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The progress of science depends partly, upon the acceptance of indeterminate tacit premisses about the nature of science and the object of science. These premisses are tacit because (i) they extend to what is beyond the limitations of present data, -not the empirical or the imaginative- and therefore involve heuristic anticipations. (ii) they also involve personal and interpersonal mechanisms such as the personal presuppositions and commitments of the scientist operating within a given community. This community confers values on scientific work in the form of publications, research grants, professional positions, etc.. This transcends the objective subjective dichotomy since the scientist submits to requirements acknowledged by himself with universal intent, that is the scientist's responsibility to pursue his research and confer his judgements as his vision of reality would have him hold as universally necessary. (iii)their acceptance is largely a-critical - they are functional interpretative systems rather than static objects. Although when they are the object of study, they are facts, they are not the fact since they play a vectorial role in establishing facts. They make factuaiity possible. There is a strong case for tacit knowledge. Therefore, Polanyi submits, we should question a concept of scientific objectivity which rests solely upon logical and empirical foundations. Even though numerous mathematics and technical procedures can be employed, the objective value of a scientific theory cannot be wholly formally assessed. Polanyi's theory, in differentiating rationality from formal inference, shows the way towards a non-normative but non-subjectivist epistemology of science beyond the accounts of the practice of science of Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan.

This thesis develops a 'response-dependent' account of the objectivity of ethical judgment. It uses the Kantian device of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as the critical reflective test for convergence in judgment that is genuinely objectivity-sustaining. After a discussion of the challenges to ethical objectivism, it is argued that Wittgenstein's consideration of rule-following provides a compelling case for rejecting attempts to ground objectivity in a manner that is external to normative practices. This removes one potent source of hostility to ethical objectivity, but it does not establish the truth of this position. Within the constraints of a broadly Wittgensteinian conception of objectivity, plausible accounts of ethical objectivity will be 'response-dependent'. The key issue facing such theories is whether they can provide a model of practical rationality that delivers suitably demanding, objectivity-sustaining standards of rational criticism. I examine two approaches to this issue. The first (suggested by John McDowell) takes Wittgenstein's rulefollowing considerations as implying a virtue-centred approach to ethical deliberation. On this view, virtuous agents' uncodifiable responses determine correct judgment. But the case for this theoretically modest model of objectivity has not been successfully made, and the approach has insufficient resources to yield genuine objectivity. Instead, appeal must be made to some more articulated account of practical rationality. The second, Kantian, model delivers this because the CI test provides a mechanism for objectivity-sustaining reflective criticism of agents' reasons for action, without importing any illicit codification of rationality. The CI can also be used for critical reflection on agents' appreciation of the ethical features of their situation. In this way the model can avoid the problem of empty formalism and offer a weak form of ethical cognitivism. This model also suggests a potential route to plausible approaches to some other problematic issues in ethical theory, such as akrasia and the categorical nature of moral reasons.

Thesis (MA)--University of Melbourne, School of Languages & Linguistics, 2009. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (p.97-100)

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Melbourne, School of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry 2009. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (p. 238-248)

Thesis (M.A.I.S.)--Oregon State University, 2010. / Printout. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-66). Also available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis--Heidelberg, 1911. / "Die ganze Abhandlung erscheint als Ergänzungsheft No. 26 der ... Zeitschrift 'Kantstudien'" Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 536-544).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Supervisor: Thomas K. Seung. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

The principle of reflexivity, as laid out by David Bloor (in Knowledge and Social Imagery) poses serious challenges to STS - while STS analysts attempt to show the partiality of scientific claims, they simultaneously offer those analyses via authoritative pronouncements in scientific language, while claiming a scientific foundation. This thesis questions the understanding of science as a form of inquiry distinct from other forms of inquiry, especially focusing on the elusive distinction between science and technology. The thesis analyzes Andrew Pickering's problematic attempt (in The Mangle of Practice) to dissolve the science/technology distinction through his 'Theory of Everything'/Mangle concept. Building an approach from commentaries on Pickering's work combined with resources from the STS tradition, especially from Latour and Haraway, the author proposes a new observational stance; this stance insists on the perspectival nature of all observation, and thereby claims to be reflexively robust; furthermore it maintains an agnostic attitude with regard to the science/technology distinction. / Master of Science