L? ritual (禮) is one of the most distinctive features of Confucianism (r? ji?, 儒家), but interpreters have yet to agree on the extent of its functions and whether the Confucians provide any justification of its use. Contemporary attempts to derive such justification have typically relied upon explaining l?'s relationship with r?n humaneness (仁), another core concept for Confucianism that is frequently given great prominence in Confucian ethics. Drawing upon such approaches, I propose that at least one aspect of l?'s function is best understood as being bound-up with that of r?n and that this function arguably justifies Confucian appeals to l? as a guide to conduct. My approach is distinct from previous interpretations, however, in that I argue that l? serves metaphorically as the language by which attitudes conducive to r?n are managed and expressed, and that the successful application of l?, including its use in symbolizing ethically significant normative statuses, contributes to the Confucian ideal of harmony (h?, 和) on both interpersonal and intrapersonal levels. The upshot of this interpretation is that, despite criticisms both modern and ancient, we can clearly see how the Confucians justifiably imbue a particular aspect of traditional mores with normative ethical force. / published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Philosophy

Mode of access: World Wide Web. / Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 237-244). / Electronic reproduction. / Also available by subscription via World Wide Web / viii, 244 leaves, bound col. ill. 29 cm

published_or_final_version / Chinese / Master / Master of Philosophy

人性非惡？惡從何來？如何去惡？自宋明儒學到當代新儒學，主流儒者無不推崇孟子的「性善說」：人性本然內具為善的能力與傾向，不善的出現只能訴諸後天環境的影響。針對於此，學界內外都不乏質疑儒家人性論過份樂觀天真的聲音。尤其後來晚明時期心學學者將「心」的內部結構撐開，認為不僅人「性」是善，甚至「心」內部的「意」、「知」、「物」、「情」、「念」等環節亦全皆是善；在這種理解下，惡從何而生更是儒學理論中亟待澄清的問題。本文撰寫的目的，即是旨在從哲學史發展的角度清理晚明王學──自王陽明以降，下轄陽明後學，直到劉蕺山為止──對於「惡」的問題方方面面的思考。並希望通過這工作整理出儒學傳統中一套「惡」的系統理論，以見儒學處理「惡」這個普遍哲學問題的基本態度。扼要言之，王陽明認為「意」念發動處是惡之出現的樞紐；「意」的本然狀態原來是「心」與「理」應事接物的表現，其淪落為惡只能從其「偏」、「滯」、「著」等流弊狀態中了解。通過唐君毅先生的相關洞見，本文接著探討了「主流」陽明學者對「惡」的思考：浙中王龍溪與泰州羅近溪緊接師說，認為當下一「念」便是本心發用的端倪，唯其陷溺與留滯才會轉而為惡。當中尤需強調的是，心知能力與知識活動赫然竟是助成心念陷溺的幫兇！雖然江右羅念菴思想在當前學界的討論中往往被視為偏離「主流」的歧出，但筆者認為在過惡的議題上念菴與龍溪近溪的相關思考實能相輔相成。若說龍溪近溪更關心常人如何在「知識」的幫助下犯過，則念菴更關注的即是心知功能如何進一步助成了修道者「空言」之過。最後，筆者將會指出，劉蕺山在理論表述上將心知功能的誤用更為明確地為說明為「妄」的毛病，並以之為惡之所以出現的最根本起源；這是儒學惡論的一大推進，由此徹底廓清了儒學惡乃無根的傳統。筆者並會考察晚明儒者對過惡問題的種種思考，如何結穴在儒學論惡的高峰文獻《人譜》之中。通過本文種種的討論，希望能夠豐富學界對儒學傳統中「惡」的理論的了解。 / Human nature is evil? Where does evil come from? How to get rid of evil? From Song Ming Neo-Confucianism to Contemporary New Confucianism, the main line of Confucian thought follows Mencius in stressing the goodness of human nature. According to Mencius, human nature has an innate faculty and tendency towards goodness, and that immorality could only be attributed to society’s influence. Accordingly, some scholars criticize Confucianism for being too optimistic and naive about human nature. That is especially a difficult question for the Wang Yangming’s scholars, who assert that not only xing性, but all yi意, zhi知, wu物, qing情, nian念 within the inner structure of xin心 are originally good and without evil. If this is the case, how come there is evil in reality? The aims of this paper are to elucidate the ideas of evil in late Ming school of Wang Yangming’s philosophy, and to articulate a systematic theory of evil in Confucianism. In brief, in Yangming’s view, evil arises from the part of yi意. The original activation of yi意 is nothing but the manifestation of xin心 and li理, it is the deviation, stagnation and attachment of yi意 that leads it to immorality. Wang Longxi and Luo Jinxi, the followers of Yangming, carry on Yangming’s view and hold that it is the stagnation and attachment of nian念 that make it an evil one. What is more interesting is that the cognitive part of xin心 would assist in the formation of evil. Furthermore, Luo Nianan’s ideas on evil are complementary to Longxi and Jinxi’ related theories. Nianan focuses on empty words as the result of the misused cognitive part of xin心, and regards it as a major wrongdoing of Confucian practitioners. Finally, Liu Jishan describes the misuse of the cognitive part of xin心as the problem of wang, and regards it as the deepest origin of evil. By doing so, Jishan clarifies the Confucian tradition that evil is rootless to its greatest extent. How Jishan’s masterpiece the schemata of humanity concludes different discussion of evil from previous Yangming’s scholars will also be discussed. By these discussions, the primary aim of this paper is to enrich our understanding of the theory of evil in Confucianism. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 陳志強. / Parallel title from added title page. / Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 212-219). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Chen Zhiqiang.

葉天賜. / "2003年8月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2003. / 參考文獻 (leaves 177-189). / 附中英文摘要. / "2003 nian 8 yue". / Ye Tianci. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2003. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 177-189). / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 論文提要 / Chapter 第一章 --- 導論 --- p.´þ / Chapter 第二章 --- 元代徽州理學的發展 --- p.（8) / Chapter 第一節 --- 南宋末的徽州儒學 --- p.（8) / Chapter 第二節 --- 元代的徽州儒學 --- p.（13) / Chapter 第三章 --- 鄭玉的生平與學術思想 --- p.（51) / Chapter 第一節 --- 鄭玉的生平及其出處問題之討論 --- p.（55) / Chapter 第二節 --- 鄭玉的“春秋學´ح和《春秋闕疑》 --- p.（66) / Chapter 第三節 --- 鄭玉的儒學思想 --- p.（83) / Chapter 第四章 --- 趙汸的生平與學術思想 --- p.（100) / Chapter 第一節 --- 趙汸的生平與著述 --- p.（100) / Chapter 第二節 --- 趙汸的“春秋學´ح --- p.（111) / Chapter 第三節 --- 趙汸的儒學思想 --- p.（144) / Chapter 第五章 --- 結語 --- p.（173) / 參考書目 --- p.（178)