The last decade has witnessed substantial changes in organizational structure, inter-organizational relations and the nature of competition. In particular, the realization of interdependencies across firm boundaries has brought forth a range of mechanisms for coordination among firms in vertically related stages of production, or among direct competitors in the same industry. Our objective is to study inter-organizational relations in an oligopolistic setting to explore the interactions between efficiency and strategic incentives for organizations to engage in various forms of coordination, vertically or horizontally. Specifically, we employ a game-theoretic approach to analyze organizational structure and coordination incentives in relation to process innovation, transfer pricing, and degree of competition between products. This study is divided into four parts. / In the first part, we look at the impact of manufacturer's investments in process innovation to reduce production costs on distribution channel structure, and vice versa. We show that the optimal channel structure decision depends on interactions between two parameters: degree of product differentiation and the extent of production cost reduction. These parameters represent the two primary 'generic strategies' that most organizations follow in order to gain competitive advantage. Second, we show that decentralized manufacturers invest less in process innovation than integrated manufacturers do. However, manufacturers may prefer decentralized, non-coordinated channels to perfectly coordinated channels when product substitutability is high, contrary to efficiency and transaction-cost based arguments for increased coordination. / In the second part, we relax the assumption that a manufacturer has a choice only between integration (or 'hierarchy') and decentralization (or 'market'). Various means of channel coordination are analyzed, and ownership is assumed to be distinct from the particular coordination mechanism employed. It is shown that the consideration of the competitive environment changes incentives for, and benefits to, coordination in various Production, Inventory, and Pricing decisions among members of a supply chain. / In the third part, we focus on horizontal cooperation among firms, ignoring the vertical relations. We consider the possibility of technological spillovers in the process innovation efforts of the manufacturers, and their incentives to engage in cooperative R&D agreements with rivals in the same industry. We develop a two-stage game model with manufacturers producing differentiated products, and establish fairly general conditions under which different cooperative arrangements would be beneficial both for manufacturers and consumers. / In the fourth part, we merge the above two dimensions, i.e., we investigate the interactions between horizontal cooperative agreements among rival manufacturers and vertical coordination arrangements along the supply chain. The models above are extended to incorporate the triple influence of technological spillovers and research joint ventures, along with demand and cost side parameters, on supply chain coordination incentives. We argue that a better understanding of such interactions is crucial in explicating a more relevant theory of the firm.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2006. / Title from title screen (site viewed May 9, 2007). PDF text: vi, 70 p. ; 0.69Mb UMI publication number: AAT 3237386. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche formats.

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This dissertation is concerned with the characterization, existence and computation of equilibrium solutions in a two-stage model of interacting producers. The model represents an industry involved with two major stages of production. On the production side there exist some (upstream) firms which perform the first stage of production and manufacture a semi-finished product, and there exist some other (downstream) firms which perform the second stage of production and convert this semi-finished product to a final commodity. There also exist some (vertically integrated) firms which handle the entire production process themselves. In this research, the final commodity market is an oligopoly which may exhibit one of two possible behavioral patterns: follower-follower or multiple leader-follower. In both cases, the downstream firms are assumed to be price takers in purchasing the intermediate product. For the upstream stage, we consider two situations: a Cournot oligopoly or a perfectly competitive market. An equilibrium analysis of the model is conducted with output quantities as decision variables. The defined equilibrium solutions employ an inverse derived demand function for the semi-finished product. This function is derived and characterized through the use of mathematical programming problems which represent the equilibrating process in the final commodity market. Based on this analysis, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence (and uniqueness) of an equilibrium solution, under various market assumptions. These conditions are formulated in terms of properties of the cost functions and the final product demand function. Next, we propose some computational techniques for determining an equilibrium solution. The algorithms presented herein are based on structural properties of the inverse derived demand function and its local approximation. Both convex as well as nonconvex cases are considered. We also investigate in detail the effects of various integrations among the producers on firms' profits, and on industry outputs and prices at equilibrium. This sensitivity analysis provides rich information and insights for industrial analysts and policy makers into how the foregoing quantities are effected by mergers and collusions and the entry or exit of various types of firms, as well as by differences in market behavior. / Ph. D.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2007. Graduate Programme in Economics. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-109). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR29317

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

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Marginal pricing is the traditional pricing method in pool based electricity markets, however pay-as-bid is an alternative that has been the focus of recent studies. One way of comparing the outcomes of these two pricing schemes is by examining their market equilibria. These equilibria have been analyzed in depth for both pricing methods under the assumption of a perfect market. Marginal pricing market equilibria has also been examined under oligopolistic markets, however, the same attention has not been given to oligopolies based on pay-as-bid pricing. / In this thesis, we study the possible outcomes of an oligopolistic electricity market under pay-as-bid pricing. For this purpose, we introduce, develop and test a new concept called defensive Nash equilibrium, which combines the risk adverseness of power suppliers with the traditional notion of Nash equilibrium. The test cases studied compare market outcomes between pay-as-bid and marginal pricing under various market power assumptions.

In an electricity market cleared by merit-order economic dispatch we identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which the market outcomes supported by pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE) exist when generating companies (Gencos) game through continuously variable incremental cost (IC) block offers. A Genco may own any number of units, each unit having multiple blocks with each block being offered at a constant IC. / Next, a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) scheme devoid of approximations or iterations is developed to identify all possible NE. The MILP scheme is systematic and general but computationally demanding for large systems. Thus, an alternative significantly faster lambda-iterative approach that does not require the use of MILP was also developed. / Once all NE are found, one critical question is to identify the one whose corresponding gaming strategy may be considered by all Gencos as being the most rational. To answer this, this thesis proposes the use of a measure based on the potential profit gain and loss by each Genco for each NE. The most rational offer strategy for each Genco in terms of gaming or not gaming that best meets their risk/benefit expectations is the one corresponding to the NE with the largest gain to loss ratio. / The computation of all NE is tested on several systems of up to ninety generating units, each with four incremental cost blocks. These NE are then used to examine how market power is influenced by market parameters, specifically, the number of competing Gencos, their size and true ICs, as well as the level of demand and price cap.