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The Political Economy Of Spanish Financial Sector And Foreign PolicyTekinbas, Ege 01 June 2009 (has links) (PDF)
This thesis analyses the Spanish financial system and foreign policy from a political economy point of view. The foundation, development and transformation of the financial elite in Spain and its affiliations with the policy-making elite are the main concerns of this study.
The traditionally complex and interlocking relationship between the financial elite and the policy-making elite in Spain is a perfect showcase to demonstrate how policy and economy affect each other interchangeably. The financial system of Spain has always been highly oligopolistic which led to the continuation of its traditional political and economical protection for many decades before, during and after the liberalisation process went underway. This traditional protection has a very unique characteristic given the fact that it survived nearly a century, under a succession of various political and regulatory regimes with very different ideological agendas. &ldquo / How could the banking sector preserve its power and influence under many different political ideals and economic orientations&rdquo / is one the questions to which an answer is sought in this study. Naturally, this answer also covers the origins and structure of the power and influence that the financial elite held over the domestic and foreign policies of the country.
Also, the mutual and complex relationship between economy and foreign policy as well as policy-making elite and economic elite, is analysed in this thesis. In other words, the consequences of the shifts in foreign and domestic policy agendas on the Spanish financial elite are studied.
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Campeões nacionais: o papel do BNDES e a atuação do sistema brasileiro de defesa da concorrênciaAlmeida, Saulo Felipe Caldeira de 13 August 2012 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2012-08-13 / The scope of this dissertation is to analyze a specific movement of the current Brazilian industrial policy, which organizes its tools to assist certain companies in a real training exercise of national champions. But that, is presents an exhaustive researches about the publications of main agent of Brazilian government at implementation of this policy, the
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social BNDES [Brazilian Development Bank]. From the results of this research, as actually observed how this movement occurs, identifying those are this national champions and which operations of BNDES have fostered this movement. As a result, after identifying the criticisms that are made to this model, in which circumstances these national champions were subjected to the Brazilian Antitrust Authorities, we highlight its main performances and analyzed its decisions. / O escopo da presente dissertação é analisar um movimento especifico da atual política industrial brasileira, que organiza seus instrumentos para auxiliar determinadas empresas num verdadeiro exercício de formação de campeões nacionais. Para tanto, apresenta-se uma exaustiva pesquisa sobre as publicações do principal agente do governo brasileiro na implementação desta política, o Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social - BNDES. A partir do resultado desta pesquisa, se observa como realmente ocorre este movimento, identificando quem são estes campeões nacionais e quais as operações do BNDES fomentaram este movimento. Na sequência, após identificar as críticas que se fazem a este modelo, verificamos em que circunstancias estes campeões nacionais foram submetidos ao Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência, elencamos suas principais atuações e analisamos suas decisões.
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State ownership and Brazilian multinational enterprises: degree of internationalization and financial performanceCarrera Junior, José Marcos 21 June 2018 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2018-06-21 / State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a mechanism adopted by emerging countries to fulfill the need for investment in specific areas. Under import substitution industrialization (ISI) policy marked by state intervention in the economy, SOEs and national private companies became protected from foreign competition and enjoyed great market power. However, economic shocks during the 1970s and 1980s, along with the growing inefficiency of these enterprises due to agency problems, led to losses. During the 1990s, Latin-American countries opened their economy and undertook privatization programs. However, since strong national companies may be useful for the State because they control strategic resources, and in order to maintain national sovereignty by preventing the acquisition of SOEs by foreign investors, the Brazilian State kept a minority equity stake in these companies. In addition, the Brazilian State also invested in some companies to make them globally competitive ("national champions"), while also holding minority equity stakes to avoid their acquisition by foreigners. We argue that the government has not abandoned its previous policy of intervention in the economy, instead, it has adapted it to new circumstances. We evaluate the influence of state ownership on the companies’ degree of internationalization and performance. SOEs may perform worse than privately controlled firms because of agency problems, while government as a minority shareholder can assist firms by providing financial and political resources. Analyzing a panel of non-financial listed companies in Brazil between 2002 and 2016, we found that the higher the state ownership by means of pension funds and BNDES, the higher the degree of internationalization measured by the foreign sales to total sales ratio. The degree of internationalization was even higher when the government was the minority shareholder of family-controlled companies. Analyzing the impact of state ownership on firm-level financial performance, we found that firms in which the government was one of the shareholders did not underperform in comparison to privately controlled firms before the Brazilian crisis of 2014- 2016 crisis. However, during the crisis, when government support decreased, we verified that the relation between majority state ownership and financial performance measured by the return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q was negative. Although negative, there was no statistically significant effect of minority state ownership. Our study suggests the need for governmentinvested enterprises to develop skills to perform well when they cannot rely on government assistance. Furthermore, the degree of internationalization did not soften the effects of the crisis on the firm-level financial performance, which may indicate that the domestic institutional environment has a strong influence on the performance of Brazilian companies. / Empresas públicas são um mecanismo adotado por países emergentes para suprir a necessidade de investimento em áreas específicas. Na política de industrialização por substituição de importações marcada pela intervenção do Estado na economia, protegidas da competição estrangeira, empresas públicas e privadas nacionais usufruíam de amplo poder de mercado. Entretanto, choques econômicos das décadas de 70 e 80, associados à crescente ineficiência destas empresas devido a problemas de agência, geraram perdas. Durante a década de 90, os países latino-americanos, abriram sua economia e adotaram programas de privatizações. Empresas nacionais fortes podem ser úteis ao Estado por controlarem recursos estratégicos, e visando manter a soberania nacional, para evitar que as empresas públicas fossem adquiridas por investidores estrangeiros, e para continuar mantendo influência sobre sua gestão, o Estado brasileiro manteve uma participação acionária minoritária. Além disso, o governo brasileiro investiu em algumas empresas para torná-las competitivas globalmente (“campeãs nacionais”), mantendo também participação minoritária para evitar sua aquisição por estrangeiros e manter influência sobre elas. Argumentamos que o governo não abandonou sua política de intervenção na economia, apenas a adaptou à novas circunstâncias. Empresas públicas podem performar pior do que empresas privadas devido a problemas de agência, ao passo que o governo como acionista minoritário pode auxiliar as empresas ao prover recursos financeiros e políticos. Desta forma, avaliamos a influência da propriedade do Estado sobre o grau de internacionalização e desempenho financeiro das empresas. Analisando um painel de companhias não financeiras listadas entre 2002 e 2016, verificamos que quanto maior o nível de participação do governo brasileiro na propriedade, principalmente por meio de fundos de pensão e BNDES, maior o grau de internacionalização medido pela razão entre as vendas no mercado externo e vendas totais. O grau de internacionalização foi ainda maior quando o governo foi o acionista minoritário de empresas controladas por famílias. Ao analisar o impacto da propriedade estatal na performance financeira das empresas, verificamos que embora antes da crise brasileira de 2014-2016 as empresas que tinham o governo como acionista não tiveram um desempenho pior do que empresa privadas, durante a crise, quando o suporte governamental diminuiu, a relação entre participação majoritária do estado e desempenho foi fortemente negativa, ao passo que embora negativo, não houve efeito estatisticamente significativo da participação minoritária, evidenciando a necessidade das empresas investidas pelo governo em criarem competências para performarem bem mesmo sem o apoio estatal. O grau de internacionalização não amenizou os efeitos da crise para as empresas analisadas, o que pode indicar que o ambiente institucional do país de origem tem forte peso no desempenho das empresas.
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