Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) In the Department of Development Studies, Faculty of Arts at the University of Zululand, 2019. / This study critically explores, in comparative terms, the socio-economic dimension (drivers and effects) of Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram insurgency, within the ongoing debate on the nexus between security and development. Using the mix of Root Cause and Rational Choice theories (2RCs), the study through qualitative methods, demonstrates the relative implication of socio-economic causes and effects of both insurgencies, based on evidence from interviews, available video documentaries and literatures. Acknowledging the weak, however irrefutable, connection between security and development, the study underscores that the social and economic dimension of both insurgencies must be factored into a long-term recovery plan, despite the seeming religious façade of Boko Haram. The study demonstrates that while poverty, for instance, is necessary but insufficient in explaining conflict, its persistence amidst affluence and economic growth suggest that it significantly determines the hopelessness, angst and lack of trust in the system that often nudges some citizens to seek alternative means of redress. Such means may be ethnonationalism or religion as suggestive of the Niger Delta militancy or Boko Haram insurgency respectively. In addition, both insecurities have been hijacked by certain individuals for self-benefiting ends. This hijack is somewhat driven by personal rational calculus and oiled by the pan-Nigeria “socio-economic neediness” among the masses. In this regard, while the masterminds manipulate this ‘socio-economic neediness’, the lower ranks (of these insurgencies) derive immediate economic or political benefits from participation through criminality. Meanwhile, the study found that socio-economic causes are more easily identifiable in the Niger Delta insurgencies as compared to Boko Haram’s, especially from the standpoint of legitimate grievances. For the Boko Haram insurgency, the socio-economic underdevelopment in the northern region are ideologically manipulated to mobilise wide support for the insurgency through monetary inducement, leveraging on the vulnerability of the populace. This is especially compounded by the lower level of education among it ranks of foot soldiers and general level of human underdevelopment across the region. The implication of Nigeria’s mono-cultural economy for the country’s development trajectory and the current instabilities are explored to illuminate what, why, and how the resultant socio-economic underdevelopment could be related to both insurgencies. Accordingly, the popular criticism of the socio-economic dimension that often allude to the relatively higher level of vii poverty in other parts of the north compared to Borno is critically revisited. This is done by demonstrating that Boko Haram is hardly a Borno or North-east phenomenon exclusively. Indeed, the historical and ideological resonance of Islamic extremism of Boko Haram, across the entire northern region, strongly reinforces this view. The study further demonstrates how the protracted insurgencies, among other agitations in the country continue to inhibit Nigeria’s overall development, creating an endless circle of conflict. Hence, in contributing to the attainment of a durable and sustainable resolution, this study advocates that adequate and improved redress of the socio-economic dimension, among the other notable undeniable dimensions must take place. In this regard, the study critically engages the mix of defence, diplomacy and development (the 3D) as used in other conflict regions in the world, to decipher possible ways forward. Minding context dependence of such policy frameworks and the difficulty with transferability however, the study ultimately seeks only to draw adaptable lessons, especially its accents on inter-agency cooperation (human and material resource) in comparable insurgencies. Herein lies the security-development nexus in Nigeria, given the deepening human insecurity and underdevelopment spawned by both insurgencies

Despite abundant oil resources, the residents of the Niger Delta endure extreme poverty, polluted environments, poor infrastructure, and high unemployment. In the early 1990s, these problems led to a violent uprising against oil exploration. In 2009 the government of Nigeria attempted to end the uprising by implementing an amnesty program for the militants that was designed to address the region's problems. The amnesty program resulted in suspending the violence but so far has not resolved the region's problems. If these problems are not addressed, the uprising may resume. Although the Urhobo people comprised the largest number of militants from the Western Niger Delta, there has been no research on whether there are aspects of the Urhobo culture that may be helpful for strengthening the amnesty program and preventing a return to violence by Urhobo ex-militants. Benet's polarities of democracy model served as the theoretical framework for this ethnographic study. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews and observations of 20 Urhobo ex-militants to learn what might prevent their return to violence. Content analysis was used to identify significant themes. Findings indicated that aspects of the Urhobo culture, such as communal obligations, respect for elders, and commitment to social justice and equality, may contribute to strengthening the amnesty program and preventing a return to violence. Recommendations include incorporating meaningful participation of Urhobo elders in the further development and implementation of the amnesty program. Implications for social change include informing policy makers of the importance the Urhobo culture may play in strengthening the amnesty program.

ABSTRACT The Niger Delta region of Nigeria has in recent years been a hotbed of conflict. The region has been embroiled in turmoil over the struggle for the control of the vast resources of the region. There has arisen a controversy over the cause of the struggle. Closely associated with this controversy is the confusion over the terms ‘resource control’ and ‘increase in revenue’. Though the Supreme Court, the apex court in Nigeria has delivered a landmark judgment on the issue of resource control, the last is yet to be heard on the matter. There is a lacuna in the law as an appropriate revenue allocation formula is yet to be fixed for Nigeria. This work examines whether the people of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria are entitled to the right to resource control. It will examine the Supreme Court’s decision in A.G. Federation v. A.G. Abia & 35 ors. and discuss on the possibility of fashioning out an acceptable revenue allocation formula for Nigeria.

No / The prime concern by the Nigerian state in the management of the oil conflicts in the Niger Delta has been to maximise oil revenues. What is probably most confounding about this strategy is the evolving tendency to twist and treat every conflict in the Niger Delta, including some episodic 'epi-oil' conflicts abetted or orchestrated by the state itself, as oil conflicts. In other words, there is a tendency on the part of the state to wittingly 'oilify' some apparently extra-oil conflicts. Compared to other regimes before it, the present civilian administration has probably contributed most to the fast-tracking of this evolving phenomenon. This article unravels and analyses the evolving politics of oilification of extra-oil conflicts in the Niger Delta, its underlying rationale and consequences. Oilification, as the study demonstrates, is yet another in the series of dangerous contradictions engendered by the Nigerian state. How this and other dangerous contradictions could possibly be solved is a research conundrum for the relevant cognoscenti of state-society relations and conflicts in Nigeria. But would the Nigerian state take on board any useful and promising solutions materialising from such studies? This is most unlikely in the present conjuncture given the prevailing configuration of interests in the state.

Texte remanié de: Master--Sciences politiques--Dijon--Université de Bourgogne, 2006. / Bibliogr. p. 283-286. Notes bibliogr.

Militancy in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria is a problem that affects government, private organizations, and individuals. The government's Amnesty and Reconciliation Program encouraged individuals to denounce militancy in return for skills training and a monthly allowance. However, the amnesty program has not yielded the desired result of ending insurgent militancy. The purpose of this research was to better understand factors that cause individuals to join militant groups in the Niger Delta region, in order to proffer plausible solutions to address the causes of militancy. Using the root cause conceptual framework in this phenomenological research, I explored the causal factors of militancy in the Niger Delta region for an in-depth understanding of this phenomenon. The key research questions focused on the motivating factors that spur individuals to participate in militant terrorism in Nigeria's Niger Delta region and whether the implementation of the Amnesty and Reconciliation Program mitigated the problem of militant terrorism in Nigeria's Niger Delta. Data were collected from 10 individuals through in-depth face-to-face interviews, while concept mapping was applied in completing the analysis of interview data. Key results revealed 8 core areas as causes of militancy: the lack of local control of resources, underdevelopment, relocation of local government headquarters, poverty, marginalization, environmental pollution, education opportunities, and poor implementation of the amnesty program. Implications for positive social change include using the findings to develop more effective programs and policies for addressing the problem of militancy and to implement strategies that will reduce or eradicate militancy and associated problems.

This thesis explores the potential and practicality of incorporating multi-stakeholder participation into the legal and institutional frameworks for managing Nigeria’s oil and gas. Despite the natural resource wealth embedded in the Niger Delta, her people suffer greatly from social, economic and infrastructural underdevelopment and this thesis argues that failure to respect the right of the Niger Delta communities to participate in Nigeria’s oil and gas management and in developmental projects that affect their lives is the foundation of the resource curse besetting the region. As a solution to the resource curse problem of the Niger Delta and in response to the incessant conflicts, environmental degradation, social, economic and infrastructural underdevelopment and military injustice perpetrated in the region, this thesis promotes the enforcement of the right to participation of the Niger Delta peoples through the incorporation of the United Nations promoted Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Approach (MSDA) and this argument is based on the Participatory Development Theory (PDT). The thesis proposes legal and institutional frameworks to ensure the effective incorporation of the MSDA into Nigeria’s oil and gas regime. Other than the human rights basis for promoting the participatory development of the Niger Delta peoples, the thesis examines the business case for participatory development as an incentive to encourage oil and gas companies operating in the Niger Delta to inculcate the values of the MSDA. This thesis establishes that incorporating the MSDA into Nigeria’s oil and gas legal and institutional regime in furtherance of the participatory development of the Niger Delta communities will promote environmental sustainability, peaceful coexistence, better informed decision making processes and economic and social sustainability among others. Though there are other rights infringement issues that bear on the development of the Niger Delta communities, it is anticipated that recognition of the Niger Delta peoples as stakeholders and their effective participation in Nigeria’s oil and gas management will give them a voice and opportunity to significantly address other human rights issues and to hold other stakeholders accountable.

The sustainability of municipal drinking water services in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria requires that its water utilities enhance their resilience to a range of risks posed by extreme weather events. Excellence in managing such risks is essential, not only to the bottom line and reputation of the utilities, but also to the wellbeing and prosperity of the people they serve and the preservation of nature in order to sustain ecosystem services. In the context of this study, organisational resilience has been defined as the adaptive deployment of the utility s assets and structures within its continua of inter-dependences to improve and sustain performance even in the face of repeated perturbations. On the other hand, vulnerability is defined as the utility s inability to withstand adverse stress based on limited or constrained capacity to adapt hence creating pathways through which risk impacts the utility. This definition of vulnerability is in tandem with those that argue that the key parameters of vulnerability are the stress to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity. In view of this, and also based on the findings of the study, the study notes that utility management could be a complex and challenging task, especially, in a multi-risk delta environment where extreme events are intense and frequent. Utility managers can become veterans of risks by dissipating, more than ever before technical competence, watershed/ecosystem awareness, social engagement skills and conceptual ability. The latter includes an understanding of how the complexities of the upstream and downstream environment impacts on the utility s internal environment and operations. The diffusive nature of risk makes every risk a potential high impact risk and the understanding of this, is the key to a resilient organization. Risk analysis and management in water utilities should aim to limit the diffusion of risks across streams in order to retard vulnerability. Utility resilience options will need to vary depending on climate related risks to each system, utility management goals, legislation, local and national water management strategies and finance. Utilities in the Niger delta needs to fully understand that they operate close to the edge by virtue of being below sea level and should cultivate a keen awareness of the consequences of flooding and saltwater intrusion, and the importance to manage them amongst others. The study has shown that there is need now, more than ever before for increased revenue generation, elimination of wastes/inefficiencies, financial investment and strategic management of water services operations in the study area if residents and the unborn generation are to be guaranteed of safe and adequate drinking water.

The thesis focuses on the protracted tripartite conflict within and between local oilbearing communities of the Niger Delta on the one hand, and between them, the state and foreign oil multinationals in the region, on the other hand. The focus also centers around how this has attracted international attention and the impact of internationalization on the conflict itself. The series of crises have been underpinned by tortuous issues on the ground for over four decades. There was a new dimension to the struggle in the early 1990s, which redefined the focus of the crises, when organized pressure groups protested against the inhuman and environmental hazards in the region. The thesis therefore examines the interest(s) of the main actors involved in the crisis in the period between 1993 and 2003 in order to establish the issues that accounted for the involvement of the international civil societies. The thesis makes three significant arguments: one, that the differences in interests among the actors in relation to the issue of oil production and its impact on the local people laid the basis for the persistent struggle between the social movements/militant youths on one side and the state and oil multinationals operating in the region on the other. The second argument the thesis advances is that the age-long crisis in the region became an agenda for the international community in the 1990s because of the trend and impact of globalization This invariably allowed international Non-Governmental Organizations to intervene in exerting pressures on oil companies and the state to re-examine their policies in the region. Finally, the recent internationalization of the crisis has not impacted enough to significantly address the demands of the people with the locally based pressure and, later, INGOs. This approach is intended to establish a pattern of alliances in the Niger Delta crisis. It might be healthy to state, ab initio, that there was a convergence of interests between the state and MNOCs on the one hand and between the social movements, local NGOs and INGOs on the other hand. The thesis employed a multivariate form of data collection from primary sources like Multinational Oil Companies in the area especially, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), interviews with local people, NGOs and some government officials, with extensive use of secondary data on the Niger Delta. The study’s findings suggest that the internationalization of the crisis has engendered new approaches and attitudes on the part of the key actors in the Niger Delta. For its part, the state has adopted the agency approach in dealing with the issues confronting the region. Shell has increased its direct intervention efforts in addressing the demands of the local communities. However, these new approaches and attitudes have yielded minimal results in view of the militarization of the Niger Delta through the continuous deployment of troops by the state and the oil multinationals under the guise of security imperatives in response to the people’s agitations, which are poverty driven.

Nigeria has seen an upsurge in violent conflicts leading to insurgency and terrorism since it returned to civilian government in 1999, following sixteen years of military rule. The Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies stand out among conflict groups in Nigeria as they have produced global consequences, hence provoking domestic and international counter-insurgency efforts. Military responses remain primary, but development responses are being increasingly employed. Addressing issues of poverty, exclusion, injustice and underdevelopment is considered to be more fundamental to solving contemporary conflicts. In this sense, development and security are linked, and human, rather than state security is seen to be prioritised. However, the nexus between development and security is fraught with contradictions and the notion of human security is vague. Development intervention appears to be securitized such that it becomes a tool for protecting the strategic interests of external interveners and a tool of control by domestic interveners. Therefore, this thesis explores the prospect of a human rights approach to development as a means of mediating the tension between development and security. It attempts to intellectually consider the triad among the three concepts in relation to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts. The study explores how the internal and external development interventions towards the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts have been developed and the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness. The exploratory study uses a triangulation method that includes interviews, focus group, documentary analysis and observation. The thesis finds evidence of a paradigmatic shift towards a rights based approach to development in the internal and external interventions, but one that still yields to securitization and corruption and adversely affects sustainable development. Nonetheless, responses to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts produce ramifications that justify general as well as specifically targeted responses to individual conflicts. More so, the study shows that the relationship between Nigeria and its external development partners seem to be less vertical.