Traditionally, transnational land deals have been described in terms of the purportedly level playing field of the competitive market. The law is seen as a neutral device, merely increasing efficiency in the management of surplus and shortage; scarcity is viewed as a natural constraint; power is considered irrelevant. However, an analysis of the historical structures of agricultural land ownership and contemporary land transactions in Brazil uncovers the systematic monopolization of land resources that was set in place during colonization and has persisted across a variety of political regimes, sustained by hierarchical legal institutions. In sharp contrast to the narrative of impersonal axes of supply and demand, this dissertation develops a theoretical framework suggesting that i) the capitalist market tends towards highly concentrated economic structures, or monopoly; ii) at the core of this propensity to high concentration is Braudel’s “alliance between the merchant and the prince”: the mutual dependence between the biggest players in the market on a quest for monopolies and the holders of the political power of the state; and iii) this alliance shapes the law and is, in turn, influenced and constrained by law, where law is a cornerstone of market construction situated at the intersection of the political and economic spheres. This framework recognizes that law supports the capitalist market by writing an idea of the future into the present and favoring certain expectations, interests, and values over others. Law structures time by determining precedence, subordination, and consequence; law also delineates, distributes, and organizes space. In particular, property rights are the heart of the alliance between merchant and prince, giving the former the power to define the legal structures of the market through their negotiations with the latter. The rise of cross-border land transactions is the latest iteration of these age-old dynamics, unfolding against the backdrop of concentrated land ownership and exacerbating its growth. The transformation of land into a financial asset obscures ownership, hampers regulation, and facilitates concentration; it is the core mechanism for globalized land ownership. The framework proposed in this dissertation sheds light on the hierarchies impressed onto Brazil’s land map and enshrined in its codes. These unequal power relationships and the legal entitlements that allow land monopolists to intentionally heighten resource scarcity have long been obfuscated by the competitive market model. The three-part framework (monopoly, the alliance, and the law) offers a more accurate account of transnational land deals, and of avenues of access to and control of land in Brazil and beyond. In the current context of escalating climate crisis, as land is increasingly regarded as a vital resource and traded both within and across borders, this reframing contributes to an urgent conversation.

Summary: Since the glorious days of Queen Elizabeth the name of the County of Devon has been connected in men�s minds wth English colonial expansion. Sir. Humphrey Gilbert, Sir Walter Raleigh, Grenville, Drake, Hawkins-these were the men with whom colonization from England originated. During the reign of King James 1 a Plymouth Company had traded extensively with America; and so, when about the year 1840 projects for the settlements of the lands of the South Pacific were so much discussed it was hoped that, if the energy and zeal which had prompted the efforts of the great-searovers of the Elizabethian era were still to be found among their descendants, then the old Plymouth Company might rise again with renewed vigour to grace the pages of future Australasian history with names then connected with the brightest annals of the Mother Country.

Thesis (M.A.)--Addis Ababa University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 133-139).

Because of recent corporate scandals, auditor independence and turnover have become the focus of much debate. For strengthening auditor independence , American government compulsorily stipulate that the firm has to replace its auditor every five years in Sarbanes-Oxley Act that was passed in 2002 to ensure that the increasing tenure can¡¦t lead to an bad audit quality. However, not every scholar all supports the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In order to analyze these issues, we try to find out the relation between the length of auditor tenure and behavior of corporate income tax evasion and auditor independence by using game theory and bargaining model. Our main results are as follows. In our model, we suppose the auditor bargaining ability is positively related to tenure. Manager will gain lower benefits of tax evasion with increasing auditor bargaining ability, implying that increasing tenure reduces managerial collusion incentives. Finally, manager decides to report higher income. In contrast, auditor will gain higher benefits of tax evasion with increasing auditor bargaining ability. But for the auditor, the precondition of making company to be willing to collude with auditor is to possess the evidence of corporate income tax evasion. Because of that, auditor will increase the level of auditing efforts and choose to help company to make an incorrect attestation. So increasing tenure will influence auditor independence and audit quality.

The main purpose of this research, which are based on Ferris, Adams, Kolodinsky, Hochwarter, & Ammeter, (2002). revised model, is to explore the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and the member of position, the member of tenure, the formalization, and the centralization. There are 2133 questionnaires provided from public and private hospitals, public and private schools, government agencies, public and private service industries, manufacturing, private financial institution, the high-tech industries and traditional industries. Questionnaires¡¦ response rate are 91.0%. Available response rate are 88.6%. The data were analyzed by descriptive statistics, reliability analysis, correlation, and hierarchical linear model. The major results of this study are as following: 1. The member of position has a significant effect on perceptions of organizational politics. 2. The member of tenure has no effect on perceptions of organizational politics. 3. Formalization has no effect on perceptions of organizational politics. 4. Centralization has a significant effect on perceptions of organizational politics. 5. Formalization has no moderate effect on the relationship between the member of position and perceptions of organizational politics. 6. Formalization has no moderate effect on the relationship between the member of tenure and perceptions of organizational politics. 7. Centralization has no moderate effect on the relationship between the member of position and perceptions of organizational politics. 8. Centralization has no moderate effect on the relationship between the member of tenure and perceptions of organizational politics.

Thesis (M.Sc.)--University of Alberta, 2010. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on January 11, 2010). At head of title: University of Alberta. A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Forest Economics, Department of Rural Economy. Includes bibliographical references.

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (doctoral)--Universidad de Valencia, 1978. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--University of Washington. / Vita. Another copy has number: Thesis 27213. Bibliography: leaves [379]-403.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 40-43).

Thesis--Norges Landbrukshøgskole, Institutt for økonomi og samfunnsfag, 2003. / Title from title screen (viewed June 1, 2004). Includes bibliographical references (p. 200-204). Also issued in print format.