CJEU judgments usually have automatic retroactive effect. However, the CJEU seems to be aware that this approach may have far-reaching consequences in some situations and may sometimes lead to negative effects. As early as 1976, the CJEU decided for the first time to limit the temporal effects of one of its judgments. As there is no explicit legal basis at all in the EC Treaty for the CJEU to limit the temporal effects of one of its judgments under the rule which is today Art. 267 TFEU, the Court itself had to develop the criteria under which it is willing do so. The Court made it clear right from the beginning of this case law in 1976 that it was only willing to limit the effects of a judgment in exceptional cases. The general approach of the CJEU in respect of the temporal effects of its judgments is understandable from a policy point of view: The Court wants to make sure that its judgments have retroactive effect as a matter of principle. However, at the same time it is understandable that the CJEU wants to leave the door open in order to limit these effects, if necessary. The CJEU sees a need for an "emergency brake". But, it is questionable whether the criteria developed by the Court in order to maintain this possibility really fit. The case Meilicke has further complicated the rules of the game for the Member States. Governments have to request this limitation in the appropriate case. Appropriateness depends on the level of abstraction and it is impossible for the governments to foresee which case the CJEU will retrospectively consider to be the relevant one. A government will only be successful with its request for a limitation of the temporal effects in a case stemming from another Member State if it can convince the Court that its own tax system infringes Union law and that a judgment will lead to serious economic repercussions for its country. If the CJEU in Meilicke has really developed its case law further in the direction that temporal effects of judgment can be limited only for all or for no Member State, requesting a limitation of these effects becomes even more challenging for governments and the consequences arbitrary. For all these reasons the Court would be well advised, on the one hand, to maintain its case law according to which only in exceptional cases judgments do not have retroactive effect and, on the other hand, to develop more transparent and operational criteria under which it is willing to distinguish between the rule and the exception. (author's abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

Aufgrund des wachsenden Bedarfs an kohärenter Interaktion zwischen dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union und den Gerichten der EMRK-Mitgliedstaaten, untersucht diese Arbeit die Problematik von Kompetenzkonflikten, die die Glaubwürdigkeit der europäischen und nationalen Gerichtshöfe untergraben und die Effektivität des gerichtlichen Rechtsschutzes in Europa schwächen, und schlägt die Lösungen vor, um Rechtsprechungskonflikte zwischen den Gerichtshöfen zu verringern. Es erfolgt eine Betrachtung der Fragen, wie Inkonsistenzen der gerichtlichen Rechtsprechung der europäischen und nationalen Gerichte vermieden werden können, wie der Beitritt der EU zur EMRK angegangen werden kann und wie das Piloturteilsverfahren des EGMR und nationalen gerichtlichen Überprüfungsverfahren wirksam funktionieren kann. Die Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass es für die Koordination der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Gerichten wichtig ist, ihre Interaktionen zu verstärken, indem bewährte Verfahren auf allen Ebenen ausgetauscht werden. Um eine tiefere Integration der Staaten in die europäische und internationale Gemeinschaft zu erreichen und das Risiko von sich widersprechenden gerichtlichen Entscheidungen zu reduzieren, wird von den Mitgliedstaaten erwartet, dass sie ihre Verpflichtungen aus dem EU-Recht und der EMRK verlässlich erfüllen, und die europäischen Gerichtshöfe werden ihrerseits die Möglichkeit eines Eingriffs in die Souveränität der Staaten ausschlieβen lassen. Nur wenn einvernehmlich beschlossene Lösungen angenommen werden, wird eine größere Kohärenz in Rechtsprechung der europäischen und nationalen Gerichtshöfe erreicht und ein einheitliches System zum Schutz der Menschenrechte gewährleistet. / In light of the growing need to establish a coherent relationship between the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the courts of the ECHR member states, this study explores the challenges of jurisdictional competition that undermine the credibility of the courts and weaken the effectiveness of judicial protection of fundamental rights in Europe, and suggests ways to reduce emerging judicial tensions between these courts. It examines how to avoid inconsistencies in judicial practices of the European and national courts, how to approach accession of the EU to the ECHR, and how to ensure effective functioning of the pilot judgment mechanism and national judicial review procedures. It concludes that in order to coordinate cooperation between the courts it is important to strengthen their interactions through adhering to best practices at all levels. To pursue deeper integration of states into the European and international community and minimise the chance of rendering contradicting judgments by the courts, member states are expected to comply faithfully with their obligations under EU law and the ECHR, and the European courts shall exclude the possibility of encroachment on state sovereignty. Only if mutually agreed solutions are adopted will a greater consistency in their case law be achieved and a uniform system of protection of human rights ensured.