This research examines the relation between incentive-based compensation and subsequent Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) performance as well as the determinants of incentive-based compensation for REITs. I propose that REITs either rely on incentive-based compensation to substitute for poor corporate governance practices or may not need to rely excessively on incentive-based compensation to align managers and shareholder interests, given their heavily regulated nature and their corporate governance practices. Using a sample of publicly traded equity, hybrid, and operating REITs for the 1999-2003 period, I find a negative relation between incentive based compensation awards and subsequent stock returns for REITs. Interestingly, this relation is not found when return on assets (ROA) is the measure of performance. These results imply that excessive incentive-based compensation negatively impact future REIT performance from a market perspective, but not an accounting perspective. With regard to the determinants of incentive based compensation, I find that CEO ownership, board of director characteristics, and institutional ownership are consistent determinants of the level of incentive based compensation awarded to REIT CEOs. Overall, the results imply that REIT corporate governance practices substitute for incentive-based compensation, but still, the level of incentive-based compensation paid to REIT CEOs is excessive up to the point that it negatively affects subsequent REIT performance.

This study investigates whether team members work harder and perform better when they are compensated based on both team and individual performance than when compensated based on team or individual performance alone and whether teammates? familiarity with one another influences the effectiveness of the compensation scheme. Four-member ad hoc student teams repeatedly complete an interdependent task on the computer in an experiment in which I manipulate individual compensation plan (flat wage or performance-based incentives), team compensation plan (flat wage or performance-based incentives), and teammate familiarity (identified teammates with pre-experiment interaction ? strong id or unidentified teammates with no pre-experiment interaction ? weak id). Results indicate that while the combination of team and individual performance-based compensation results in the highest performance, the incremental performance boost is higher from the first performance-based reward strategy, regardless of whether it is team or individual. Under both strong and weak identity, offering a combination of individual and team performance-based compensation results in comparable performance, suggesting that lower productivity levels associated with low team identity can be overcome with performance-based compensation. Together these results suggest that, regardless of team identity, firms can benefit from offering both team and individual performance-based compensation. However, companies should understand that the performance bump may be smaller from the second performance-based scheme.

This study investigates whether team members work harder and perform better when they are compensated based on both team and individual performance than when compensated based on team or individual performance alone and whether teammates? familiarity with one another influences the effectiveness of the compensation scheme. Four-member ad hoc student teams repeatedly complete an interdependent task on the computer in an experiment in which I manipulate individual compensation plan (flat wage or performance-based incentives), team compensation plan (flat wage or performance-based incentives), and teammate familiarity (identified teammates with pre-experiment interaction ? strong id or unidentified teammates with no pre-experiment interaction ? weak id). Results indicate that while the combination of team and individual performance-based compensation results in the highest performance, the incremental performance boost is higher from the first performance-based reward strategy, regardless of whether it is team or individual. Under both strong and weak identity, offering a combination of individual and team performance-based compensation results in comparable performance, suggesting that lower productivity levels associated with low team identity can be overcome with performance-based compensation. Together these results suggest that, regardless of team identity, firms can benefit from offering both team and individual performance-based compensation. However, companies should understand that the performance bump may be smaller from the second performance-based scheme.

Teacher compensation reforms have been on the rise in recent years, yet research has yet to fully demonstrate how teachers interpret these policies and how they may influence their instructional practices and professional decisions. This qualitative study of a performance pay program in an urban district in Texas drew on cognitive approaches to policy implementation and theories of sensemaking to examine and explicate these issues. Teachers’ experiences in two schools were examined through interviews, focus groups, and document analysis. The experiences of school principals and district policymakers acting as sensegivers to teachers about the program’s goals, purposes, and theory of action were also examined. District policymakers’ understandings of the program varied, and were informed by their positions in the system and their own interests in the program. These differences resulted in a complex program with an array of objectives for teachers to implement in schools and classrooms, as well as varying expectations for teachers’ work, which were not always understood by teachers. With few clear and consistent messages from policymakers, teachers and principals interpreted the program according to their own ideas about important outcomes, and then shaped it to fit their situations. Although accepting of the program, teachers and principals were not always able to focus on it in ways expected by policymakers given other demands on them, particularly those emanating from the accountability system. Some evidence of goal distortion in terms of teachers’ attention to student assignments and mobility was also found. These findings hold implications for cognitive theories of policy implementation, suggesting that teachers’ responses to policies are influenced by the amount of attention they are able to give them, as well as direct sensegiving about policy goals and expectations on the part of policymakers. The findings also suggest that performance pay programs can be expected to be adapted, co-opted, and selectively attended to in order to fit within the contexts in which they are implemented. Thus, policymakers should consider other demands in the policy environment that may compete with performance incentives, as well as the organizational contexts of schools in which they will be implemented. / text

No description available.

<p>CEO compensation is a relevant topic in today's society that touches both political and economic questions which are of interest for the whole general public. It affects people indirectly through CEOs actions and how these actions affect company performances. Due to the fact that there is a financial crisis, this thesis has its aim to catch some light over CEO compensation and its relation to company performances, if there is one.</p><p>The purpose was to investigate if we could find a relation between CEO compensation and company performances by using variables which we considered significant for this study. These variables are collected from each company's annual reports and which we have chosen to focus on the two past years 2007 and 2008, as it is the most recent data. For the principle of our thesis a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was applied, to best suite the purpose. When finding a sustainable and significant result, regressions of different variables from the annual reports were drawn and the outcomes of these were interpreted and analyzed. Our findings show that turnover is the only variable which indicated any significant p-value in the regressions drawn. Of all regressions three show significance and all arerelated to turnover. Given these results we can conclude that the other variables are not related to the CEO compensation in this case study.</p>

CEO compensation is a relevant topic in today's society that touches both political and economic questions which are of interest for the whole general public. It affects people indirectly through CEOs actions and how these actions affect company performances. Due to the fact that there is a financial crisis, this thesis has its aim to catch some light over CEO compensation and its relation to company performances, if there is one. The purpose was to investigate if we could find a relation between CEO compensation and company performances by using variables which we considered significant for this study. These variables are collected from each company's annual reports and which we have chosen to focus on the two past years 2007 and 2008, as it is the most recent data. For the principle of our thesis a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was applied, to best suite the purpose. When finding a sustainable and significant result, regressions of different variables from the annual reports were drawn and the outcomes of these were interpreted and analyzed. Our findings show that turnover is the only variable which indicated any significant p-value in the regressions drawn. Of all regressions three show significance and all arerelated to turnover. Given these results we can conclude that the other variables are not related to the CEO compensation in this case study.

傳統代理理論主張，企業可利用績效酬勞激勵員工努力工作，提昇組織績效；而競賽理論則強調，利用同儕競賽，並擴大勝負間的酬勞差距，以達企業利潤極大化目標。績效酬勞與競賽誘因對員工投入的努力皆具正面激勵效果，然而，在不同工作特性下，酬勞誘因隨著員工工作所需的合作程度不同，對組織績效的影響卻有所差異。 本文首先依據代理理論與競賽理論模型，將績效酬勞與競賽誘因同時納入酬勞誘因制度中，以利分析在不同工作特性的情況下，酬勞誘因對於營業單位經營績效之影響。在績效酬勞對經營績效之影響上，理論分析結果發現：不論對員工工作彼此獨立或對工作需合作的營業單位而言，績效酬勞的增加，都可提高經營績效；當隨機干擾因素增加，因員工獲得酬勞的不確定性增加，進而削弱員工努力的意願，降低營業單位之經營績效。在競賽誘因對組織績效的影響方面，靜態分析結果指出：在不同工作特性的情況下，競賽誘因會出現不同的效果。當員工工作彼此獨立時，擴大競賽後贏家與輸家間的酬勞差距，有利於組織績效之提高。相對的，在員工工作彼此合作的情況下，酬勞差距擴大後，一方面使員工最適個人努力提高，有益於組織經營績效；另一方面卻削弱員工彼此合作的意願，降低協助同儕的努力，兩種效果抵銷之後，使得酬勞誘因對組織經營績效之提昇受到限制。 本文以一家大型連鎖汽車公司為個案公司，研究期間為2001年至2004年，包括86個營業所及90家汽車修護廠的營業績效資料及中低階層員工之酬勞資料，以實地實證研究法進行實證研究。研究結果發現，當員工工作彼此獨立時，營業單位之個人績效酬勞愈大或收入變異程度愈小者，績效愈好；當員工工作彼此需要合作時，營業單位之團體績效酬勞愈大或收入變異程度愈小者，績效愈好。在競賽誘因方面，當員工工作彼此獨立時，不論是職務間或職務內的酬勞差距的擴大，皆對營業單位之經營績效具有正面提昇效果；相較於工作彼此獨立，當員工工作彼此需要合作時，職務間或職務內酬勞差距的擴大對營業單位績效提昇幅度顯著較小。由此可知，企業在進行酬勞誘因設計時，應同步考量工作特性與酬勞誘因機制間的配適性，俾利於組織績效的提昇。 / Agency theory suggests that organizations can motivate employees to exert their efforts by providing individual-based compensation. Tournament theory argues that, by encouraging competition among employees and increasing the compensation gaps between winners and losers, firms can direct employees’ actions in alignment with the firm’s interests. Both compensation schemes can induce employees’ efforts and increase corporate performance. However, the positive effects on corporate performance vary in the need of cooperation among employees, ranging from independent to interdependent tasks. This paper uses a theoretical and empirical analysis of performance-based and tournament-based incentives to examine the impacts of compensation incentives on branch performance. For the impacts of performance-based incentives on branch performance, the performance will increase in the individual performance-based incentives. When employees work independently, the greater the compensation gaps lead to more efforts and higher performance. When employees work interdependently, two contradictory effects of greater the compensation gaps make the performance change unclear. On the one hand, greater compensation gaps will increase employees’ efforts for being winner in the tournament. On the other hand, greater compensation gaps will induce employees not to help their competitors and hurt the performance, although help efforts can contribute firms profits. Using four years of data from a large car company with 86 car dealer branches and 90 car repair service branches, we find that for the independent tasks, the branch performance increase as individual performance-based compensation increases or revenue variance decreases. For the tasks needed cooperation among employees, the branch performance is increasing in group-based compensation or decreasing in revenue variance. Besides, we find that the larger the compensation gaps between inter- or intra-jobs, the branch performance for the independent tasks are better. The impacts of the compensation gaps on the interdependent tasks are smaller than on the independent tasks. Therefore, incentive policy rewards the best performances with the complementary fit between tasks design and compensation schemes

This thesis aims to investigate fund managers salaries in relation to their contributions. The study is conducted on the Swedish fund market under a period over five years, 2014-2018, and include 332 funds. The result observed shows a positive relation between salaries and risk-adjusted performance. The result proves that fund managers are able to outperform the market on average, which should not be possible to do systematically over time according to the efficient market hypothesis. It also turns out that salary has a positive relationship with assets under management. This indicates that fund managers are employed and compensated for more reasons than to generate a high return, namely to contribute to more significant inflows of cash to the fund company. Interpretations of fund managers’ salaries are primarily linked to agency theory and economics of superstars. The agency problem alter in the fund industry since the setting is two-folded. Agency problem could be mitigated by implementing a performance-based compensation structure, to aligning investors, management and fund managers’ ambitions. The result shows signs that a performance-based salary is present in the fund industry. A fund managers’ salary assumes to be based on his/her skillfulness, but could also be due to an individual’s stardom. To conclude, the thesis state that fund managers’ deserve their salary, which in relative terms are fairly high, since they procure additional benefits to the fund company.