents the description of the research agenda to be followed.

Between 1953 and 1963, during the administrations of President Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy, the United States government transformed the way it formulated and executed foreign and defense policies. These changes gave the White House its own foreign policy staff, in the form of the National Security Council, and increased the powers of the Secretary of Defense. Most of these changes began under Eisenhower in the 1950s. Eisenhower, however, delayed making several key reforms despite the recommendations of his staff. He believed some reforms were unnecessary and remained ambivalent about others. Moreover, he wanted to avoid sending complex reorganization legislation through Congress, which Eisenhower feared would allow legislators to interfere in matters of the Executive Branch. Democrats in the 1960 presidential election capitalized on the failure to push through these reforms. The Democratic attacks proved remarkably compelling to a bipartisan audience. Kennedy used this bipartisan agreement to enact many of the reforms Eisenhower had ignored. The motivating factor for many of these decisions was not merely an attempt by either President to concentrate power in the White House, it was a belief that the post-1945 world was so unstable that only giving the White House unfettered access and oversight of the levers of power could ensure the safety of the nation. This work merges Diplomatic History with the field of American Political Development to examine these dramatic changes to the structure of the US government. Historians traditionally have examined these Kennedy era administrative changes in isolation. Studying them together with those that took place under Eisenhower yields a more complete picture of how the national security state developed. Despite Eisenhower’s reluctance to adopt some of the reforms embraced by Kennedy, both presidents believed that major reforms were necessary. Any sound analysis of the ways the contemporary United States makes its foreign and defense policies requires understanding momentous changes that took place during the transformational period of the early Cold War

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar as mudanças institucionais ocorridas no Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos entre 2001 e 2016. Ele se enquadra nas Resoluções nº 114/2014 e 115/2014 da Câmara de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul e, portanto, é dividido em três partes. A PARTE I é composta por uma contextualização do objeto, contendo uma descrição geral do objetivo do trabalho, bem como a delimitação do objeto, marco teórico, e marco temporal. A PARTE II é comporta pelo artigo em si, que analisa as mudanças no sistema do Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos através das administrações dos presidentes George W. Bush (2001-2008) e Barack Obama (2008-2016). O objetivo é demonstrar que mudanças em agencias de segurança nacional podem ser pontuais ou incrementais, dependendo das suas causas e consequências. Para tal, foram utilizadas técnicas de analise qualitativa e teoria do equilíbrio pontuado no exame de documentos oficiais e registros públicos. Primeiro, uma matriz institucional formada por normas, organizações, regras, capacidades e incentivos foi usada para comparar as mudanças no Conselho de Segurança Nacional para comparar as mudanças nas duas presidências. Em seguida, possíveis causas de mudanças selecionadas foram identificadas – design original da agencia, interesses dos atores burocráticos, ou eventos externos –, e finalmente, determinamos as consequências que essas mudanças podem ter para instituições ou politicas. A PARTE III apresenta a descrição da agenda de pesquisa a ser seguida. / This paper aims to analyze the institutional changes that took place in the National Security Council of the United States between 2001 and 2016. It is in accordance with Resolutions 114/2014 and 115/2014 of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, and therefore is divided into three parts. PART I is composed of a contextualization of the object, containing a general description of the objective of the work, as well as the delimitation of the object, theoretical framework, and time frame. PART II is composed by the article itself, which analyzes the changes in the system of the United States National Security Council through the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush (2001-2008) and Barack Obama (2008-2016). The objective is to demonstrate that changes in national security agencies can be punctual or incremental, depending on their causes and consequences. In order to do so we used techniques of qualitative analysis and theory of punctuated equilibrium in the examination of official documents and public records. First, an institutional matrix consisting of norms, organizations, rules, capabilities, and incentives was used to compare changes in the National Security Council to compare changes in the two presidencies. Then, possible causes for selected changes have been identified - original agency design, bureaucratic actors’ interests, or external events - and finally we determine the consequences that such changes can have for institutions or policies. PART III presents the description of the research agenda to be followed.

Submitted by VITOR LOUREIRO SION null (vitorlsion@gmail.com) on 2016-06-21T15:09:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 vitorsiondissertacaofinal2.pdf: 2161542 bytes, checksum: a10dcf0816f17ad7d51f3d2e5a48d39c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Grisoto (grisotoana@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-06-23T16:25:48Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 sion_vl_me_mar.pdf: 2161542 bytes, checksum: a10dcf0816f17ad7d51f3d2e5a48d39c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-23T16:25:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 sion_vl_me_mar.pdf: 2161542 bytes, checksum: a10dcf0816f17ad7d51f3d2e5a48d39c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-05-31 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O trabalho analisa a política externa do governo de Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco (1964-1967). A partir do cruzamento da literatura existente com a análise das atas das reuniões do Conselho de Segurança Nacional (CSN), esta dissertação de mestrado pretende discutir as dinâmicas da diplomacia do primeiro governo da ditadura militar. O argumento deste trabalho discute a interpretação e o alcance do alinhamento automático do Brasil com os Estados Unidos entre os anos 1964 e 1967. Três aspectos centrais sustentam a visão deste trabalho: o pragmatismo da diplomacia castellista, a predominância dos condicionantes domésticos no processo de tomada de decisão e a atuação do Brasil como país semiperiférico com pretensões de ascender na hierarquia de poder do sistema internacional. O estudo do conteúdo das reuniões, que foi desclassificado e passou a ficar disponível para pesquisa apenas em 2009, é realizado no sentido de avançar na abertura da caixa preta do processo de tomada de decisão em política externa. Um dos benefícios da análise das atas do CSN consiste na possibilidade de identificar com clareza as divergências internas da ditadura militar. Outro aspecto discutido no trabalho é a evolução da política externa de Castello Branco, sobre a qual se considera que o Ato Institucional número 2 (AI-2), de outubro de 1965, representou um momento de inflexão. Argumenta-se neste trabalho que, a partir de então, a ação internacional do Brasil buscou maior autonomia, diminuindo a dependência em relação à superpotência ocidental. / This paper analyzes Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco’s foreign policy (1964-1967). By comparing the existing literature to the National Security Council (CSN)’s minutes, it examines the dynamics of the country’s diplomacy during Brazil’s first military government. It interprets and discusses the scope of Brazil’s automatic alignment with the United States between 1964 and 1967. There are three key aspects to support its conclusions: the pragmatism of Castello Branco’s diplomacy, the predominance of domestic constraints in the decision-making processes and Brazil’s actions as a semi-peripheral country aiming to rise in the international hierarchy power system. CSN’s meetings were declassified and available for research only in 2009. The study of its contents aims at opening the black box of the foreign policy’s decision-making process. One of the benefits of analyzing CSN´s minutes is the possibility of clearly identify internal divergences in the military dictatorship. This paper also discusses the evolution of Castello Branco's foreign policy, considering the Institutional Act No. 2 (AI-2), issued in October 1965, a turning point. Since then, Brazil has sought greater autonomy internationally, reducing its dependence of the United States, even during Castello Branco´s government.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar as mudanças institucionais ocorridas no Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos entre 2001 e 2016. Ele se enquadra nas Resoluções nº 114/2014 e 115/2014 da Câmara de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul e, portanto, é dividido em três partes. A PARTE I é composta por uma contextualização do objeto, contendo uma descrição geral do objetivo do trabalho, bem como a delimitação do objeto, marco teórico, e marco temporal. A PARTE II é comporta pelo artigo em si, que analisa as mudanças no sistema do Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos através das administrações dos presidentes George W. Bush (2001-2008) e Barack Obama (2008-2016). O objetivo é demonstrar que mudanças em agencias de segurança nacional podem ser pontuais ou incrementais, dependendo das suas causas e consequências. Para tal, foram utilizadas técnicas de analise qualitativa e teoria do equilíbrio pontuado no exame de documentos oficiais e registros públicos. Primeiro, uma matriz institucional formada por normas, organizações, regras, capacidades e incentivos foi usada para comparar as mudanças no Conselho de Segurança Nacional para comparar as mudanças nas duas presidências. Em seguida, possíveis causas de mudanças selecionadas foram identificadas – design original da agencia, interesses dos atores burocráticos, ou eventos externos –, e finalmente, determinamos as consequências que essas mudanças podem ter para instituições ou politicas. A PARTE III apresenta a descrição da agenda de pesquisa a ser seguida. / This paper aims to analyze the institutional changes that took place in the National Security Council of the United States between 2001 and 2016. It is in accordance with Resolutions 114/2014 and 115/2014 of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, and therefore is divided into three parts. PART I is composed of a contextualization of the object, containing a general description of the objective of the work, as well as the delimitation of the object, theoretical framework, and time frame. PART II is composed by the article itself, which analyzes the changes in the system of the United States National Security Council through the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush (2001-2008) and Barack Obama (2008-2016). The objective is to demonstrate that changes in national security agencies can be punctual or incremental, depending on their causes and consequences. In order to do so we used techniques of qualitative analysis and theory of punctuated equilibrium in the examination of official documents and public records. First, an institutional matrix consisting of norms, organizations, rules, capabilities, and incentives was used to compare changes in the National Security Council to compare changes in the two presidencies. Then, possible causes for selected changes have been identified - original agency design, bureaucratic actors’ interests, or external events - and finally we determine the consequences that such changes can have for institutions or policies. PART III presents the description of the research agenda to be followed.

Submitted by Jailda Nascimento (jmnascimento@pucsp.br) on 2016-09-27T19:37:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Vitor Loureiro Sion.pdf: 2057717 bytes, checksum: c8e81e6e88937167429f466046203a4b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-27T19:37:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vitor Loureiro Sion.pdf: 2057717 bytes, checksum: c8e81e6e88937167429f466046203a4b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-05-31 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Fundação São Paulo / The paper analyzes the foreign policy of Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco government's (1964-1967). From the intersection of the existing literature with the analysis of the minutes of meetings of the National Security Council (CSN), this dissertation discusses the dynamics of the diplomacy of the first government of the military dictatorship. The argument of this paper discusses the interpretation and scope of the automatic alignment of Brazil with the United States between the years 1964 and 1967. Three key aspects support the vision of this work: the pragmatism of Castello Branco´s diplomacy, the predominance of domestic constraints in decision-making and the action of Brazil as a country with semi-peripheral claims to rise in the international system power hierarchy. The study of the content of the CSN´s meetings, which was declassified and went on to be available for research only in 2009, is carried out in order to advance in the opening of the black box of the decision-making process in foreign policy. One of the benefits of the CSN´s minutes analysis is the ability to clearly identify the internal differences in the military dictatorship. Another aspect discussed in the paper is the evolution of Castello Branco's foreign policy, on which it considers that the Institutional Act No. 2 (AI-2), in October 1965, was a turning point. Since then, it is considered that international action of Brazil sought greater autonomy, reducing the dependence on Western superpower / O trabalho analisa a política externa do governo de Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco (1964-1967). A partir do cruzamento da literatura existente com a análise das atas das reuniões do Conselho de Segurança Nacional (CSN), esta dissertação de mestrado pretende discutir as dinâmicas da diplomacia do primeiro governo da ditadura militar. O argumento deste trabalho discute a interpretação e o alcance do alinhamento automático do Brasil com os Estados Unidos entre os anos 1964 e 1967. Três aspectos centrais sustentam a visão deste trabalho: o pragmatismo da diplomacia castellista, a predominância dos condicionantes domésticos no processo de tomada de decisão e a atuação do Brasil como país semiperiférico com pretensões de ascender na hierarquia de poder do sistema internacional. O estudo do conteúdo das reuniões, que foi desclassificado e passou a ficar disponível para pesquisa apenas em 2009, é realizado no sentido de avançar na abertura da caixa preta do processo de tomada de decisão em política externa. Um dos benefícios da análise das atas do CSN consiste na possibilidade de identificar com clareza as divergências internas da ditadura militar. Outro aspecto discutido no trabalho é a evolução da política externa de Castello Branco, sobre a qual se considera que o Ato Institucional número 2 (AI-2), de outubro de 1965, representou um momento de inflexão. Argumenta-se neste trabalho que, a partir de então, a ação internacional do Brasil buscou maior autonomia, diminuindo a dependência em relação à superpotência ocidental

This thesis examines the construction of ideology in three public speeches held by the Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Shamkhani. Shamkhani’s position makes him one of the most powerful public officials in Iran, with vast influence over domestic and international security matters, including over Iran’s nuclear negotiations. This thesis presents theories on discourse analysis as ideology analysis, which enables identification of linguistical ideologization. With this theory as backdrop, three speeches with varying content and context are analysed in order to determine whether or not Shamkhani is constructing ideology in them. Political officials are arguably expected to ideologize speeches to a certain extent. Even though Shamkhani enjoys a similar seniority as many politicians, Shamkhani’s position remains formally apolitical, which makes it is interesting to analysis his speeches. Linguistic analyses of public speeches in Iran are rarely deployed when attempting to understand the Islamic Republic but given the attention Iranian officials themselves ascribe their language, a discourse analysis of what they say might disclose otherwise hidden qualities in their communications. Through the speeches’ diverse content in written, orally formal and orally colloquial Farsi, it was possible not only to establish that Shamkhani uses discourse to construct ideology but also to what extent this is done, depending on modes of communication.

Intelligence services are vital security systém elements of each democratic state. Access to the important intels without any lags is basic for state to survive. No state, nor the democratic nor the totalitarian can survive withou intelligence. On the other hand, strong based and rooted oversight is nature in democratic states. Basic purpose of this work is in examination of the situation in the Czech republic, where intelligence systém reform should be prepared as soon as possible. Especially in the light of missuse of the military intelligence by prime minister's mistress in 2013. In advance, the limits of current oversight methods and systém should be find. Deborah Stone's, proffesor of Dartmouth university, in the Czech republic rare theory called Policy Paradox is used as main for this work. It was choosen because it brings new view on the current intelligence system setup and its oversight. This analytical model see creation of public policy as continuous clash of personal and public interests. In advanced it is in opposition to the traditional view of policy from the market perspective and it provide new view as ancient polis where you have to beer the public interest on your mind. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)