The Laird rams, built from 1862-1865, reflected concepts of naval power in transition from the broadside of multiple guns, to the rotating turret with only a few very heavy pieces of ordnance. These two ironclads were experiments built around the two new offensive concepts for armoured warships at that time: the ram and the turret. These sister armourclads were a collection of innovative designs and compromises packed into smaller spaces. A result of the design leap forward was they suffered from too much, too soon, in too limited a hull area. The turret ships were designed and built rapidly for a Confederate Navy desperate for effective warships. As a result of this urgency, the pair of twin turreted armoured rams began as experimental warships and continued in that mode for the next thirty five years. They were armoured ships built in secrecy, then floated on the Mersey under the gaze of international scrutiny and suddenly purchased by Britain to avoid a war with the United States. Once purchased, they were largely forgotten. Historians rarely mention these two sister ironclads and if mentioned at all, they are given short shrift. Built with funds obtained in part through the Confederate Erlanger loan, these ironclads were constructed at Lairds shipyard in Birkenhead and represented an advanced concept of ironclad construction through new proposals involving turrets, the ram, heavy guns and tripod masts on an armoured ship, as advocated by Captain Cowper Coles, R.N. They proved too much of a leap in one design but when their roles caught up to the revised designs, the ships were modified to meet new requirements. After several mission and design changes they then performed to standard. This belated success occurred when the concept of the ideal armoured warship was in flux throughout the middle Victorian years.

"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009." / Advisor(s): King, Cynthia. ; Salem, Anita. "December 2009." "MBA Professional report"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on April 12, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Energy Conservation; Strategic Communication; U.S. Navy Energy Conservation Programs; Motivations; Incentives; Behavior Change Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-87). Also available in print.

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This thesis presents a new analysis of British naval policy before and during the First World War which challenges both orthodox and revisionist interpretations of the period and highlights a highly significant yet much neglected facet of Admiralty planning. It argues that safeguarding the British Isles from invasion was one of the Admiralty’s prime concerns between 1888 and 1918 and that these defensive considerations played a hitherto unappreciated role in shaping British naval strategy. By exploiting source material generally overlooked by previous writers, it demonstrates that, contrary to popular historical belief, Britain’s naval leadership planned extensively to ensure the inviolability of the British coastline during this period. Before 1900, these plans were characterized by relying upon an extensive flotilla of small vessels, supported by a small number of old armoured warships, to secure the position in the Channel and North Sea, while the Navy’s most modern warships focused upon the main French Fleet in the Mediterranean. The Admiralty’s willingness to rely primarily upon flotilla craft for home defence ended after 1900, however, when German displaced France as Britain’s primary naval rival. Germany posed a very different threat to Britain than had previously been the case with France, since it possessed a merchant marine large enough to transport a significant military force without major disruption to the normal operation of its commerce and had her naval forces concentrated in northern waters. Despite the paucity of German planning for the invasion of the United Kingdom, the Admiralty became haunted by the possibility of a ‘surprise’ German invasion attempt, launched before the outset of war and escorted by a strong German Fleet. The Admiralty identified the danger of a surprise German raid or invasion by early 1907 and formed a series of highly secretive plans to deploy the Navy’s most modern armoured warships into the North Sea at the outset of war to meet this danger. These plans were updated constantly between 1910 and 1918 as perceptions of the German threat developed. The nature and extent of these plans has highly significant implications for our understanding of naval policy throughout the period, and for our appreciation of the role of sea power during the First World War.

This thesis is concerned chiefly with the military role of sea power during the English Civil War. Parliament’s seizure of the Royal Navy in 1642 is examined in detail, with a discussion of the factors which led to the King’s loss of the fleet and the consequences thereafter. It is concluded that Charles I was outmanoeuvred politically, whilst Parliament’s choice to command the fleet, the Earl of Warwick, far surpassed him in popularity with the common seamen. The thesis then considers the advantages which control of the Navy provided for Parliament throughout the war, determining that the fleet’s protection of London, its ability to supply besieged outposts and its logistical support to Parliamentarian land forces was instrumental in preventing a Royalist victory. Furthermore, it is concluded that Warwick’s astute leadership went some way towards offsetting Parliament’s sporadic neglect of the Navy. The thesis demonstrates, however, that Parliament failed to establish the unchallenged command of the seas around the British Isles. This was because of the Royalists’ widespread privateering operations, aided in large part by the King’s capture of key ports in 1643, such as Dartmouth and Bristol. The Navy was able to block many, but not all, of the King’s arms shipments from abroad, thus permitting Charles to supply his armies in England. Close attention is paid to the Royalist shipping which landed reinforcements from Ireland in 1643-44. The King’s defeat in the First Civil War is then discussed, with the New Model Army, and greater resources, cited as the key factors behind Parliament’s victory, with recognition that the Navy provided essential support. Finally, the revolt of the fleet in 1648 is examined. It is concluded that the increasing radicalism of Parliament alienated a substantial section of the Navy, but that the Royalists failed to capitalise on their new-found maritime strength.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis compares characteristics that influence intended stay/leave behavior of non prior service junior naval officers from two different time periods. Samples of officers, under the rank of lieutenant, with less then six years of active duty service from the 1992 and 1999 Department of Defense Surveys of Active Duty Personnel were used for this analysis. Metrics for important determinates of retention were constructed using similar questions from both surveys. Logistic regression was used to identify significant influences on retention intentions in both survey years. Two composite dimensions positively affected retention intentions in both survey years: satisfaction with Service Attributes and satisfaction with Present Employment Attributes. Being female negatively affected retention intentions in both surveys. The minority variable, Black, the number of PCS moves, and having debt greater than $7 ,500 positively affected retention intentions, while being stationed onboard a ship, probability of finding a civilian job, and the composite dimension, satisfaction with Future Employment Attributes, negatively affected retention intentions in 1992. Influence from a significant other and the number of hours worked positively affected retention in 1999. Monetary variables were highly significant for retention intentions in 1992 but not in 1999. It is likely that the force drawdown, base closures, and a weak economy in 1992 explain these differences. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

The Royal Navy, and especially its leadership, is perceived to have performed poorly in the First World War and its officers have been described as being automatons who only came alive when directed by superiors. By contrast in the Second World War the Royal Navy and its officers are seen as having ‘done well,’ displaying flair and initiative. There does not appear to have been any attempt to look in any detail at what, if anything, changed in the twenty years between the wars to explain the perceived improvement. This thesis critically examines the executive branch of the Royal Navy, and contends that the navy adapted and modified the training of its officers to meet whatever was required of them; when they were required to passively obey orders as in the Grand Fleet of the First World War, they had been trained for that eventuality, when to show initiative likewise. During the 1920s the officer corps was mismanaged and morale and motivation suffered badly. The influence of the Admiralty civil service, the repository of institutional memory, which managed junior officers’ careers, was conservative and resistant to change. Changes in training both before and after the mutiny at Invergordon (September 1931) brought the officer corps up to date and set it on track for its outstanding performance in the next war, in particular recognising that leadership was not an innate class based ability, but had to be taught and developed. However, the navy had since the latter part of the nineteenth century changed the emphasis of officer’s career paths; specialist training was seen as the ‘route to the top’ and command was downgraded as a necessary part of an officer’s career development. It was only during the latter part of Second World War that having exercised command at sea was recognised as being an important part of an officer’s experience. The thesis also addresses the ‘RNVR myth’ that the Royal Navy was only able to prosecute the Second World War successfully because of an influx of well educated temporary officers and that they were the major driving force. This thesis has been largely based on primary sources, including personnel records which have not been studied before and have been examined in such a way as to allow statistical analysis.

This study consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 is a study of the motives and intent of Congress in creating a navy. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the operations conducted by the Marine Committee, Chapter 2 being devoted to its early operations and Chapter 3 to its later operations. Chapters 4 and 5 examine, in turn, the work of the Board of Admiralty and the Agency of Marine.

Trauma is arguably the most comparative and least ambiguous of palaeopathological lesions. As such, it is an ideal vehicle for exploring the respective contributions and differences between historical and osteological approaches to health in the past. A direct comparison between historical and osteological assemblages is often impossible due to the lack of comparable data, or complicated by the very different perceptions, motivations and pre-occupations of past writers and present researchers. Nevertheless, where genuine opportunities exist to compare and contrast the alternative strands of evidence, it may lead to a much richer and more nuanced understanding of the past. This study uses trauma in the late 18^th- to early 19^th century British Royal Navy (R.N.) to explore the differences between the two disciplines, and through this process to come to a deeper understanding of the physical effects of a maritime lifestyle on the health of late 18th- to early 19th century R.N. seamen and marines. The 18^th- and early 19^th century R.N. is one of the best documented institutions of its day, with a large corpus of records accessible in the National Archives in Kew. Recent archaeological excavations in the burial grounds of the three R.N. hospitals of the 18^th century in Britain- the Royal Hospitals Haslar in Gosport, Stonehouse in Plymouth and Greenwich Hospital in South-East London- have made available over 300 skeletons of seamen and marines, who were treated but died in these institutions. This study explores the osteological evidence for fractures and joint trauma patterning in 300 of these skeletons. Eighteenth century accounts of the privations and dangers of sailing a fighting ship are well supported osteologically by the presence of 926 fractures and 14 joint dislocations. Osteological trauma patterning was compared with historical data collated from the Haslar and Plymouth Hospital musters (1792-1824) and Entry Books of Greenwich Hospital (1749-1765). The most probable aetiology of injuries was explored using insights from modern medical and forensic research, and 18^th century sea surgeons' journals. Falls accounted for a very high proportion of injuries in both datasets, as did crush injuries, and to a much lesser extent, battle trauma. Extremely high rates of nasal fractures, Bennett's fractures of the first metacarpal, and anterior rib fractures in the skeletal assemblages strongly suggest very high rates of casual interpersonal violence. Interestingly, these injuries were very seldom recorded in either sea surgeon or hospital records, possibly due to seamen's fear of punishment for transgressing official naval regulations against fighting. Several unusual fractures (such as Shepherd's fractures of the talus, and third metacarpal avulsion fractures) and bony modifications (such as shallow and unstable hip and shoulder joints, os acromiale and Eagle's syndrome) appear to be the consequences of engaging in a maritime lifestyle, often beginning in childhood or adolescence. Trauma is arguably the most comparative and least ambiguous of palaeopathological lesions. As such, it is an ideal vehicle for exploring the respective contributions and differences between historical and osteological approaches to health in the past. A direct comparison between historical and osteological assemblages is often impossible due to the lack of comparable data, or complicated by the very different perceptions, motivations and pre-occupations of past writers and present researchers. Nevertheless, where genuine opportunities exist to compare and contrast the alternative strands of evidence, it may lead to a much richer and more nuanced understanding of the past. This study uses trauma in the late 18th- to early 19th century British Royal Navy (R.N.) to explore the differences between the two disciplines, and through this process to come to a deeper understanding of the physical effects of a maritime lifestyle on the health of late 18th- to early 19th century R.N. seamen and marines. The 18th- and early 19th century R.N. is one of the best documented institutions of its day, with a large corpus of records accessible in the National Archives in Kew. Recent archaeological excavations in the burial grounds of the three R.N. hospitals of the 18th century in Britain- the Royal Hospitals Haslar in Gosport, Stonehouse in Plymouth and Greenwich Hospital in South-East London- have made available over 300 skeletons of seamen and marines, who were treated but died in these institutions. This study explores the osteological evidence for fractures and joint trauma patterning in 300 of these skeletons. Eighteenth century accounts of the privations and dangers of sailing a fighting ship are well supported osteologically by the presence of 926 fractures and 14 joint dislocations. Osteological trauma patterning was compared with historical data collated from the Haslar and Plymouth Hospital musters (1792-1824) and Entry Books of Greenwich Hospital (1749-1765). The most probable aetiology of injuries was explored using insights from modern medical and forensic research, and 18th century sea surgeons’ journals. Falls accounted for a very high proportion of injuries in both datasets, as did crush injuries, and to a much lesser extent, battle trauma. Extremely high rates of nasal fractures, Bennett’s fractures of the first metacarpal, and anterior rib fractures in the skeletal assemblages strongly suggest very high rates of casual interpersonal violence. Interestingly, these injuries were very seldom recorded in either sea surgeon or hospital records, possibly due to seamen’s fear of punishment for transgressing official naval regulations against fighting. Several unusual fractures (such as Shepherd’s fractures of the talus, and third metacarpal avulsion fractures) and bony modifications (such as shallow and unstable hip and shoulder joints, os acromiale and Eagle’s syndrome) appear to be the consequences of engaging in a maritime lifestyle, often beginning in childhood or adolescence.