In this study, I introduce the alternative-dependent focal Luce model (ADFLM), a random choice model generalizing the well-known Luce model (1959). In the ADFLM, focal alternatives are chosen more frequently relative to their utilities. I identify utilities, focal sets, and the magnitude of focal biases from choice data. Additionally, I axiomatically characterize the ADFLM by weakening the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom. This model can explain the well-known behavioral phenomena, the attraction and compromise effects. Furthermore, I also study the seller's profit maximization problem in the ADFLM. I also study an asymmetric dynamic patent race with a deadline under complete information. In my model, two firms decide whether to invest in RandD. The patent arrives randomly according to a Poisson process, and the large firm has a higher hazard rate than the small firm. I find the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium strategy for this game. At the equilibrium, the large firm will stay longer in the race, while the small firm will quit earlier. The large firm's optimal stopping time is not affected by the competition, while the small firm's stopping time is reduced. Additionally, I find that companies will remain longer in the race if the investigation cost is lower, the winning premium is higher, the deadline is extended further, and the hazard rate is more prominent. Moreover, the market becomes more efficient with the competition since the patent is easier to realize. / Doctor of Philosophy / In this research, I study the consumer's behavior when individuals have limited cannot or do not give the same attention to each alternative available to them. In my study, I characterize the alternative-dependent focal Luce model (ADFLM), a consumer behavior model. Moreover, I solve the seller's profit maximization problem when the consumer's behavior follows the ADFLM. Meanwhile, I also study a dynamic patent race problem that occurs when firms compete for a patent with a deadline. If no firms achieve the patent, the stopping time (when the firm quits the patent race) of the large firm's (with a higher success rate every period) is not affected by the introduction of the small firm. However, the small firm quits earlier when the large firm is introduced. The competition between the two companies increases the overall probability of receiving a patent.

Diese Dissertation analysiert eine Vielzahl von Aspekten, die sich auf Patente und Patentrennen beziehen. Im einleitenden Kapitel wird die betriebs- und volkswirtschaftliche sowie die gesellschaftliche und ethische Bedeutung von Patenten hervorgehoben. Es werden sowohl Stärken als auch Nachteile von Patenten vorgestellt. Kapitel 2 beschreibt Instrumente, die von Entscheidungsträgern benutzt werden können, um Patentschutz zu regulieren: Patentbreite, -höhe und -länge. Das Kapitel zeigt weiterhin, warum ein optimales Regulierungsniveau nicht erreicht werden kann. Kapitel 3 behandelt den dramatischen Anstieg von Patenttätigkeiten in Europa als auch weltweit. Erklärende Faktoren für dieses Phänomen sowie Effekte und mögliche Lösungen werden diskutiert. Im vierten Kapitel wird gezeigt, dass Patente zu einem großen Gewinnzuwachs in der Pharmaindustrie beigetragen haben, während die Innovationsfähigkeit dieser Industrie gesunken ist. Patentrennen für Pharmaka und die Entwicklung von Generika werden auch in diesem Kapitel analysiert. Kapitel 5 gibt einen umfangreichen Überblick der Literatur zum Patentrennen und zeigt, dass diese Literatur extrem komplex, widersprüchlich, instabil bei experimenteller Überprüfung und allgemein uneindeutig ist. Kapitel 6 stellt eine experimentelle Studie eines Patentrennens vor. Es beginnt mit einem intuitiven Modell eines Segelwettbewerbs; danach wird ein spieltheoretisches Modell eines asymmetrischen F&E-Wettbewerbs zwischen zwei Firmen entwickelt; später werden Gleichgewichtsvoraussagen formuliert und mit den Handlungen realer Entscheidungsträger in einem experimentellen Labor verglichen. Eine ökonometrische Untersuchung zeigt ein hohes Maß an Übereinstimmung zwischen den theoretischen Vorhersagen und den experimentellen Ergebnissen. Das letzte Kapitel fasst die Schlussfolgerungen der Dissertationen zusammen und bietet Empfehlungen. / This dissertation analyzes a plethora of aspects related to patents and patent races. In the introductory chapter the importance of patents to business, economics, society and ethics is emphasized. On one side, the traditional argument in favor of patent protection as well as further strengths of patents are presented, while on the other side situations in which patents bring significant drawbacks and disadvantages are identified. Chapter 2 describes the instruments that can be used by policymakers to regulate patent protection: patent breadth, height and length. The chapter further shows why an optimal level of regulation cannot be achieved. Chapter 3 deals with the dramatic increase in patenting activities in Europe and around the world. Determinants of this phenomenon as well as its effects and potential solutions are provided. In the fourth chapter patents are shown to have contributed to a large rise of profits in the pharmaceutical industry, while the industry’s innovativeness seems to have declined. Patent races for pharmaceuticals and the evolution of generic medicine are also analyzed in this chapter. Chapter 5 gives an extensive overview of the patent race literature and shows that this literature is extremely complex, filled with contradictions, not robust to experimental testing and overall inconclusive. Chapter 6 sets out an experimental study of a patent race. It starts from an intuitive model of a sailing race, develops a game-theoretic model of an asymmetric R&D competition between two firms who want to attain a patent, formulates equilibrium predictions and compares them with the actions of real decision makers in an experimental laboratory. An econometric analysis proves a high degree of consistency between theoretical predictions and experimental results. The last chapter wraps up the main conclusions of the dissertation and proposes some recommendations.

La forte hausse des rendements agricoles, observée tout au long des 150 dernières années, est, pour une large part, due à l’amélioration des variétés, résultant elle-même essentiellement de processus de recherche et développement. L’optimalité sociale de l’effort de recherche entrepris par les firmes de ce secteur, ainsi que des institutions encadrant l’activité de recherche, constituent un sujet important pour les politiques publiques. L’objet de cette thèse est de contribuer à éclairer cette question, en s’efforçant de tenir compte de l’impact sur l’environnement de l’innovation en matière de variétés agricoles. Nous examinons ce sujet à travers trois prismes différents : celui de l’innovation en tant que telle, celui du processus de recherche, et celui du cadre institutionnel offert aux entreprises de recherche. Nous montrons que la prise en compte des effets environnementaux de la recherche en modifie les optima, et devrait donc conduire à une adaptation du cadre incitatif et règlementaire. / The sharp increase in agricultural yields in the past 150 years owes a lot to the improvement of plant varieties, which, to large extent, is the result of the research and development process. Whether the research and development effort undertaken by firms operating in this sector and institutions regulating research are socially optimal is an important question for public policies. This thesis aims to contribute to tackling this issue, and its main contribution is to endeavor to account for the impact of crop innovation on the environment. We address the question through three different perspectives: innovation per se, the research and development process, and the institutional framework available to research firms. We show that environmental externalities of research significantly modify social optima.