In modern economies, national governments have a wide range of policies for restricting international trade and protecting domestic industries at their disposal. The most popular form of non-tariff trade policies is probably that of a direct quantitative restriction. This policy takes two principal forms: explicit import quotas and voluntary export restraints (VERs). A VER is a quota imposed by an exporting country upon exports to other countries in response to pressures exercised by the importing countries (i.e., in the form of threats of various types of import restrictions). When these two policies are partially liberalized, subject to a reasonable foreign share in the domestic market, product differentiation between imported goods and domestic goods within an imperfect market can serve to increase welfare levels within the domestic economy. In this situation, the foreign share will not be as high as it would be for the homogeneous assumption. Under a partial VER liberalization policy, if the degree of substitutability between domestic and imported goods is sufficiently small, then domestic welfare will improve as foreign imports are increased. That is, if domestic and imported goods are perfect substitutes, then the most favorable domestic policy will be to close domestic markets to the foreign country since no country can allow foreign market shares as high as 66 percent in the domestic market. In a simulation of U.S. automobile industrial production, when a partial quota liberalization is observed, welfare levels can be increased by reducing the Japanese import market share to a level below 10 percent, that is, to a level which is less than the actual current foreign market share. In real terms, this implies that U.S. auto industry must be further liberalized to acquire additional domestic benefits under a VER policy, whereas the U.S. should restrict foreign market share below 10 percent to maximize domestic welfare levels under a quota policy. This will occur if the net consumer surplus is in excess of producer net excess profits under an imperfect market structure. / Graduation date: 1993

Wholesale electricity markets now operate in many countries around the world. These markets determine a spot price for electricity as the clearing price when generators bid in energy at various prices. As the trading in a wholesale electricity market can be seen as a dynamic repeated game, it would be expected that profit maximising generators learn to engage in tacit collusion to profitably increase spot market prices. This thesis investigates this tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets. We do not follow the approach of previous work in game theory that presupposes firms' collusive strategies to enforce collusion in an oligopoly. Instead, we develop a co-evolutionary approach (extending previous work in this area) using a genetic algorithm (GA) to co-evolve strategies for all generators in some stylised models of an electricity market. The bidding strategy of each generator is modelled as a set of bidding actions, one for each possible discrete state of the state space observed by the generator. The market trading interactions are simulated to determine the fitness of a particular strategy. The tacitly collusive outcomes and strategies emerging from computational experiments are thus obtained from the learning or evolutionary process instead of from any pre-specification. Analysing many of those emergent collusive outcomes and strategies. we are able to specify the mechanism of tacit collusion and investigate how the market environment can affect it. We find that the learned collusive strategies are similar to the forgiving trigger strategies of classical supergame theory (Green and Porter, 1984). Also using computational experiments, we can determine which characteristics of the market environment encourage or hinder tacit collusion. The findings from this thesis provide insights on tacit collusion in an oligopoly and policy implications from a learning perspective. With modelling flexibility, our co-evolutionary approach can be extended to study strategic behaviour in an oligopoly considering many other market characteristics.

Wholesale electricity markets now operate in many countries around the world. These markets determine a spot price for electricity as the clearing price when generators bid in energy at various prices. As the trading in a wholesale electricity market can be seen as a dynamic repeated game, it would be expected that profit maximising generators learn to engage in tacit collusion to profitably increase spot market prices. This thesis investigates this tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets. We do not follow the approach of previous work in game theory that presupposes firms' collusive strategies to enforce collusion in an oligopoly. Instead, we develop a co-evolutionary approach (extending previous work in this area) using a genetic algorithm (GA) to co-evolve strategies for all generators in some stylised models of an electricity market. The bidding strategy of each generator is modelled as a set of bidding actions, one for each possible discrete state of the state space observed by the generator. The market trading interactions are simulated to determine the fitness of a particular strategy. The tacitly collusive outcomes and strategies emerging from computational experiments are thus obtained from the learning or evolutionary process instead of from any pre-specification. Analysing many of those emergent collusive outcomes and strategies. we are able to specify the mechanism of tacit collusion and investigate how the market environment can affect it. We find that the learned collusive strategies are similar to the forgiving trigger strategies of classical supergame theory (Green and Porter, 1984). Also using computational experiments, we can determine which characteristics of the market environment encourage or hinder tacit collusion. The findings from this thesis provide insights on tacit collusion in an oligopoly and policy implications from a learning perspective. With modelling flexibility, our co-evolutionary approach can be extended to study strategic behaviour in an oligopoly considering many other market characteristics.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Southampton, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 237-251).

Hong Kong is considered to be the most economically free country in the world, but also has the highest amount of income inequality of any developed country. The Hong Kong government is able to sustain laissez faire policies due to its monopoly on land supply. Maintaining high property values allows the government to maximize revenue from property tax, which acts as a hidden tax. A major contributor to income inequality is the formation of oligopolies in Hong Kong that creates an anticompetitive environment. The interests of the government and oligarchs are aligned as both obtain significant portions of revenue from the property sector. As globalization makes Hong Kong even more vulnerable to external shocks, the government faces the challenges of increasing competition, diversifying its revenue streams, and closing the income gap while standing by its principles in order maintain regional competitiveness as an international business hub.

Univ., Diss.--Kiel, 2002.

Freedom of speech as a basic right is the starting point of the article. The Inter-American legal framework contributes pondering on the importance plurality and the vast array of information have in the validity of this right and democracy in general. This consideration is done from the standards given by the Commission reports and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights case law. The article ponders on how and how much the exercise of freedom of speech right is affected by the excessive concentrationof personal property and control over the media. / El artículo toma como punto de partida que la libertad de expresión forma parte del corpus de derechos fundamentales que el marco jurídico interamericano para reflexionar sobre la importancia de la pluralidad y la diversidad de la información tienen para la vigencia de este derecho y de la democracia en general. Esta reflexión se realiza a partir de los estándares construidos por los informes de la Comisión y la jurisprudencia de la Corte interamericanas. El texto reflexiona sobre cuánto y cómo afecta, al pleno ejercicio de la libertad de expresión, la excesiva concentración de la propiedad privada y del control de los medios de comunicación.

Diese Dissertation befasst sich in drei voneinander unabhängigen Kapiteln mit dem Forschungsfeld des ökonomischen Designs. Das "Design" von Situationen wirtschaftlicher Interaktion hat zum Ziel, den Verlauf und das Ergebnis der jeweiligen Interaktion zu steuern. In dieser Arbeit werden mathematisch-theoretische "Designs" zum einen formal entwickelt und diese zum anderen durch politische oder soziale Institutionen realisiert. Das erste Kapitel thematisiert die Implementierung von Sozialwahlfunktionen in einem kollusiven Umfeld. Es wird gezeigt, wie die gezielte Schaffung von asymmetrischer Information zwischen den kolludierenden Parteien deren Koordination erschweren und die Implementierung erleichtern kann. Im zweiten Kapitel wird dieser Ansatz im Kontext der Bestechlichkeit bei Finanzaudits angewendet. Korruption kann verhindert werden, wenn der bestechliche Akteure eine Warnung über anstehende Kontrollen erhält, nicht jedoch der bestechende Akteur. Das dritte Kapitel wiederum untersucht "Design" in Form von Markt- und Wettbewerbsregulierung. Eine Beschränkung des Wettbewerbs - durch eine Begrenzung der Zahl miteinander konkurrierender Firmen - kann entgegen der ökonomischen Intuition wohlfahrtsoptimierend sein. / This thesis contributes to the field of economic design in three independent chapters. Taking the perspective of a "designer", it derives formal solutions in the framework of economic theory and suggests political as well as social institutions to put these solutions to practice. The first chapter employs mechanism design to mitigate the problem of collusion. It shows how the implementation of social choice functions can be achieved by introducing asymmetric information into a system prone to collusion. In the second chapter, this methodology is applied to the context of corruption in auditing. Bribery is impeded by selectively warning one - and only one - of the corruptive parties about upcoming inspections. Finally, the third chapter studies market regulation as a means of "design". Contrary to economic intuition, it may be beneficial in terms of welfare to limit competition by restricting the number of firms allowed to enter a market.