O presente trabalho abordará uma das mais polêmicas abordagens da segunda metade do século XX sobre Direito Internacional, a Escola de New Haven, a qual, segundo o discurso tradicional dos internacionalistas, teria maculado a distinção entre direito e política, tornando aquele instrumento desta ou, em outra versão, teria resumido o direito à política. Apesar de as críticas à proposta formarem um coro consistente, este estudo visará a demonstrar que, para fugir dos pré-conceitos, a Escola precisa ser lida na sua integralidade, e não apenas pelos julgamentos negativos, pois somente no todo se encontra a explicação para as suas idiossincrasias. Para cumprir essa tarefa, a Escola será estudada sob três óticas: a Escola de New Haven por seus contextos, a Escola de New Haven por ela mesma e a Escola de New Haven por seus defensores e críticos. / The present study will discuss one of the most controversial approaches of the second half of the twentieth century, the New Haven School, which, according to the traditional discourse of internationalists, would have tainted the distinction between law and politics, making the former instrument of the latter, or, in another version, it would have summed up law into politics. Despite the strong criticisms against the School, this study aims to demonstrate that, to escape from the preconceptions, it would be necessary to read the School in its entirely, and not from the perspective of the critics, because this would be the best way to understand its idiosyncrasies. To fulfill this task, it will be studied the New Haven School from three points of view: New Haven School by its contexts, New Haven School by itself, and New Haven School by its advocates and critics.

O presente trabalho abordará uma das mais polêmicas abordagens da segunda metade do século XX sobre Direito Internacional, a Escola de New Haven, a qual, segundo o discurso tradicional dos internacionalistas, teria maculado a distinção entre direito e política, tornando aquele instrumento desta ou, em outra versão, teria resumido o direito à política. Apesar de as críticas à proposta formarem um coro consistente, este estudo visará a demonstrar que, para fugir dos pré-conceitos, a Escola precisa ser lida na sua integralidade, e não apenas pelos julgamentos negativos, pois somente no todo se encontra a explicação para as suas idiossincrasias. Para cumprir essa tarefa, a Escola será estudada sob três óticas: a Escola de New Haven por seus contextos, a Escola de New Haven por ela mesma e a Escola de New Haven por seus defensores e críticos. / The present study will discuss one of the most controversial approaches of the second half of the twentieth century, the New Haven School, which, according to the traditional discourse of internationalists, would have tainted the distinction between law and politics, making the former instrument of the latter, or, in another version, it would have summed up law into politics. Despite the strong criticisms against the School, this study aims to demonstrate that, to escape from the preconceptions, it would be necessary to read the School in its entirely, and not from the perspective of the critics, because this would be the best way to understand its idiosyncrasies. To fulfill this task, it will be studied the New Haven School from three points of view: New Haven School by its contexts, New Haven School by itself, and New Haven School by its advocates and critics.

Values matter in both legal decision (lawmaking and lawapplying) and discourse (lawshaping and lawinfluencing). Yet, their purported subjectivity means that gaining or improving knowledge about values (whether they be epistemic, legal, moral, ethical, economic, political, cultural, social, or religious) in the context of analytic legal thought and understanding is often said to be at odds with its goal of objectivity. This phenomenon is amplified at the international level where the infusion of seemingly subjective political values by sovereigns, and the decisionmakers to whom they delegate, can, and does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law. The discourse on value subjectivity, and its relation to the purpose and function of the law, is particularly apparent in evolving international legal orders such as investment treaty arbitration. The primary aim of this work is to provide a new method for gaining empirical knowledge about value subjectivity that can help close a weak link in all nonpositivist (value-laden) legal theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as skepticism about the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to permit its incorporation as a necessary component of analytic jurisprudence. This work proposes a theory of configurative fairness for addressing the problem related to the development or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal regimes perceived as subjectively unfair can be remedied. Such a theory accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in directing the way that legal orders develop, and that perceptions of fairness relate to the manner in which values are distributed and maximized in particular legal orders. It is posited that legal orders perceived as fair by their participants are more likely to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding (and are therefore more likely to comply with the processes and outcomes that such laws mandate). The purpose of a theory of configurative fairness is an attempt to provide a methodological bridge for improving knowledge about value in the context of legal inquiry through the employment of a technique called Q methodology: an epistemological and empirical means for the measurement and mapping of human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What Stephenson did was to create a way for systematically measuring subjective perspectives, and although not previously used in jurisprudential thought, Q methodology will facilitate a means for the description and evaluation of shared subjectivities. In the context of law generally, and in investment treaty arbitration specifically, these are the subjectivities that manifest themselves as the conflicting perspectives about value that are omnipresent in both communicative lawshaping discourse and authoritative and controlling lawmaking and lawapplying decision. Knowledge about these shared value subjectivities among participants in investment treaty arbitration will allow the legal analyst to delineate and clarify points of overlapping consensus about the desired distribution of value as they relate to the regime-building issues of evolving legal orders. The focus for a theory of configurative fairness pertains to the identification of the various value positions that participants hold about a particular legal order and to configure those values, through its rules and principles, in a manner that is acceptable (and perceived as fair) by all of its participants. If such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal order can be configured by decisionmakers in a way so as to satisfy participants’ shared value understandings. To engage such a theory, a means for identifying shared value subjectivities must be delineated. This work conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study asked participants knowledgeable about investment treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of statements about the way that the values embraced by this legal order ought to be configured. The results of the study demonstrate that there is significant overlap about how participants in investment treaty arbitration perceive the desired distribution of values across the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives that represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the development of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also able to identify where there is an overlapping consensus about value distribution across the distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that are most likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it is proposed that it is upon these shared value understandings that the future development of investment treaty arbitration ought to aim.

Les « trois organisations soeurs », à savoir la Commission du Codex Alimentarius (CCA), l’Organisation mondiale de la santé animale (OIE) et la Convention internationale pour la protection des végétaux (CIPV), et les mesures sanitaires et phytosanitaires de l’ASEAN maintiennent une relation mutuellement étroite et des rapports d’interactions complexes et multidimensionnelles, rapports qui peuvent affecter des flux d’activités d’importation et d’exportation de produits agro-alimentaires réglementées surtout par le droit international économique. En envisageant le droit comme processus de décisions, particulièrement le droit international comme processus de communication entre les différents participants de la « communauté mondiale », ces rapports peuvent être mieux identifiés et compris à tous les niveaux : multilatéral, régional, bilatéral et national. Compte tenu de l’intensité et de la fréquence des échanges et du caractère fortement interdépendant du monde d’aujourd’hui, les « trois organisations soeurs » et leurs normes, directives et recommandations sont susceptibles de jouer divers rôles dans la promotion d’une plus grande production et d’un plus large partage des valeurs fondamentales recherchées par l’humanité entière, soutenues par la « New Haven School of International Law ». Non seulement s’agit-il des rôles liés à l’augmentation de l’efficacité du processus de réduction de barrières commerciales résultant des mesures SPS protectionnistes, mais aussi de ceux qui sont peu soulignées et qui se précisent suite aux pratiques répétées des décisionnistes de l’ASEAN. Ce sont notamment les rôles en tant qu’inducteurs de performance pour les mécanismes d’encadrement de mesures SPS, afin de s’assurer que celles-ci sont raisonnables par rapport à chaque contexte spécifique et respectueuses de la dignité humaine ; en tant que catalyseurs du régionalisme ouvert ; et en tant que promoteurs de la dimension du développement dans les accords commerciaux régionaux de l’ASEAN. / The « three sisters », namely the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), and SPS measures of ASEAN maintain a mutually close relationship and can interact with one another in complex and multidimensional ways, which can affect flows of import and export activities of agro-food products regulated especially by international economic law. By perceiving law as a process of decisions, and particularly international law as a process of communication among different participants of the « world community », these interactions can be better identified and comprehended at all levels : multilateral, regional, bilateral and national. Considering the intensity and frequency of exchanges and the strong interdependency of today’s world, the « three sisters » and their standards, guidelines and recommendations are likely to play numerous roles in promoting a greater production and wider distribution of fundamental values that all human beings desire to maximize and achieve, as defended by the « New Haven School of International Law ». Not only are these roles related to the promotion of a more efficient process of eliminating trade barriers deriving from SPS protectionist measures, but also those which are insufficiently highlighted, yet becoming more obvious through repeated practices of ASEAN decision-makers. These are notably the roles of the « three sisters » as performance drivers for monitoring mechanisms of SPS measures with a view to ensuring that they are reasonable in each specific context and respectful towards human dignity; as catalysts of open regionalism ; as promoters of the development dimension in regional trade agreements concluded by ASEAN.