As social scientists have become increasingly aware of the welfare implications of firms' locations in space there has been a considerable amount of renewed interest in the issues pertaining to the geography of price. In the short time since Hay and Johnston (1980) lamented the insufficient attention being given to the theoretical background of geographic pricing, there has been impressive amounts of progress in certain analytical areas. However, within this bulk of literature, we still know remarkably little about the determinants of geographic price variation in spatial markets containing numerous sellers (firms) and buyers (consumers). Perhaps this should not be surprising given that much of the current research is being carried out by economists (who generally tend to emphasize market process in classically constructed structural-conduct-performance modes) rather than geographers (who tend to emphasize market description and locational patterns/properties arising from spatially defined economic and behavioral market processes). This dissertation focuses on geographic price variations in competitive oligopolies, where firms react under alternative pricing conjectures/strategies. Using computer aided simulation, the analytics of equilibrium price levels are examined in one-dimensional bounded and unbounded markets to uncover the algebraic properties of spatial markets, the effects of firm density, firm location, and demand elasticity on prices, the perversities associated with consumer-related transportation costs, and the distorting effects of mixed or asymmetrical rivals' pricing strategies. The modeling of spatial price competition is regarded as essential in the evaluation of equilibrium price as a function of boundary complications, market description, and the spatial arrangement of interdependent rivals. Long-run implications of spatial price competition are discussed with the intention of developing a model (beyond the scope of this dissertation) that not only recognizes rivals' price reactions, but also stresses locationally competitive strategies. Some empirical evidence on the nature of spatial price dependence amongst rival food chains in a metropolitan area is also examined.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 86-88). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

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The role of market accessibility and entry is the central theme of this dissertation. Two theoretical models of oligopoly theory are examined in a controlled laboratory market setting. Experimental testing of Contestability Theory is extended beyond the natural monopoly case and a "safe haven" provides subjects with a viable alternative to the "contestable" market. Evidence reported supports the conclusion that the contestable market is robust to the introduction of the alternate market. The theory of Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly is explored from a game theoretic perspective with special attention to buyer queuing rule assumptions. Experimental evidence underscores sensitivity of market outcomes to the queuing rule adopted. The presence of excess capacity relative to market demand tends to push theoretical Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria toward competitive levels. This result is substantiated by experimental evidence and is independent of the queuing rule assumed. The similarity between the Bertrand-Edgeworth excess capacity case and a contestable natural monopoly market is investigated. The presence of excess capacity/potential entrants is shown to exert more downward pressure on observed laboratory market prices than the presence of additional competitors alone. This result is at odds with the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. A herfindahl index calculated from experimental results has almost no power to predict market outcome.

We investigate the incentive to provide goods of high quality in a vertically related market for different types of business organizations, a farmer-owned cooperative and an investor-owned firm. Contrary to the firm, the cooperative is characterized by decentralized decision making, which gives rise to overproduction and problems coordinating the quality decisions of its members (free riding). Comparing both manufacturers acting as monopolists we show that the cooperative will never supply final goods of higher quality than the firm, and that the problem of quality coordination is mitigated if the cooperative succeeds in preventing overproduction. When a cooperative faces competition of an investor-owned firm (mixed duopoly), it will - except in one limit case - never produce final goods of a higher quality than the firm and will deliver lower quality in a number of scenarios.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 137-139). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

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