Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1980. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 174-176).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1984. / Typescript. Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 158-164).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2002. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains x, 94 p.; also includes graphics. Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Ian M. Sheldon, Dept. of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics. Includes bibliographical pdnerences (p. 83-94).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on Feb 15, 2010). The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Dissertation advisor: Dr. X. H. Wang Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2001.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Oregon State University, 2009. / Printout. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 98-102). Also available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1983. / Typescript. Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis considers the utilization of an exhaustible resource in an oligopolistic market in which producers are assumed to behave noncooperatively. Within a game-theoretic framework, the amount of resource recovered by the industry is endogenized by allowing producers to undertake, prior to extraction, investment activities which alter the variable cost of resource recovery. The open-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium is characterized in considerable detail, especially in the symmetric case in which property rights are identical across producers. In this case, it is shown that an increase in the number of producers in the industry (a) increases the ultimate amount: of resource recovered by the industry (b) increases the initial investment undertaken on each deposit (c) lowers the resource price, at least initially (d) raises the shadow price of the resource, initially (e) decreases the present value of industry profits, and (f) increases the present value of the total surplus generated in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. When the property rights are asymmetric, it is shown that the output profile of the industry is inefficient from society's point of view: the same stream of resource output can be provided, in general, at lower investment cost and present value variable cost. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 1981 / Vita. / Includes bibliographies. / by David Knudsen Levine. / Ph. D. / Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics