The biological sciences are changing the ways in which we understand ourselves Biological Being is a philosophical exploration of biology, mapping some of the features of the field that make it so important in generating these changes Two central themes are at the heart of this exploration: biology is a science that should be grasped from a realist position, and it is a science that reveals a disunified, pluralistic world of kinds of things. After an introduction of some the issues involved, in three substantial chapters these themes are unpacked and analysed. The first major chapter is about experimentation and biology. In it the experimental realism of Hacking is rejected, whilst the core notion of intervention and manipulation of the world as a vital epistemic tool is retained. Similarities and differences between experiments in the physical and biological science are investigated. This comparison is continued in the second major chapter, which is about natural kinds and biology’s relationship to the physical sciences. Reductionism. even in its weaker forms, is rejected along with the notion of scientific unity Recent attempts by Rosenberg to understand biology as an instrumental science are contrasted with Dupré's realism, and a system of type-hierarchies that could support realism for biology described. The third major chapter then looks at biology and the construction of human kinds by the social sciences. A reading of Foucault is given that attacks the idea that there can be a simple distinction drawn between those sciences that discover and those which construct kinds. Biology's role in the social sciences is explored. A final chapter draws the components of the thesis together and seeks a general understanding of rationality underpinning the whole discussion in recent work by Putnam.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 236-245).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2008. / "Graduate Program in Philosophy." Includes bibliographical references (p. 224-233).

Thesis--Freiburg im Breisgau. / Bibliography: p. 191-200.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Toronto, 2006. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-06, Section: A, page: 2092. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 241-253).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 172-175) Also available in print.

This thesis provides a critical examination of Robert Jenson's doctrine of the Trinity, and the ways in which Jenson's development of this doctrine corrects central aspects of contemporary metaphysics. Jenson's doctrine of the Trinity develops from his belief in the significance of the narrative form of Scripture, and the way in which the Christian Gospel addresses human religiosity. In order to explain this development, the thesis addresses some topics not addressed in scholarship on Jenson, especially his understanding of theological language and his approach to religious epistemology. It also describes the ways in which Jenson's theological project coheres with the task and method of contemporary metaphysics. After describing Jenson's doctrine of the Trinity, the thesis moves on to address substantial critiques from George Hunsinger, David Bentley Hart, and Oliver Crisp. Hunsinger critiques Jenson on the ground of orthodoxy. He claims that Jenson's views commit him to a number of heresies, both ancient and modern. David Bentley Hart also critiques Jenson for his perceived unorthodoxy, arguing that Jenson makes the world necessary for God, and makes God responsible for evil in a way which is at odds with the Christian faith. Oliver Crisp critiques Jenson's metaphysics on the grounds of coherence. The thesis provides responses to all of these critiques. Following these critiques, the thesis describes the ways in which Jenson's Trinitarianism reconstitutes certain central aspects of contemporary metaphysics, especially in the philosophy of time and fundamental metaphysics. Jenson argues on Trinitarian grounds that Christians ought to hold something akin to a moving spotlight view of time. He also argues that Christians ought to deny the category of substance and hold 'event' to be the primary category of metaphysics. The thesis also highlights several weaknesses in Jenson's thought: he has no clear epistemology, his response to the problem of evil is inconsistent, and his work on 'being' is misdirected. None of these weaknesses are found to be fatal to Jenson's project, and the thesis offers suggestions for how each in turn could be corrected.

Relative terms are those such as ‘larger’, ‘smaller’, ‘parent’ and ‘offspring’. Questions concerning the nature of this type of term in Plato fall under three themes. First, logic: what is the syntax and semantics of relative terms? Second, metaphysics: what structures in the world constitute relative properties? Third, taxonomy: do relative terms form a distinguishable class? Questions concerning purpose ask what role these terms have in the wider economy of Plato’s thought. Only one existing approach addresses all of these themes and questions: it was put forward by G.E.L. Owen in 1957, although it was subsequently developed by others. The Owenian view holds that relatives are syntactically or semantically incomplete, that they are identical to metaphysically dyadic relations and that they do form a taxonomic class. According to Owen, Plato introduces relative terms to bolster a certain argument for the separation of forms and participants. Therefore, they have an ontological purpose. This thesis aims to offer a plausible, non–anachronistic alternative to the Owenian view. To give such an account I have to argue for a radically different logic, metaphysics and purpose for relatives in Plato. I call the view that I defend ‘conjunctivism’. I begin by characterising the logic of conjunctivism. Plato holds that relative terms have formal objects. These are exceptionlessly correct objects of the relative in question. A parent is always and only parent of offspring, so ‘offspring’ is the formal object of ‘parent’. I then demonstrate that the metaphysical problems for relatives which are not dyadic relations are avoided by Plato’s version of conjunctivism. Looking at Sophist 255c–d and Parmenides 133c–134e, I discuss the taxonomy of relative terms. I show that, under the conjunctive reading, they form a distinguishable class and, in contrast to Owenian relatives, each reciprocates with its correlative. So, just as a parent is relative to offspring, so offspring are relative to a parent. With the nature of relative terms established, I proceed to refute Owen’s account of their purpose, and give my own explanation. By looking at passages from the Euthydemus and Charmides, I argue that Plato introduced relative terms to articulate why some arguments are fallacies and others not. That is, relative terms have a dialectical purpose.

The thesis aims to interpret the philosophy of negative Platonism, which Jan Patočka developed during the 1950s. In the first part, negative Platonism, whose preliminary notion is derived from the interpretation of the eponymous programme essay, is studied in the context of contemporary philosophical discussion and Patočka's subjectivist humanistic conception he developed in the latter half of the 1940s as well as his lectures on classical philosophy. The second part contains author's own systematic interpretation of negative Platonism, including the reconstruction of the textual corpus of Patočka's programme. Finally, the third part, which considers first the inspirational sources of the observed project, reviews negative Platonism and outlines a concept, with which Patočka replaced negative Platonism in the late 1950s. The thesis aims to outline the philosophy of negative Platonism as an important stage in Patočka's philosophical development as well as a significant part of the modern history of European thinking.

Many prominent scientists have pointed out that philosophy is of no benefit to science. Stephen Hawking asserts: Philosophy is dead! Sciences use conceptions like natural laws, matter, nature, theories, etc. But science is also confronted with questions such as: "What is a natural law?" "What is nature?" "What is matter?" and "What is a scientific theory?" These (metatheoretical) questions exceed the sphere of competence of science – they are items of the philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is a metatheory of science. The Philosophy of science overlaps epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics by exploring whether scientific results are true, or whether entities like quarks or electrons really exist. More detailed investigations bring various questions into consideration such as: "How do we define the boundaries between different scientific disciplines?" "Is there a relation between the beauty and the truth of a scientific theory?" and "How do we distinguish between science and pseudoscience?" Additionally, the philosophy of science is concerned with ethical problems of modern technology, with the methodological questions, with the reconstruction of the structure and the development of scientific theories, and with revealing of any indoctrination of science. The optimistic conclusion of this paper is: Philosophy is still alive – but the philosopher has to participate in round-table discussions with scientists. We just want philosophers talking to scientists!:I. Über die Kompetenz und Inkompetenz von Philosophie 09 II. Philosophie und Wissenschaft 12 III. Philosophische Rückverweise in den Naturwissenschaften 15 IV. Kompass wissenschaftsphilosophischer Kompetenz 26 01. Ontologische Kompetenz 28 02. Epistemologische Kompetenz 28 03. (Meta-)Methodenkompetenz 29 04. Kompetenz der logisch-begrifflichen Analysen 30 05. Metaphysische Kompetenz 30 06. Begründungskompetenz 31 07. Kompetenz der philosophisch motivierten Antizipation 33 08. Rekonstruktionskompetenz (historisch und systematisch) 34 09. Die Abgrenzungskompetenz 38 10. Grenzziehungskompetenz 38 11. Antinomien- und Krisenmanagement-Kompetenz 39 12. Kooperationskompetenz 42 13. Ethische Kompetenz 42 14. Deideologisierungskompetenz 45 15. Ästhetische Kompetenz 46 16. Inkompetenzdestruktionskompetenz 51 Ausblick 53 Abkürzungen 55 Literatur 55