財務預測相較於歷史性財務報表而言，其決策之攸關性較大。我國自民國80年5月起開始實施強制性財務報表迄今，已成為資本市場中相當重要的訊息，惟隨著我國證券市場規模逐步擴大，公司面臨之經濟環境日趨複雜，為符合國際作法及實務需要，故行政院金融監督管理委員會證券期貨局於93年12月9日依據證券交易法第三十六條之一，發布金管證六字第930005938號函，修正財務預測制度改採自願公開方式（並得以簡式或完整式方法擇一為之），並參考國外有關預測性資訊公開之相關規定及實務運作方式，配合相關配套措施，以增進資本市場效率及決策品質。 　　宣告取消財務預測強制公開揭露制度後，實證結果顯示：(1)對股價會產生一負向的效果，有顯著的負向異常報酬產生，且消息提前反應於市場上；在交易量方面，有顯著異常增加的情形發生。(2)對資訊特性不同分組採單變量分析，結果顯示公司規模及分析師人數可解釋宣告效果大小，兩組之間均達顯著水準。(3)公司規模越大時，股價反應越小，顯示公司規模與宣告異常報酬率間呈負向關係，亦即規模效果存在；但交易量反應越大。(4)分析師人數越多時，股價反應越小；但交易量反應越大，且較少分析師人數公司來得顯著。 / Financial forcast is more relevant than historical financial statements. Our country began to implement the mandatory financial forcast since May, 1991, has already become a very important information in the capital market. While the economic environment becoming complicated, in order to meet international practices, so on December 9, 1993, change the firm can dicide disclosure their financial forcast by themselves, in order to promote the efficiency of capital market and decision quality. The empirical results show that：(1) For stock price, it will produce negative effect; on the other hand, trading volume is significant increaseing. (2) For groups with different level of information characteristics, the results show that firm size and the number of ananlysts can explain that declaring effect. (3) When the size of firm is larger, the stock price is smaller; but the trading volume is larger. (4) The number of analysts is larger, the response of stock price is smaller; but the trading volume is larger in response.

本研究以中國2007年至2012年的A股上市公司為研究對象，探討管理當局能力與分析師盈餘預測行為的關係，預測行為迴歸模型以分析師追蹤人數、分析師盈餘預測準確性及預測離散程度三種特性進行分析。 研究結果發現，管理當局能力與分析師追蹤人數、盈餘預測精確度皆呈現顯著正相關，與預測離散程度則為負相關，但并不顯著。這表示經理人能力較好，則分析師對該公司之追蹤意願較高，且盈餘預測誤差與預測離散度較低。本研究藉此結果推論，管理當局能力愈佳之企業，經理人愈會提供品質良好、具可靠性的財務報導，故分析師將愈信賴該公司所提供之資訊，並可幫助分析師做出更精確之盈餘預測，並降低彼此間之預測誤差。 / This study examines the relation between managerial ability and financial analysts’ earnings forecast behaviors in China from 2007 to 2012. We use several analysts’ attributes: number of analysts following, forecasts error, and forecasts dispersion. According to the empirical results, in general, analysts tend to follow firms with more ability of managers, and managers with superior ability might decrease analysts’ forecast errors and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts.