<p>In South Africa, municipal councils are accorded a legal status and authority of a deliberative legislative body. This is considered critical for the municipal council to establish appropriate structures, processes and systems for effective oversight, particularly, oversight of budget execution. However, indications are that, the current legal and institutional measures need to be strengthened to enable municipal council to exercise oversight of the budget execution. Literature review conducted in this study highlighted executive dominance, lack of technical capacity, lack of access to relevant information and partisan attitude as key factors constraining elected representatives in general from exercising oversight of budget execution. In addition, the review identified institutional and behavioural criteria as the normative framework within which to evaluate the effectiveness of the current legal and institutional measures for oversight of budget execution in South African municipalities.</p>

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / In South Africa, municipal councils are accorded a legal status and authority of a deliberative legislative body. This is considered critical for the municipal council to establish appropriate structures, processes and systems for effective oversight, particularly, oversight of budget execution. However, indications are that, the current legal and institutional measures need to be strengthened to enable municipal council to exercise oversight of the budget execution. Literature review conducted in this study highlighted executive dominance, lack of technical capacity, lack of access to relevant information and partisan attitude as key factors constraining elected representatives in general from exercising oversight of budget execution. In addition, the review identified institutional and behavioural criteria as the normative framework within which to evaluate the effectiveness of the current legal and institutional measures for oversight of budget execution in South African municipalities. / South Africa

[pt] As atividades de transporte aéreo devem ser fiscalizadas para garantir a adequação dos níveis de segurança e procedimentos operacionais, no Brasil essa atividade é realizada pela Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC). Diversos aeroportos devem ser fiscalizados e em cada um deles uma inspeção diferente pode ser necessária. Os inspetores estão alocados em centros da ANAC em diferentes estados e é importante que o custo dessa atividade de inspeção seja minimizado, respeitando as regras existentes. Nesse sentido, essa dissertação de mestrado propõe dois modelos matemáticos para alocação de agentes qualificados para a realização de missões de fiscalização no território brasileiro. O objetivo é a definição de quais colaboradores formarão cada equipe de fiscalização, minimizando o custo de deslocamento dos agentes. O modelo proposto nesse trabalho é multi-período, para o planejamento operacional quinzenal, com a definição do período que as atividades devem ocorrer, da equipe de inspetores multi-habilitados em atividades de inspeção, multi-origens e multi-destinos. A modelagem é feita no LINGO e em Julia com a utilização do pacote JuMP e dos solvers Gurobi e CPLEX. O Modelo 1 propõe uma reformulação de artigos da literatura e possui tempo de solução entre 2 e 25 vezes menor. O Modelo 2 leva em consideração aspectos não considerados até então no Modelo 1, além disso, dada a quantidade de variáveis de decisão, foi utilizada para resolução do modelo heurística baseada na geração de colunas com programação dinâmica, proposta pelo autor, capaz de reduzir em até 95 porcento a quantidade de variáveis de decisão. A heurística permitiu a obtenção de solução inteira em instâncias que não a obtiveram com o modelo completo. / [en] Air transport activities must be inspected to ensure the adequacy of safety levels and operating procedures, in Brazil this activity is carried out by the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC). Several airports must be inspected and at each airport a different inspection may be required. The inspectors are located in ANAC centers in different states and it is important that the cost of this inspection activity is minimized, respecting the existing rules. In this sense, this master s thesis proposes two mathematical models for the allocation of qualified workforce to carry out inspection missions in the Brazilian territory. The objective is to define which employees will form in each inspection team, minimizing the cost of displacement of agents. The model proposed in this work is multi-period, for fortnightly operational planning, with the definition of the period that the activities must occur, of a team of multiskilled inspectors in inspection activities, multi-sources and multi-destinations. Modeling is done in LINGO and Julia using the JuMP package and the solvers Gurobi and CPLEX. Model 1 proposes a reformulation of articles in the literature and has a solution time between 2 and 25 times shorter. The second model takes into account aspects not considered so far in Model 1, in addition, given the amount of decision variables, it was used to solve the heuristic model based on the generation of columns with dynamic programming, proposed by the author, capable of reducing by up to 95 percent the amount of decision variables. The heuristic allowed obtaining an integer solution in instances that did not have a solution with the complete model.

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in 25% fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management) March 2017 / In recent years, increased attention being given to accountability on public finances in South African municipalities saw an increase in the number of municipalities establishing Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) to address deficiencies and gaps in the local government accountability mechanisms and oversight. The purpose of the study was to establish the alignment between the recently established MPACs and the generally accepted public accounts committees with respect to the institutional design, practices and performance assessment. A qualitative case study of the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (NMBM) MPAC was followed where documents were analysed and semi-structured in-depth interviews with purposively selected participants were conducted. This research study revealed some gaps in the alignment of the NMBM MPAC to the generally accepted public accounts committees. The most crucial gap that emerged pertained to the mandate and powers of the NMBM MPAC. Recommendations for enhancing the financial oversight of the NMBM MPAC were made. The study also suggests further research on a larger number of municipalities. / GR2018

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in 50 per cent fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management) February 2017 / This study examines legislative oversight practice within the Limpopo Legislature (subnational government) in South Arica, over a specific historic period. Legislative oversight and executive accountability are constitutionally mandated responsibilities. This study is focused on the fourth term (2009-2014) of the government of Limpopo, when financial management and policy implementation challenges resulted in five departments being placed under national administration. Semi-structured interviews and document analysis was utilised to understand the practice of legislative oversight and explore the challenges embedded in securing executive accountability. Drawing on the literature, a conceptual framework was used to guide the process for establishing the areas for detailed exploration. These included the legal and institutional framework for oversight; the capacity availed and utilised for oversight; and the informal institutional incentives and challenges that influenced the performance of oversight. The study revealed that oversight by the legislature and accountability by the executive are intertwined mandates and there are numerous contingencies embedded in the relationships they embody. The manner in which mandates unfold and oversight is exercised is affected by the underlying political dynamics within the dominant party. These dynamics impact on the autonomy of the legislature, shape the power relations between the executive and the legislature and creates incentives for practices that impact on legislative oversight and executive accountability. Members of the legislature were junior in party structures and did not have political authority which influenced the extent to which members of the legislature held the executive answerable as well as the extent to which the executive would account. In addition, the capacity of the institution and budget were insufficient to perform adequate oversight effectively and timeously and enable the legislature to develop into an efficient and successful institution. Furthermore, the legislature relied on the executive for information which was not always credible or reliable. This combination of factors led to oversight at times not being effective. The lessons derived from this study can be used to improve oversight effectiveness at a subnational and national governance level. However, given the role that the party plays in the governance system, there is a need for further research on party functioning, party incentives and internal democracy within the party. Key words: legislative oversight, executive accountability, parliamentary system, proportional representation, electoral system, Limpopo / MT2017

O papel da polícia em uma sociedade democrática é auxiliar os cidadãos e fazer com que todos observem as leis. Por isso mesmo, a atividade policial não deve estar acima das leis. Como toda instituição republicana, a polícia deve prestar contas das suas atividades, ainda mais porque utiliza a força, podendo facilmente ultrapassar os limites da violência legítima. A experiência das ouvidorias de polícia mostra que a sua instalação faz diferença. As ouvidorias são instituições que incentivam a participação dos cidadãos. Trata-se de instituições recentes e inovadoras com grande potencial para ajudar a garantir os direitos humanos. / The role of the police in a democratic society is to help citizens and make them obey the law. For this reason, police activities should not be above the law. As with every institution of a republic, the police are expected to be accountable for their actions, even more so because they use force and may easily exceed the limits of justifiable violence. The experience of civilian oversight of the police shows that its existence makes a difference. Such oversight comes in the form of institutions that invite the involvement of citizens. These institutions are recent and innovative with great potential for helping and guaranteeing human rights.

This dissertation seeks to explain variation in legislative strategies to control policymaking across institutional contexts. Of these many strategies, I focus particularly on the use of statutory language meant to direct agency action and on the use of oversight hearings. I argue that while low levels of oversight activity need not imply that a legislature is helplessly abdicating policymaking responsibility to unelected agencies, this may be the case in some circumstances. With the goal of establishing when the lack of oversight may mean such normatively problematic abdication, I develop a signaling model of delegation and oversight which proposes that oversight depends on institutional features (such as legislative capacity, the existence of legislative term limits and a legislative veto), political features (such as policy conflict within the government and within the legislature and the policy preferences and activism of important judicial actors), and the legislature's initial delegation of policymaking discretion to an agency. Critically, the pursuit of either strategy depends on alternative strategies available as well as on the likely actions of other institutions with the power to affect policy outcomes. The dissertation extends our theoretical understanding of legislative-executive relations and provides one of the first large-scale empirical analyses of legislative policymaking. In the first empirical chapter of this dissertation, I assess the predictions of the theory concerning congressional oversight activity from 1947-2006. I find that both the extent to which a congressional committee's ideology diverges from an agency's and the policy-specific expertise of said committee affect the number of oversight hearing days the committee holds, but only when policy disagreements are sufficiently conflictual. This last condition suggests, contrary to previous research, that the extent to which oversight should be necessary, to either legislative policymaking or democratic legitimacy, varies across preference arrangements. In the next empirical chapter, I switch my focus from the analysis of a single legislature over time to a cross-sectional study of the extent to which U.S. state legislatures delegate authority to bureaucratic agencies. Here, I find that the amount of discretion that a legislature delegates to an agency charged with implementing Medicaid policy is nonlinearly related to the extent to which state courts are likely to affect policy outcomes, as captured by a new measure of judicial activism. These analyses confirm that legislatures consider alternative methods of control as well as the likely actions of external institutions when crafting their policymaking strategies.

Financial accountability is a pressing issue in United States NPOs because there is a demand, by donors and the public they serve, to implement clear accountability practices. The purpose of this study was to explore and document the financial oversight and accountability policies and procedures that successful NPOs employ to maintain clear financial accountability practices. The theoretical framework underlining this qualitative phenomenological study was a combination of social construction theory and institutional rational choice theory. The research question was focused on understanding essential financial oversight and accountability policies and procedures that should be designed for NPOs to create and maintain financial accountability. Interview data were collected from 6 participants from 4 successful emerging organizations, less than 5 years in business, and 8 participants from organizations that have a longer history, more than 5 years in business. Data were coded using the basic NVivo software package and analyzed thematically. Findings regarding the tools needed to create and maintain vital accountability policies and procedures in NPOs were as follows; need for accountability, importance of appropriate disclosure, impact of dashboard tool, expense projection, financial manager, financial misappropriation reporting, oversight policies, revenue forecasts, board members and supportive culture. The potential impact of this qualitative study for social change is that the policies, practices, and procedures of successful NPOs were identified and documented for those old, new and emerging NPOs not using them. The critical finding of this study shows the need for continued research to bring positive social change through nonprofit financial accountability policy improvement.

<p>The history of prison reform after 1994 was shaped by the relationship between governance and human rights standards / the requirements for both are set out in the Constitution and elaborated on in the Correctional Services Act. Good governance and human rights converge in five dimensions of a constitutional democracy: legitimacy, transparency, accountability, the rule&nbsp / of law / and resource utilisation. The new constitutional order established a set of governance and rights requirements for the prison system demanding fundamental reform. It de-legitimised the existing prison system and thus placed it in a crisis. This required its reinvention to establish a system compatible with constitutional demands. The thesis investigates whether&nbsp / constitutionalism provided the necessary transformative basis for prison reform in South Africa after 1994. The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) senior management failed to&nbsp / anticipate this in the period 1990 to 1994. In the five years after 1994 senior management equally failed to initiate a fundamental reform process. This lack of vision, as well as a number of external factors relating to the state of the public service in the period 1994 to 2000, gave rise to a second crisis: the collapse of order and discipline in the DCS. By the late 1990s the state had lost control of the DCS and its internal workings can be described as a mess &ndash / a highly interactive set of problems in causal relationships. In many regards the problems beleaguering the prison system were created in the period 1994 &ndash / 1999. The leadership at the time did not recognize that the prison system was in crisis or that the crisis presented an opportunity for&nbsp / fundamental reform. The new democratic order demanded constitutional and political imagination, but this failed to materialise. Consequently, the role and function of imprisonment within the&nbsp / criminal justice system has remained fundamentally unchanged and there has not been a critical re-examination of its purpose, save that the criminal justice system has become more punitive. Several investigations (1998-2006) into the DCS found widespread corruption and rights violations. Organised labour understood transformation primarily as the racial transformation of the staff corps and embarked on an organised campaign to seize control of management and key positions. This introduced a culture of lawlessness, enabling widespread corruption. w leadership by 2001 and facing pressure from the national government, the DCS responded to the situation by focusing on corruption and on regaining control of the Department. A number of&nbsp / gains have been made since then, especially after 2004. Regaining control of the Department focused on addressing systemic weaknesses, enforcing the disciplinary code and defining a&nbsp / new employer-employee relationship. This has been a slow process with notable setbacks, but it continues to form part of the Department&rsquo / s strategic direction. It is concluded that the DCS&nbsp / has engaged with and developed a deeper understanding of its constitutional obligations insofar as they pertain to governance requirements in the Constitution. However, compliance with&nbsp / human rights standards had not received the same attention and areas of substantial non-compliance remain in violation of the Constitution and subordinate legislation. Overcrowding,&nbsp / violations of personal safety, poor services and/or lack of access to services persist. Despite the detailed rights standards set out in the Correctional Services Act, there is little to indicate that&nbsp / legislative compliance is an overt focus for the DCS. While meeting the minimum standards of humane detention, as required by the Constitution, should have been the strategic focus of the&nbsp / DCS in relation to the prison population, the 2004 White&nbsp / Paper defines &ldquo / offender rehabilitation&rdquo / as the core business of the DCS. In many regards the DCS has assigned more prominence&nbsp / and weight to the White Paper than to its obligations under the Correctional Services Act. In an attempt to legitimise the prison system, the DCS defined for itself a goal that is required neither&nbsp / by the Constitution nor the Correctional&nbsp / Services Act. Compliance with the minimum standards of humane detention must be regarded as a prerequisite for successful interventions to reduce&nbsp / future criminality. After&nbsp / seven years, delivery results on the rehabilitation objective have been minimal and not objectively measurable. The noble and over-ambitious focus on rehabilitation at&nbsp / policy level distracted the DCS from its primary constitutional obligation, namely to ensure safe and humane custody under conditions of human dignity Throughout the period (1994 to 2012)&nbsp / the DCS has been suspicious if not dismissive of advice, guidance and at times orders (including court orders) offered or given by external&nbsp / stakeholders. Its relationship with civil society&nbsp / &nbsp / &nbsp / &nbsp / organisations remain strained and there is no formal structure for interaction. Since 2004 Parliament has reasserted its authority over the DCS, not hesitating to criticise poor decisions and&nbsp / sub-standard performance. Civil society organisations have increasingly used Parliament as a platform for raising concerns about prison reform. Litigation by civil society and prisoners has&nbsp / also been used on a growing scale&nbsp / to ensure legislative compliance. It is concluded that prison reform efforts needs to refocus on he rights requirements set out in the Correctional Services&nbsp / Act and approach this task in an inclusive, transparent and accountable manner.&nbsp / &nbsp / </p>

<p>The history of prison reform after 1994 was shaped by the relationship between governance and human rights standards / the requirements for both are set out in the Constitution and elaborated on in the Correctional Services Act. Good governance and human rights converge in five dimensions of a constitutional democracy: legitimacy, transparency, accountability, the rule&nbsp / of law / and resource utilisation. The new constitutional order established a set of governance and rights requirements for the prison system demanding fundamental reform. It de-legitimised the existing prison system and thus placed it in a crisis. This required its reinvention to establish a system compatible with constitutional demands. The thesis investigates whether&nbsp / constitutionalism provided the necessary transformative basis for prison reform in South Africa after 1994. The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) senior management failed to&nbsp / anticipate this in the period 1990 to 1994. In the five years after 1994 senior management equally failed to initiate a fundamental reform process. This lack of vision, as well as a number of external factors relating to the state of the public service in the period 1994 to 2000, gave rise to a second crisis: the collapse of order and discipline in the DCS. By the late 1990s the state had lost control of the DCS and its internal workings can be described as a mess &ndash / a highly interactive set of problems in causal relationships. In many regards the problems beleaguering the prison system were created in the period 1994 &ndash / 1999. The leadership at the time did not recognize that the prison system was in crisis or that the crisis presented an opportunity for&nbsp / fundamental reform. The new democratic order demanded constitutional and political imagination, but this failed to materialise. Consequently, the role and function of imprisonment within the&nbsp / criminal justice system has remained fundamentally unchanged and there has not been a critical re-examination of its purpose, save that the criminal justice system has become more punitive. Several investigations (1998-2006) into the DCS found widespread corruption and rights violations. Organised labour understood transformation primarily as the racial transformation of the staff corps and embarked on an organised campaign to seize control of management and key positions. This introduced a culture of lawlessness, enabling widespread corruption. w leadership by 2001 and facing pressure from the national government, the DCS responded to the situation by focusing on corruption and on regaining control of the Department. A number of&nbsp / gains have been made since then, especially after 2004. Regaining control of the Department focused on addressing systemic weaknesses, enforcing the disciplinary code and defining a&nbsp / new employer-employee relationship. This has been a slow process with notable setbacks, but it continues to form part of the Department&rsquo / s strategic direction. It is concluded that the DCS&nbsp / has engaged with and developed a deeper understanding of its constitutional obligations insofar as they pertain to governance requirements in the Constitution. However, compliance with&nbsp / human rights standards had not received the same attention and areas of substantial non-compliance remain in violation of the Constitution and subordinate legislation. Overcrowding,&nbsp / violations of personal safety, poor services and/or lack of access to services persist. Despite the detailed rights standards set out in the Correctional Services Act, there is little to indicate that&nbsp / legislative compliance is an overt focus for the DCS. While meeting the minimum standards of humane detention, as required by the Constitution, should have been the strategic focus of the&nbsp / DCS in relation to the prison population, the 2004 White&nbsp / Paper defines &ldquo / offender rehabilitation&rdquo / as the core business of the DCS. In many regards the DCS has assigned more prominence&nbsp / and weight to the White Paper than to its obligations under the Correctional Services Act. In an attempt to legitimise the prison system, the DCS defined for itself a goal that is required neither&nbsp / by the Constitution nor the Correctional&nbsp / Services Act. Compliance with the minimum standards of humane detention must be regarded as a prerequisite for successful interventions to reduce&nbsp / future criminality. After&nbsp / seven years, delivery results on the rehabilitation objective have been minimal and not objectively measurable. The noble and over-ambitious focus on rehabilitation at&nbsp / policy level distracted the DCS from its primary constitutional obligation, namely to ensure safe and humane custody under conditions of human dignity Throughout the period (1994 to 2012)&nbsp / the DCS has been suspicious if not dismissive of advice, guidance and at times orders (including court orders) offered or given by external&nbsp / stakeholders. Its relationship with civil society&nbsp / &nbsp / &nbsp / &nbsp / organisations remain strained and there is no formal structure for interaction. Since 2004 Parliament has reasserted its authority over the DCS, not hesitating to criticise poor decisions and&nbsp / sub-standard performance. Civil society organisations have increasingly used Parliament as a platform for raising concerns about prison reform. Litigation by civil society and prisoners has&nbsp / also been used on a growing scale&nbsp / to ensure legislative compliance. It is concluded that prison reform efforts needs to refocus on he rights requirements set out in the Correctional Services&nbsp / Act and approach this task in an inclusive, transparent and accountable manner.&nbsp / &nbsp / </p>