Many of those artefacts with which we are so familiar – including, for example, works of music, photographs, novels, essays, films, television adverts, and graphic designs – share a common ontological nature. I argue in this thesis that they are all repeatable, and set out to provide an ontological account of these entities that explains the phenomenon of repeatability. In a fruitful meeting of aesthetics and metaphysics, a great deal has been written recently on the ontological nature of musical works. More encompassing enquiries have sought to understand the ontology of artworks in general. I will be responding to and engaging with this body of literature insofar as it also offers accounts of the entities I describe as repeatable. However, my approach gives metaphysical concerns and the phenomenon of repeatability primacy over aesthetic concerns.Here I argue that repeatable artefacts fall into the ontological category of kinds. I develop an account of repeatable artefacts as kinds that has two key components. Firstly, on my view kinds are physical rather than abstract. Secondly, I argue that repeatable artefacts, as kinds, have essences that are purely relational and historical. The thesis begins with a discussion of method. The methodological issue has grown in prominence in recent years, as theorists have sought some higher level arbitration on the expanding number of theories and approaches being offered in response to ontological puzzles. Drawing on the work of Amie Thomasson, I defend a methodology according to which we should develop an ontological account using careful conceptual analysis that assesses our intuitions about the application of referring terms. This commitment to conceptual analysis is then defended from misunderstandings and objections. I apply this method in giving an ontological explanation for the phenomenon of repeatability. I argue that repeatable artefacts are kinds. Kinds are strongly individuated by their essences, which are the conditions that must be satisfied for the kind to be instanced. I then develop an account of kinds as physical multiply located entities, that exist when and where they have instances. This stands in contrast to the prevailing view according to which kinds are abstract. I then set out to give an account of the essences of paradigmatic repeatable artefacts. I argue that this can be done if we are willing to reject the default view according to which essences are at least partly structural, and replace it with an account of purely relational and historical essences. The essences of many paradigmatic repeatable artefacts, I claim, involve causal historical processes of copying.

Θέμα της παρούσας διπλωματικής εργασίας είναι η παρουσίαση της θεωρίας του Αριστοτέλη για το πρώτο κινούν ακίνητο στο βιβλίο Λ (12ο), του έργου του "Μετά τα Φυσικά". Η πραγμάτευση του ζητήματος της ουσίας του πρώτου κινούντος ακινήτου, καταλαμβάνει κατά κύριο λόγο τα κεφάλαια 6,7 και 9 του βιβλίου Λ και παρουσιάζει ιδιαίτερο ενδιαφέρον και πρωτοτυπία, γι’ αυτό και δικαίως απασχόλησε αρκετούς σχολιαστές. Στις απόψεις μερικών απ’ αυτών γίνεται αναφορά και στην παρούσα εργασία , σε μια απόπειρα να επεξηγηθούν, να τονιστούν αλλά και να "φωτιστούν", βασικά σημεία του αριστοτελικού κειμένου, όπως ακόμη και να διερευνηθούν κάποια από τα ερωτήματα που τυχόν εγείρει. / --

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 535429 bytes, checksum: 9de365f472b4b7b023608244d3c88b8f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-07-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The present dissertation intends to favor a significant contribution to the clear comprehension of the matter of truth from Heidegger, in such a way it surpasses the problematic raised by his thought, having, however, as principle focus, a reconstruction or re-reading of Heidegger investigations before the tradition, History of Philosophy, and show the metaphysical insufficiency concerning the comprehension of the truth of the being. We started from an investigation of ancient Ontology, which has as principal figure, Platoon, which according to Heidegger, is responsible for the original curve of truth: platonic conception of truth as correction, ratified by Aristóteles with the agreement concept; perpetuated concepts throughout the History of Philosophy as Metaphysics. Nevertheless, Heidegger does not treat metaphysics in a negative way, but as a place where all the problems, while question for Philosophy, get together, that is why in Heidegger existing analytics, it is necessary to step back towards appropriate comprehension, with no curves, no forgetting, that is, in such a way the thought surpasses and corrects the lack caused by metaphysics, that is why it is necessary to recover the truth as Alethéia = uncovering. In accordance with truth as correction, Heidegger ontology for truth lies in the existing ontological possibility of Dasein. Heidegger wants the truth of origin: Let-it-be, uncovering, non-concealing, Alethéia. Of origin because the word Alethéia lies in the origin of the Greek thought, of philosophy, of Heraclitus . The dissertation still brings the problem of truth in modern science and language. All the questions raised in the dissertation are upon the chive of Heidegger thought, that is why in the second part of the dissertation we treat the question of truth leaning on the existing phenomenon condition of the analytics of Heidegger: In a construction of a new ontology, this being of ontological hermeneutic nature, of the world, of men, of the truth. / A presente dissertação pretende favorecer uma significativa contribuição para o esclarecimento da questão da verdade em Heidegger, de modo que perpasse a problemática levantada pelo seu pensamento, tendo, portanto, como principal foco uma reconstrução das investigações heideggerianas perante a História da Filosofia. Mostrar a insuficiência metafísica frente o esclarecimento da verdade do ser. Partimos de uma investigação da Ontologia Antiga, nesta, tem-se como principal figura, Platão, responsável, segundo Heidegger, pelo o desvio original da verdade: concepção platônica da verdade como correção, ratificado por Aristóteles com o conceito de concordância ; conceitos perpetuados ao longo da História da Filosofia como Metafísica. Todavia, Heidegger não trata a metafísica de forma negativa, mas antes como lugar onde se encontram todos os problemas enquanto questão para a Filosofia, por isso que, na analítica existencial heideggeriana, faz-se necessário dar um passo atrás em direção a uma compreensão apropriada, sem desvios, sem esquecimentos, ou seja, de modo que o pensamento supere e corrija a falta cometida pela metafísica, por isso é necessário resgatar a verdade como Alétheia, desencobrimento. Em detrimento à verdade como correção, a ontologia de Heidegger para a verdade encontra-se na possibilidade ontológica existencial do Dasein. Heidegger quer a verdade originária: deixar-ser, desencobrimento, desocultamento, Alétheia. Originária porque a palavra Alétheia está na origem do pensamento grego, da filosofia, de Heráclito . A dissertação traz ainda o problema da verdade nas ciências modernas e na linguagem. Todas as questões levantadas na dissertação estão sobre o crivo do pensamento heideggeriano, por isso que na segunda parte da dissertação tratamos da questão da verdade amparando-se na condição fenomenológica existencial da analítica de Heidegger: numa construção de uma nova ontologia; essa de cunho ontológico da existência, do mundo, do homem, da verdade.