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This study examines the understanding of leadership in Germany, as it developed throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The investigation is based on the work of contemporary writers and thinkers, as well as on the leadership styles of key political figures. Given the ideological connotations of the term "Fûhrung" in post-war Germany, the aim is to reconsider the meaning of leadership, with particular reference to the alternative notion of spiritual guidance. The rise to power of Napoleon I fundamentally influenced the understanding of leadership in Germany, as is demonstrated through an analysis of the Napoleonic reception in contemporary literature. Despite polarised responses, the formation of the heroic ideal may be identified, the quest for spiritual guidance having become subordinate to the charismatic legitimisation of political authority. As advocated by Thomas Carlyle, the mid to late nineteenth century witnessed the realisation of this ideal through Bismarck. The intellectual response to this development is characterised by the work of Wagner, Burckhardt and Nietzsche. In different ways each figure emphasised the need to redefine greatness and to seek spiritual guidance from alternative sources. The reflection on leadership in the early twentieth century is traced through the work of Harry Graf Kessler and the circles around Stefan George. Hitherto unpublished material is examined, revealing both the influences of nineteenth century thought and reactions to the "persönliches Regiment" of Wilhelm II. The intellectual debate culminates in Max Kommerell's 1928 study Der Dichter als Fûhrer. Read in conjunction with unpublished notes and correspondence, this provides new insights into Kommerell's thought. The concept of poetic leadership constitutes a potential spiritual and intellectual alternative to the ideal of the political "Fûhrer" which dominated the forthcoming era. It therefore remains of contemporary significance and may contribute to a broader discussion of the leadership dilemma in modern Germany.

This thesis sets out to examine the idea that self-identity can be coherently viewed as a performance event. If such a proposition is supportable, it would seem to argue for attention to be paid to the nature of the activity of performing as a means to better understanding the processes of human identity. Beginning with an analysis of an early example of such a theoretical position, this thesis examines some of the central issues involved in viewing the self as performative. The agenda dictating the direction of this analysis can be summarised as an effort to provide a model of the performative self that is affirmatory rather than negative; that establishes it as a positive, rather than debilitating, fact of existence. The construction of this model is achieved in large part by the adoption of the ontological outlook contained in the philosophy of Frederich Nietzsche which, it is argued, offers a reading of the nature of human identity that avoids the sometimes reductive elements of more contemporary theories such as poststructuralism. Allied to this elaboration of a theoretical model of the self is the recognition that the theory produced within and around radical theatre practice in the West over the last century can be seen as a field of activity that has consistently argued for, and experimented with, new conceptualisations of the constituent factors of human social identities. Because of this, such theatre writings are proposed as being genuinely potent political activities; ones which continuously seeks to extend, rather than reduce, the sphere of influence of individuals in society. The contribution this thesis makes to research in the field of theatre studies, then, is in the provision of a theoretical framework within which it becomes possible to see radical theatre as a paradigmatic site of liberatory activity.

In this thesis I explore the attempt by Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche and Georges Bataille to confront the problem of the meaning and value of existence. I consider each of these philosophers as involved in the development of a stream of post-Kantian thought that, following Nick Land, I call libidinal pessimism. Libidinal pessimism is both the metaphysical principle of the primacy of willing as the fundamental reality, and the moral principle that the greatest value to our existence is to be found in liberating willing from the small-scale concern of the good of individual beings. Each sees a crisis in the dominance of optimism: the belief that willing is commensurate with the good of individuated beings. They attack the dominance of optimism not just in the history of philosophy, but also in the values that dominate the culture at large. My contention is that these thinkers were provoked to think about the meaning and value of existence by encountering the tragic sublime: a pleasure in the destruction of the happiness of the individual. This affective intensity provokes them to the realisation that our will is not directed towards the happiness of the individual, contra the dominant values of our culture. Yet since the tragic sublime is non-conceptual, its implications for the meaning and the value of existence are not explicit. The task of philosophy is to conceptualise this affective intensity to specify the inadequacy of the values that dominate the age, and to assert the values that can liberate human possibility from its current wretchedness to a new glory. To structure the thinking of these philosophers on the problem of existence, I analyse their thinking using the following logical model: 1) specifying what they regard as the predominant symptoms of the problem regarding existence, our current wretchedness; 2) their diagnosis of the source of this wretchedness in the dominant optimism; 3) their pronouncement of the solution to this problem, through liberating willing from the small-scale; and 4) their prescription for how to overcome this problem, for how the tragic sublime can liberate willing from the fetters of a concern for individuated beings. In elaborating upon the thinking of these philosophers as a definite stream of post- Kantian thought, I also highlight how each engages with the thinking of the earlier of the philosophers. I explore how Schopenhauer's philosophy develops out of Kant's philosophy, how Nietzsche develops the thinking of Schopenhauer and how Bataille develops the problematics of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Through this I attempt to explore how these three philosophers mark a development in the attempt to conceptualise the tragic sublime as the key to address the problem of the meaning and value of existence.

In this thesis Didiodato addresses a central theme in Nietzsche’s thought: namely, “life”. Nietzsche uses this term in a number of ways throughout his writings in many metaphorical, aphoristic, and often seemingly contradictory ways. This thesis attempts to flesh out what Nietzsche means by “life” by examining each of the particular ways Nietzsche uses the term in isolation. Ultimately, Didiodato argues that “life” is used in several fundamentally different ways which demonstrates Nietzsche’s criticism of metaphysical descriptions, while at the same time speaking to his emphasis on perspectivism. The thesis closes with a reflection on Nietzsche’s notion of the “affirmation of life” wherein this thesis argues that the diversity of accounts of life Nietzsche provides can find something of a unity.

This thesis aims to analyze the similarity of the change in Nietzsches and Wittgensteins approaches to the meaning of life. The main argument is that their approach to the meaning of life changed from a metaphysical perspective to an anti-metaphysical one. Nietzsche gave a metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life in the Birth of Tragedy. In this book Nietzsche conceived of Ancient Greek culture as the ideal culture since it was the product of the union of the two artistic deities: Apollo and Dionysus. This Primordial Unity (Ur-Eine), for Nietzsche, was the metaphysical essence of the world and the meaning of life was to be found in this unity. Nietzsche, later, with his new preface to the Birth of Tragedy called An Attempt at a Self-Criticism and Human All Too Human, criticized his earlier metaphysical approach to the meaning of life and shifted to an anti-metaphysical perspective. Wittgenstein had a similar shift in his thought. The Tractatus was written to explore the nature of reality and the world, and explain the relationship between the world and language. The Tractatus gave a metaphysical explanation of the nature of reality by dividing it into two levels, the world the lower and the mystical the higher. Logic, ethics, aesthetics and religion are the mystical which is the scaffolding of the world. Language, on this view, can only state the worldtotality of facts and cannot state what is higher. Ethics is about the meaning of life thus the meaning of life is higher and cannot be attained within the limits of this world. Later Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations argued against this metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life. From an anti-metaphysical point of view, Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of life can be found within the limits of this world.

This thesis aims to analyze the similarity of the change in Nietzsches and Wittgensteins approaches to the meaning of life. The main argument is that their approach to the meaning of life changed from a metaphysical perspective to an anti-metaphysical one. Nietzsche gave a metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life in the Birth of Tragedy. In this book Nietzsche conceived of Ancient Greek culture as the ideal culture since it was the product of the union of the two artistic deities: Apollo and Dionysus. This Primordial Unity (Ur-Eine), for Nietzsche, was the metaphysical essence of the world and the meaning of life was to be found in this unity. Nietzsche, later, with his new preface to the Birth of Tragedy called An Attempt at a Self-Criticism and Human All Too Human, criticized his earlier metaphysical approach to the meaning of life and shifted to an anti-metaphysical perspective. Wittgenstein had a similar shift in his thought. The Tractatus was written to explore the nature of reality and the world, and explain the relationship between the world and language. The Tractatus gave a metaphysical explanation of the nature of reality by dividing it into two levels, the world the lower and the mystical the higher. Logic, ethics, aesthetics and religion are the mystical which is the scaffolding of the world. Language, on this view, can only state the worldtotality of facts and cannot state what is higher. Ethics is about the meaning of life thus the meaning of life is higher and cannot be attained within the limits of this world. Later Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations argued against this metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of life. From an anti-metaphysical point of view, Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of life can be found within the limits of this world.

In this thesis Didiodato addresses a central theme in Nietzsche’s thought: namely, “life”. Nietzsche uses this term in a number of ways throughout his writings in many metaphorical, aphoristic, and often seemingly contradictory ways. This thesis attempts to flesh out what Nietzsche means by “life” by examining each of the particular ways Nietzsche uses the term in isolation. Ultimately, Didiodato argues that “life” is used in several fundamentally different ways which demonstrates Nietzsche’s criticism of metaphysical descriptions, while at the same time speaking to his emphasis on perspectivism. The thesis closes with a reflection on Nietzsche’s notion of the “affirmation of life” wherein this thesis argues that the diversity of accounts of life Nietzsche provides can find something of a unity.