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11	Studies of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence Excitations Measured with LaBr3(Ce)detectors for Nuclear Security Applications / 核セキュリティ応用のためのLaBr3(Ce)検出器による核共鳴散乱測定に関する研究 Abdelsanad, Mohamed Omer Nagy 24 September 2013 (has links) 京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(エネルギー科学) / 甲第17918号 / エネ博第290号 / 新制\|\|エネ\|\|60(附属図書館) / 30738 / 京都大学大学院エネルギー科学研究科エネルギー応用科学専攻 / (主査)教授大垣英明, 教授白井康之, 教授松田一成 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Energy Science / Kyoto University / DGAM Special Nuclear Material Non-destructive Inspection Nuclear Security Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence Gamma-ray Detector Laser-Compyon Backscattering Gamma-ray 501
12	The design of a mobile synthetic aperture collimated gamma detector for passive HEU sources Chin, Michael Raymond 13 January 2014 (has links) This thesis covers the individual work of Michael Chin as part of the sponsored research project funded by the U.S. State Department in support of a computational design of a "Mobile Pit Verification System" (MPVS), a mobile “drive by” passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes. The MPVS system is intended to enable a comprehensive, rapid verification and validation of stored nuclear weapon core physics packages containing SNM, or so-called “weapon pits,” in weapon materials and stockpile storage facilities. The MPVS platform is designed to move at a constant speed and accumulate a signal for each stored weapon pit container. The gamma detector was selected to be a 4 × 4 × 8 cubic inch CsI detector while the neutron detector array designed for the “Transport Simulation and Validation of a Synthetic Aperture SNM Detection System (“T-SADS”) project was used in conjunction with this work; T-SADS was a 3 year project funded by DOE-NNSA which was completed on May 2013. The computational design effort for this project was completed in April 2013, and leveraged novel computational radiation transport methods, algorithms, and SNM identification methods, including a synthetic aperture collection approach, and a new gamma ratio methodology for distinguishing between naturally occurring radiation materials and weapon class SNM materials. Both forward and adjoint transport methods were utilized to characterize the adjoint reaction rate as a function of inter-source spacing, collimation thickness, linear and angular field of view, source age, source type, source geometry, and mobile platform speed. The integrated count was then compared with background radiation and the associated probabilities of detection and false alarm were then computed. Publications resulting from this research were published in PHYSOR 2012, presented at the 53rd annual Proceedings of the INMM, and at the Mathematics & Computation 2013 Conference. Gamma Transport SNM Radiation Weapon pits Special nuclear material MPVS HEU Plutonium Collimation Time-gating Uranium Gamma ray detectors Synthetic apertures Nuclear weapons
13	Safeguards for Uranium Extraction (UREX) +1a Process Feener, Jessica S. 2010 May 1900 (has links) As nuclear energy grows in the United States and around the world, the expansion of the nuclear fuel cycle is inevitable. All currently deployed commercial reprocessing plants are based on the Plutonium - Uranium Extraction (PUREX) process. However, this process is not implemented in the U.S. for a variety of reasons, one being that it is considered by some as a proliferation risk. The 2001 Nuclear Energy Policy report recommended that the U.S. "develop reprocessing and treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant." The Uranium Extraction (UREX+) reprocessing technique has been developed to reach these goals. However, in order for UREX+ to be considered for commercial implementation, a safeguards approach is needed to show that a commercially sized UREX+ facility can be safeguarded to current international standards. A detailed safeguards approach for a UREX+1a reprocessing facility has been developed. The approach includes the use of nuclear material accountancy (MA), containment and surveillance (C/S) and solution monitoring (SM). Facility information was developed for a hypothesized UREX+1a plant with a throughput of 1000 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM) per year. Safeguard goals and safeguard measures to be implemented were established. Diversion and acquisition pathways were considered; however, the analysis focuses mainly on diversion paths. The detection systems used in the design have the ability to provide near real-time measurement of special fissionable material in feed, process and product streams. Advanced front-end techniques for the quantification of fissile material in spent nuclear fuel were also considered. The economic and operator costs of these systems were not considered. The analysis shows that the implementation of these techniques result in significant improvements in the ability of the safeguards system to achieve the objective of timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material from the UREX+1a reprocessing facility and to provide deterrence against such diversion by early detection. nuclear material safeguards UREX UREX+1a Uranium Extraction proliferation resistant proliferation resistance reprocessing PUREX Plutonium Uranium IAEA TMFD Tension Metastable Fluid Detector detection probability nondetection probability non-detection probability nuclear material accountancy containment and surveillance solution monitoring process monitoring false alarm probability real-time measurement material balance area material balance period key measurement point significant quantity timely detection defense in depth detector non-destructive assay NDA front-end measurement material unaccounted for CCD-PEG TRUEX TALSPEAK

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