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This thesis addresses the meaning and scope of application of the right not to be subjected to degrading treatment, a distinct form of harm within the absolute prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Through an interpretive case-law analysis, the thesis presents a deeper conceptual understanding of the meaning of degrading treatment than is found in existing human rights literature. It is a central argument of this thesis that the concept of human dignity occupies a key position in the interpretation of degrading treatment adopted by the European Court of Human Rights. Consequently, it is argued that the meaning of human dignity in this context ‘frames’ the potential boundaries of the right. The thesis aims to facilitate identification of situations that may convincingly be argued to amount to potential instances of degrading treatment through generating a richer appreciation of the right’s proper scope of concern. A comprehensive account of the meaning of degrading treatment and corresponding state obligations is offered. This account provides a framework for future application of the right that is both practical and plausible.

Le droit à un recours effectif constitue une disposition clé de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. En vertu de l'article 13 de la Convention, toute personne ayant un "grief défendable" tiré d'une violation des droits conventionnels, doit bénéficier d'un recours effectif devant une autorité nationale. Le droit à un recours effectif vient ainsi consolider la protection des droits conventionnels au niveau interne. Par conséquent, il établit avant tout une garantie supplémentaire qui renforce l'effectivité des droits substantiels. Dans le même temps, l'article 13 contient à la fois un droit subjectif procédural dont la violation peut être constatée par la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, ainsi qu'une obligation étatique découlant de l'obligation générale de protection des droits de l'homme. Il est ainsi l'expression du principe de subsidiarité et permet aux Etats parties de remédier eux-mêmes aux violations des droits conventionnels. Dans un souci d'efficacité, le juge européen a enrichi de plus en plus le contenu du droit à un recours effectif, qui semble se transformer en droit à un recours juridictionnel effectif. / The right to an effective remedy is one of the key-provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. On the basis of the Article 13 of the Convention, everyone who has an “arguable claim” that one of his Convention rights has been violated, shall have an effective remedy before a national authority. The right to an effective remedy therefore enforces the protection of the Convention rights on domestic level. In this way, it principally establishes an additional guarantee that reinforces the effectiveness of the substantive rights. At the same time, the Article 13 contains an individual procedural right, the violation of which can be found by the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, it contains an obligation of the States giving direct expression to their general obligation to protect human rights. The Article 13 is therefore the expression of the principle of subsidiary and it allows the Contracting parties to remedy directly the violations of the Convention rights. Attentive to the effectiveness of the Convention, the European Court has gradually enhanced the content of the right to an effective remedy, resulting in what appears to be a transformation into a right to an effective judicial remedy.

La présente étude a pour objet l’analyse de l’appréhension des conditions de détention en établissements pénitentiaires par le mécanisme européen à travers la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Plus précisément, il s’agit d’étudier de quelle manière la Convention internationale contribue à protéger les droits fondamentaux des personnes privées de liberté et si son action est réellement efficiente. Cette recherche doit s’ordonner autour de deux axes principaux. En effet, il conviendra tout d’abord de démontrer la réelle efficacité du mécanisme européen de prévention des conditions de détention en s’interrogeant sur le degré d’effectivité de l’engagement des Etats membres du Conseil de l’Europe. Il est dans ce sens important d’observer avec attention la qualité de la promotion des droits fondamentaux des détenus sur la scène internationale. De même, il sera nécessaire d’étudier les différentes stratégies européennes afin d’assurer une prévention opérante des conditions de détention. A cet égard, l’on constatera la parfaite prévention relative aux conditions de vie des détenus qu’a constitué le Conseil de l’Europe. Par ailleurs, il sera également nécessaire de constater la relative efficacité du mécanisme européen de sanction des conditions de détention en constatant les carences qui subsistent et les sanctions qui restent aujourd’hui insuffisantes. A cet égard, il est essentiel de s’interroger sur l’influence de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme sur les ordres juridiques internes relatifs aux conditions de détention à travers la jurisprudence de Strasbourg. En effet, c’est précisément ce raisonnement qui va démontrer le degré d’efficacité du mécanisme juridictionnel strasbourgeois. Il est dans ce sens primordial d’étudier minutieusement la réalité des conditions de vie des personnes privées de liberté afin de comprendre les raisons de l’insuffisance du mécanisme de sanction des conditions de détention. / The present study has an aim the analysis of the apprehension of the detention conditions in penal institutions by the European mechanism throught the European Convention of the human rights. More precisely, it is a question of studying International convention how contributes to protect the basic rights from the individuals of freedom and if its action is really efficient. This research must be ordered around two main axes. Indeed, it will first of all be advisable to show the real effectiveness of the European mechanism of prevention of the detention conditions while wondering about the degree of effectiveness of the commitment of the Member States of the Council of Europe. It is in this direction important to observe with attention the quality of the promotion of the basic rights of the prisoners on the international scene. In the same way, it will be necessary to study the various European strategies in order to ensure an operative prevention of the detention conditions. In this respect, one will note the perfect prevention relating to the living conditions of the prisoners whom the Council of Europe constituted. In addition, it will be also necessary to note the relative effectiveness of the European mechanism of sanction of the detention conditions by noting the deficiencies which remain and the sanctions which remain insufficient today. In this respect, it is essential to wonder about the influence of the European Convention of the human rights on the internal legal orders relating to the detention conditions through jurisprudence of Strasbourg. Indeed, it is precisely this reasoning which will show the degree of effectiveness of the jurisdictional mechanism of Strasbourg. It is in this direction paramount to thoroughly study the reality of the living conditions of the individuals of freedom in order to understand the reasons of the insufficiency of the mechanism of sanction of the detention conditions.

Le droit au développement personnel fut consacré, il y a un peu plus d'une dizaine d'années, par la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, sur le terrain du droit au respect de la vie privée, dans le prolongement de la reconnaissance d'une protection se déployant dans la sphère sociale de l'existence de l'individu. Il va débuter et poursuivre sa « construction » au gré d'une jurisprudence dynamique et évolutive, traitant de problématiques liées aux transformations et bouleversements qui animent les milieux sociaux dans lesquels la Convention européenne a vocation à s'appliquer. Il se déploie, d'une manière formelle, exclusivement dans la jurisprudence relative au droit au respect de la vie privée, aux côtés de certaines notions avec lesquelles il entretient un rapport de consubstantialité. Ces notions semblent alors fonctionner à la manière d'un bloc, imbriquées dans une formulation sous-tendant un objectif commun qui, au regard des espèces dans lesquelles le juge européen les sollicite, paraît avoir trait au respect, à la préservation, voire au développement de la qualité de vie et du bien-être de l'individu. Mais cette relation n'est pas constante, et varie dans le raisonnement de la Cour européenne, au gré des affaires soumises à son examen. Le droit au développement personnel se décline ainsi comme une notion complexe, revêtant deux facettes distinctes, quoique non nécessairement a priori inconciliables. Il se caractérise en effet par des traductions juridiques concrètes, et se présente par ailleurs comme un concept assumant une fonction plus générale, d'une nature plus abstraite. Du fait notamment de sa généralité, il semble, dans une certaines mesure, trouver une résonance dans la jurisprudence relative à d'autres dispositions du texte conventionnel. Dans cette perspective, il paraît susceptible de contribuer à l'évolution et à la cohérence du système européen de protection des droits de l'homme, tantôt de manière concrète, tantôt de manière moins tangible, mais dans les deux cas, en saisissant particulièrement l'esprit du texte conventionnel. / The right to personal development was established, a little more than a decade ago, by the European Court of Human Rights in the area of the right to respect for private life, as an extension of the recognition of a protection of the existence of the individual within the social sphere. It will begin and continue to develop through a dynamic and evolving jurisprudence dealing with issues related to transformations and upheavals that drive social environments in which the European Convention is intended to apply. It is formally unfolding exclusively in the jurisprudence on the right to respect for private life, alongside notions with which it maintains a consubstantial relationship. These notions seem to operate as a unit, nested in a formulation underlying a common goal that, in terms of cases in which the European Court uses them, seems to relate to the respect, preservation and even the development of the quality of life and well-being of the individual. However, this relationship is not constant and varies in the reasoning of the European Court, according to the cases submitted for its consideration. The right to personal development thus appears to be a complex notion, with two distinct facets, though not necessarily a priori irreconcilable. It is indeed characterized by specific legal translations and also seems to be a concept assuming a more general function of a more abstract nature. Due specifically to its general character, it seems, to a certain extent, to resonate in the jurisprudence of other provisions of the text of the Convention. From this perspective, it seems likely to contribute to the development and coherence of the European system for the protection of human rights, sometimes concretely, sometimes less tangibly yet, in both cases, particularly comprehending the spirit of the Convention text.

Under the auspices of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights the right to freedom of expression is said to be held by everyone and to include the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority, subject to the limitation clauses outlined in Article 10(2). Whilst the text of Article 10 therefore makes no explicit reference to specifically artistic expression, the European Court of Human Rights has, in its interpretation of ‘information and ideas’, nevertheless accepted that artistic expression does indeed fall within the ambit of Article 10’s protection of freedom of expression. However, despite the Court recognising artistic expression as a form of expression within the framework of Article 10, conclusions reached in the early case law concerning the issue of controversial artworks would appear to suggest the judicial creation of an implicit hierarchy of expression under which artistic expression is seen to enjoy a relatively low level of protection. Given the non-differentiated articulation of the right to freedom of expression enounced in the text of Article 10, the creation of such a hierarchy of expression is therefore a cause for doctrinal concern. In seeking to assess this misnomer the thesis’ analysis of the treatment of artistic expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights may be distilled in to two component parts. Firstly, a theoretical basis will be established from which artistic expression may be located within the context of the discourse pertaining to freedom of expression more generally. Having confirmed that, whilst of a distinctive, sui generis nature, artistic expression may indeed constitute ‘expression’ for the purposes of freedom of expression doctrine the second part of the thesis will examine the particular question of artistic expression’s treatment under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

<p>The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) was adopted in 1950. One of the most important rights established therein is the right to life, which can be found in article 2.</p><p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine how far the scope of this right reaches concerning the beginning and the end of life. This is mainly done by examining the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) which is set to monitor the observance of the rights. To make this thesis manageable, the three areas of abortion, euthanasia and the death penalty have been chosen as the starting-point of the examination.</p><p>The position of the three areas among the member states varies. Abortion and euthanasia have been regarded by the Court as sensitive areas in which the states have a wide margin of appreciation to decide on their own. This is much due to the lack of consensus within the states as to how they should be regulated.</p><p>Whether the unborn foetus is protected by the Convention and in such case to what extent is still in dispute. This is also the case concerning when life begins. The Court has stated that any right the foetus may possess is limited by the rights of the mother. They have also said that they do not want to impose a certain view on the member states.</p><p>The Commission has stated that if the foetus would have an absolute right to life under the Convention, then it would lead to serious implications for the mother, as she would not be able to have an abortion in any circumstance. Also, in <em>Vo v. France</em> one of the dissenting judges stated that the foetus’ right to life have to be narrower in scope than the right of the born.</p><p>In the case <em>Pretty v. the United Kingdom</em> the Court unanimously ruled that article 2 does not include a right to die. However some member states, like the Netherlands, have made euthanasia legal without being found to violate its obligations under the Convention. Consequently, it does not seem to be against the Convention for states to make their own legislation allowing for euthanasia to be practiced.</p><p>One important aspect to this debate is whether one considers life to be inalienable or not. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has said that even though the rights of the terminally ill should be respected, it does not mean that one has the right to die at the hands of someone else. The Court has also said that in this area, it is important to protect those vulnerable from being used, and therefore states have the right to legislate against euthanasia.</p><p>The situation is different when it comes to the death penalty. Two additional protocols have been adopted restricting or completely abolishing the penalty since the adoption of the Convention. In 1950 there was no possibility to exclude the right to use the death penalty from the Convention since many European states still retained it in their domestic laws. However, the development since has moved towards a complete abolition. This is for instance evident since aspiring members of the Council of Europe have to be willing to abolish the penalty to be accepted.</p><p>The Court has dealt with the death penalty in several cases. In <em>Soering v. the United Kingdom</em> they said that extraditing someone to a state where he or she risks being executed not automatically means a violation of the right to life or the prohibition of torture. In <em>Öcalan v. Turkey</em> they established that the imposition of the death penalty after an unfair trial was a violation of article 3. Also, they considered the death penalty to now be regarded as an unacceptable punishment in peace time. Abolition of the death penalty is something the Council of Europe has worked for in decades to realise.</p>

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) was adopted in 1950. One of the most important rights established therein is the right to life, which can be found in article 2. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how far the scope of this right reaches concerning the beginning and the end of life. This is mainly done by examining the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) which is set to monitor the observance of the rights. To make this thesis manageable, the three areas of abortion, euthanasia and the death penalty have been chosen as the starting-point of the examination. The position of the three areas among the member states varies. Abortion and euthanasia have been regarded by the Court as sensitive areas in which the states have a wide margin of appreciation to decide on their own. This is much due to the lack of consensus within the states as to how they should be regulated. Whether the unborn foetus is protected by the Convention and in such case to what extent is still in dispute. This is also the case concerning when life begins. The Court has stated that any right the foetus may possess is limited by the rights of the mother. They have also said that they do not want to impose a certain view on the member states. The Commission has stated that if the foetus would have an absolute right to life under the Convention, then it would lead to serious implications for the mother, as she would not be able to have an abortion in any circumstance. Also, in Vo v. France one of the dissenting judges stated that the foetus’ right to life have to be narrower in scope than the right of the born. In the case Pretty v. the United Kingdom the Court unanimously ruled that article 2 does not include a right to die. However some member states, like the Netherlands, have made euthanasia legal without being found to violate its obligations under the Convention. Consequently, it does not seem to be against the Convention for states to make their own legislation allowing for euthanasia to be practiced. One important aspect to this debate is whether one considers life to be inalienable or not. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has said that even though the rights of the terminally ill should be respected, it does not mean that one has the right to die at the hands of someone else. The Court has also said that in this area, it is important to protect those vulnerable from being used, and therefore states have the right to legislate against euthanasia. The situation is different when it comes to the death penalty. Two additional protocols have been adopted restricting or completely abolishing the penalty since the adoption of the Convention. In 1950 there was no possibility to exclude the right to use the death penalty from the Convention since many European states still retained it in their domestic laws. However, the development since has moved towards a complete abolition. This is for instance evident since aspiring members of the Council of Europe have to be willing to abolish the penalty to be accepted. The Court has dealt with the death penalty in several cases. In Soering v. the United Kingdom they said that extraditing someone to a state where he or she risks being executed not automatically means a violation of the right to life or the prohibition of torture. In Öcalan v. Turkey they established that the imposition of the death penalty after an unfair trial was a violation of article 3. Also, they considered the death penalty to now be regarded as an unacceptable punishment in peace time. Abolition of the death penalty is something the Council of Europe has worked for in decades to realise.

Freedom of expression and the right to criticize are important prerequisites in the Swedish labor market. In fact, the freedom of expression is regulated in a long chain of protection, and not at least for the public employees which have the ECHR’s protection and the Swedish constitution embedded in their employment contracts. For the private employees, on the other hand, the legal situation looks completely different. A private employee does not receive equal opportunities to invoke the ECHR or the Swedish constitution when criticizing the employer. The main purpose of this paper is thus to investigate the legal situation for each sector, after which the legal situation must be compared and discussed in light of the duty of loyalty.  As the right to criticize has become a major issue for discussion, Sweden received a whistleblower regulation in 2017 which came to protect workers from reprisals. Nonetheless, a couple of years have passed, and a new EU-directive has been introduced with a number of new requirements. In December 2021, Sweden will introduce a more comprehensive whistleblower regulation and replace the current regulation. The second purpose of this paper is accordingly to investigate the new protection and examine the possible impact of the protection in each sector.  The conclusions of the paper were not entirely easy to summarize. What is clear is that there is no uniform protection in the sectors, and the enhanced protection may result in a smaller gap between the sectors, despite different interests.

In 2019 the European Union presented a new directive, Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and the council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law. An EU-directive needs to be implemented into the national law of every member state, which for Sweden resulted in a new law regarding whistle-blowing: Law (2021:819) about protection for persons reporting misconduct, or in Swedish, Lag (2021:819) om skydd för personer som rapporterar om missförhållanden. The directive is a minimum directive, which means that all of its content needs to be implemented into national law, but there is no stopping member states from giving further protection than the directive. This paper aims to analyse the new Swedish law, how it differs from the directive and earlier Swedish law regarding whistleblowing, how it interacts with other Swedish regulations and most importantly if and how the new law strengthens the protection of whistleblowers. Our focus will be on the perspective of the employee and what the new law can mean for them, along with discussing differences in protection between the public and private sector.  In order to fulfil our purpose we will in our legal investigation first present some background information surrounding whistleblowing to create an understanding of the concept and its importance. Then we will follow the legal hierarchy and firstly present information surrounding international and EU-law, then present relevant Swedish regulations that are of importance to whistleblowing. Furthermore there will be a presentation of both the old Swedish law regarding whistleblowing and the new Swedish law and how it is based off of the directive. During the legal investigation some case law, both from the European Court of Human Rights and the Swedish court, will be presented to explain some background to the origin of the EU-directive and to analyse if and how the new Swedish law could be of help in the Swedish case. Finally there will be an analysis based on our legal investigation where we answer and discuss our research question.