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Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis analyzes a range of possible future scenarios governing security conditions in the Persian Gulf, in order to determine future requirements for forward-deployed Naval forces in the region. Examination of the past 30 years of U.S. Naval activity in the Persian Gulf provides examples of a full spectrum of deployment options ranging from a nominal presence in the 1970's to the recent deployment of forces unmatched in naval history. Two contrasting scenarios, "best case" and "worst case" are proposed by way of establishing a framework to evaluate the naval presence requirements that may arise in the future. Factors that could effect naval presence in the Gulf are success or failure of nationbuilding in Iraq, the path Iran takes regarding weapons of mass destruction, the progress of the Global War on Terrorism and the perception of American forces by the Arab world. These scenarios reveal the need for sustained naval presence in order to meet the future trends in the Persian Gulf. The Navy's recently implemented Fleet Response Plan calls for "deployment for a purpose." The purpose of naval forces in the Persian Gulf is clear: to provide persistent maritime dominance, power projection and effective crisis response. / Lieutenant, United States Naval Reserve

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This study explores the role of the Royal Navy's North American squadron in protecting Britain's colonies and trade in North America from 1847 to 1815. The squadron had its origins in the war of 1739--48, when it became clear that a fleet based on the eastern Atlantic or the West Indies could not adequately support operations in the North American theatre. The British naval establishment, however, even when North America was the principle theatre of war, never developed as strong an attachment to the North American squadron as it did to its fleets in the West Indies or other theatres. It was, with a few notable exceptions, generally treated as one of the lesser commands of the Royal Navy, and rarely received more than secondary consideration from the Admiralty. This was especially true during the Napoleonic Wars, in which the North American station was viewed a one of the 'quiet' stations, especially when compared to the more active stations in the West Indies. / England's main priority was in defeating France, and she was willing to achieve this at the expense of antagonizing the United States, leading to an unnecessary war with them in 1812. Yet even when faced with a new war in North America, the needs of the squadron were considered of secondary importance to the war in Europe, and several months passed before sizable reinforcements were sent to the North American theatre. Even when the war in Europe ended in 1814, the British leaders continued to treat North America as a secondary theatre. Their efforts to gain victory were at best half-hearted, and the government was more interested in demobilizing the navy to cut costs than in defeating the United States. / The War of 1812 brought little glory to England or the Royal Navy, and there was much criticism in the way the conflict was fought after the war. The inability of England's leaders to correctly read the situation in the United States or to understand the American threat led them to send forces inadequate to wage more than a limited war in North America. Despite this, the performance of the North American Squadron in this period was far more commendable than has generally been acknowledged, especially in light of the handicaps set upon it. This work will give a detailed description of the operations of the squadron, to give a better understanding of its role in this period.

Note: / This study explores the role of the Royal Na'vy's North American Squadron in protecting Britain' s colonies and trade in North America from 1807 to 1815. The squadron had its origins in the war of 1739-48, when it became clear that a fleet based on the eastem Atlantic or the West Indies could not adequately support operations in the North American theatre. The British naval establishment, however, even when North America was the principle theatre of war, never developed as strong an attachment to the North American Squadron as it did to its fleets in the West Indies or other theatres. It was, with a few notable exceptions, generally treated as one of the lesser commands of the Royal Navy, and rarely received more than secondary consideration from the Admiralty. This was especially true during the Napoleonic Wars, in which the North American station was viewed a one of the 'quiet' stations, especially when compared to the more active stations in the West Indies. / Notre étude trace le role de la marine britannique en Amérique du Nord entre 1807 et 1815. L'origine de la flotte remonte à la guerre de 1739-48, quand c'était devenu évident que les flottes dans le secteur de l'est Atlantique ou dans les Antilles n'étaient pas capables de supporter des opérations en Amérique du Nord. Mais cette flotte était rarement considérée comme une des flottes importantes dans la marine britannique. Ceci était le cas durant la guerre contre Napoléon, quand la flotte américaine protégeait un secteur perçu comme tranquille comparativement à la flotte antillaise, elle plus active.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 5, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

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This dissertation investigates the reasons behind combined military and naval offensive expeditions that Great Britain conducted outside of Europe during the Great War. It argues that they were not unnecessary adjuncts to the war in Europe, but they fulfilled an important strategic purpose by protecting British trade where it was most vulnerable. Trade was not a luxury for the British; it was essential for maintaining the island nation's way of life, a vital interest and a matter of national survival. Great Britain required freedom of the seas in order to maintain its global trade. A general war in Europe threatened Great Britain's economic independence with the potential of losing its continental trading partners. The German High Seas Fleet constituted a serious threat that also placed the British coast at grave risk forcing the Royal Navy to concentrate in home waters. This dissertation argues that the several combined military and naval operations against overseas territories constituted parts of an overarching strategy designed to facilitate the Royal Navy's gaining command of the seas. Using documents from the Cabinet, the Foreign and Colonial Offices, the War Office, and the Admiralty, plus personal correspondence and papers of high-ranking government officials, this dissertation demonstrates that the Offensive Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense drafted the campaign plan. Subsequently, the plan received Cabinet approval, and then the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, and the Colonial Office coordinated with allies and colonies to execute the operations necessary to prosecute the campaign. In Mesopotamia, overseas expeditions directed against the Ottoman Empire protected communications with India and British oil concessions in Persia. The combined operations against German territories exterminated the logistics and intelligence hubs that supported Germany's commerce raiders thereby protecting Britain's world-wide trade and its overseas possessions. / History

This dissertation relates to the dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord from November 1916 to December 1917, by Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, at the behest of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. The dismissal was peremptory and effected without rational explanation, despite Jellicoe having largely fulfilled his primary mission of combating the German U-boat threat to British merchant shipping. The outcome of the war may well have been affected if the level of shipping losses sustained through U-boat attack in April 1917 had continued unabated. The central argument of the dissertation is that the dismissal was unjustified. As an adjunct, it argues that the received view of certain historians that Jellicoe was not successful as First Sea Lord is unwarranted and originates from severe post war critism of Jellicoe by those with a vested interest in justifying the dismissal, notably Lloyd George. Supporting these arguments, the following assertions are made. Firstly, given the legacy Jellicoe inherited when joining the Admiralty, through the strategies adopted, organisational changes made and initiatives undertaken in anti-submarine weapons development, the progress made in countering the U-boat threat was notable. Secondly, the universal criticism directed at the Admiralty over the perceived delay in introducing a general convoy system for merchant shipping is not sustainable having regard to primary source documentation. Thirdly, incidents that occurred during the latter part of 1917, and suggested as being factors which contributed to the dismissal, can be discounted. Fourthly, Lloyd George conspired to involve General Haig, Commander of the British Forces France, and the press baron, Lord Northcliffe, in his efforts to mitigate any potential controversy that might result from Jellicoe's removal from office. Finally, the arguments made by a number of commentators that the Admiralty performed better under Jellicoe's successor, Admiral Wemyss, is misconceived.

This dissertation is an examination of the operations of U.S. battleships in World War I. The study examines tactical cooperation between units of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the British Grand Fleet and relations between the two navies; the efficiency of U.S. battleships in terms of both personnel and material; and the strategic ideas of U.S. naval leaders governing the use of capital ships. The manuscript is based primarily on records of the Department of the Navy in the National Archives and Admiralty records at the Public Record Office. Also important are the private papers of principal naval leaders, located at the Library of Congress and the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, U.K. The published memoirs of several of the participants are also utilized. The first chapter examines Anglo-American naval relations and traces diplomatic events leading to the U.S. Navy Department's decision to dispatch dreadnought battleships to European waters. The following two chapters discuss the amalgamation of Battleship Division Nine into the British Grand Fleet. Chapter IV examines the gunnery efficiency of U.S. battleships serving with the Grand Fleet. Chapter V reviews Anglo-American planning for a possible German battle cruiser raid against the Atlantic convoys. Chapter VI deals with the movement of Battleship Division Six to Berehaven, Ireland. Chapter VII discusses the use of pre-dreadnought battleships as training ships, convoy escorts, and troop transports. The study concludes that U.S. battleships made a subsidiary, but important contribution toward victory at sea. The addition of U.S. battleships allowed the Allies to protect Scandinavian commerce and the supply lines from the United States from German surface raiders while also maintaining superiority in the North Sea.