Talcott Parsons, generally acclaimed to be one of the paramount sociological theorists at present, frequently asserts that he is seeking to develop an abstract scientific theory of social phenomena. There is, however, a corpus of notions, principles, and stratagems regarding scientific theory called the hypothetico-deductive approach. It is generally recognized as perhaps the most logically tenable and empirically revealing approach as regards the formulation of significant statements about the world. The problem, therefore, in this study centers on the question: How do Talcott Parsons' conception of the Mature and functions of scientific theory (his metatheory) and the basic structure of his substantive theory stand if they are compared with the various aspects of a hypothetico-deductive approach. To accomplish this, several lines of attack are initially pursued. Parsons' early intellectual influences and contacts are roughly traced out in an attempt to illumine the connections between Parsons and certain theorists who imparted a definite direction to Parsons' theoretical thinking. It is discovered that, the influences on Parsons were wide, diverse and, on the whole of a European speculative approach toward social theory. A discussion of the nature and functions of scientific theory and explanation in terms of a hypothetico-deductive approach is, then, carried out. Following this, an extensive elaboration and criticism of Parsons' conception of scientific theory, as revealed in a number of published essays and volumes, particularly The Structure of Social Action, is undertaken. It is found that many of Parsons' views, in this respect, are vague and logically untenable, with an extraordinary emphasis on concept development rather than the formulation of general statements (or laws) which form the heart of all scientific theory. An examination of the basic structure of Parsons' substantive theory reveals that it is structurally modelled in the light of what he conceives scientific theory to be and, consequently, is found to be decidedly lacking in a logical sense, thereby impairing its empirical applicability. It is concluded that Parsons' conception of scientific theory is inadequate and that his substantive theory is not theory if viewed from a hypothetico-deductive perspective. It is suggested, moreover, that Parsons has provided orientations in his substantive work rather than theory. / Arts, Faculty of / Sociology, Department of / Graduate

Chen Hon-fai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 256-261). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.iii / ABSTRACT --- p.iv / INTRODUCTION: PARSONIANISM IN CONTEXT / Chapter I. --- The Context: Parsons Revival and the Reading of Parsons --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- The Problem: Relationship between Parsons' Structural-Functionalism and Luhmann's Neo-Functionalism --- p.13 / Chapter III. --- "Interpretive Perspective: Theory, Methodology and Presupposition" --- p.31 / Chapter CHAPTER 1 --- ANALYTICAL REALISM AND VOLUNTARISM: PARSONS´ة ACTION THEORY IN THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION / Chapter 1.1 --- Analytical Realism --- p.49 / Chapter 1.2 --- Action Frame of Reference --- p.62 / Chapter CHAPTER 2 --- EMERGENCE AND FUNCTIONALISM: PARSONS´ة SYSTEM THEORY IN THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION --- p.90 / INTERLUDE PARSONS̐ơ THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION / Chapter I. --- From Voluntarism to Structural-Functionalism --- p.116 / Chapter II. --- From Structural-Functionalism to Systems Functionalism --- p.131 / Chapter CHAPTER 3 --- SELF-REFERENCE AND FUNCTIONALISM: LUHMANN̐ơS SYSTEM THEORY IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.147 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Methodological Principle of Self-Reference --- p.150 / Chapter 3.3 --- Double Contingency and the Formation of Self-Referential Social System --- p.165 / Chapter CHAPTER 4 --- SELF-REFERENCE AND ANTI-HUMANISM: LUHMANN'S ACTION THEORY IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS / Chapter 4.1 --- Self-Reference of Communication and its Attribution to Voluntaristic Action --- p.195 / Chapter 4.2 --- Interpenetration and Anti-Humanism --- p.218 / CONCLUSION: LUHMANNIANISM ON TRIAL --- p.239 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.256

Tableau d’honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2014-2015 / Ce travail de maîtrise a pour but de confronter les théories sociales de Niklas Luhmann et de Jürgen Habermas, afin d’éclairer les défis que le monde contemporain pose à la pensée philosophique. À la suite d’un examen approfondi, qui nous mènera à revisiter les traditions classique (Weber et Durkheim) et moderne (Parsons) de la sociologie, il sera possible de mettre en évidence les implications qui s’ensuivent pour les concepts de société, de rationalité et de normativité. Plutôt que de prendre parti pour l’une des théories en question, nous décèlerons leur signification philosophique en exposant la manière dont elles abordent le phénomène de la complexité. Nous discutons enfin de la place qu’occupe l’humanisme au sein de la théorie sociale contemporaine. / This M.A. thesis compares the social theories of Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas. Its main goal is to cast light upon the problems that philosophical thinking encounters in its attempt to understand modern society. The Luhmann-Habermas debate is presented from a comparative perspective, which will then lead into key problems of both classical (Weber and Durkheim) and modern (Parsons) traditions of sociology. It is our contention that this debate reveals two alternative standpoints from which the concepts of society, rationality, and normativity can be conceived. Instead of endorsing one theory or the other, this thesis would rather display their philosophical significance by addressing the manner in which they deal with complexity. Finally, the place of humanism within contemporary social theory is examined.

Ce mémoire étudie comment Condorcet, Hegel, Durkheim, Parsons, Bourdieu et Passeron conçoivent les fonctions respectives de la famille et de l’école en matière d’éducation. Depuis la Révolution française, les idées modernes sur ce partage ont beaucoup évoluées. C’est à titre de témoins éminents de cette évolution que ces auteurs sont interrogés. Toutes héritières des principes issus du siècle des Lumières, les conceptions étudiées varient selon le rapport à l’ordre social et selon l’intention qui les guide ; le bonheur universel qui fait autorité sur la liberté de l’individu en formation devient de moins en moins abstrait. En tant que finalité, cet idéal se fait supplanter, presque, par la question du bonheur individuel, pourtant soumise aujourd’hui à l’exigence de la réussite scolaire. La responsabilité individuelle s’en trouve accrue, puisque, depuis que les structures sociales inégalitaires ont été sévèrement critiquées, l’ordre social ne doit plus reposer sur des déterminations de classe. / This study examines how Condorcet, Hegel, Durkheim, Parsons, Bourdieu and Passeron perceive the roles of both the family and the school with regard to upbringing. Since the French Revolution, these perceptions have greatly evolved. We refer to these authors since they clearly represent the context of this evolution. Although these perceptions have inherited principles originating from the Enlightenment, they vary according to the relationship with society and the intentions by which they are guided. Universal happiness, which has an impact on the freedom of the growing individual, becomes less and less abstract. In the end, this ideal is almost surpassed by the freedom of personal happiness, which still depends today on success in school, as it is a generally accepted requirement. The responsibility of each individual is amplified, because, ever since unequal social structures have been highly criticized, social order shall no longer be based upon class determination.