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Perceptual knowledge : explorations and extensions of the Sellarsian framework /Nixon, David Mitsuo. January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 332-343).
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Evolutionary arguments and the mind-body problemCorabi, Joseph. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2007. / "Graduate Program in Philosophy." Includes bibliographical references (p. 235-239).
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Normativism and mental causationTiehen, Justin Thomas, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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"Do you know what I think?" a cross-linguistic investigation of children's understanding of mental state words /Souza, Debora Hollanda, Echols, Catharine H. January 2004 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Catharine H. Echols. Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Also available from UMI.
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Exploring individual differences in theory of mind in deaf children : relations with receptive vocabulary, executive function, maternal education, and number of siblingsMacaulay, Catrin Elizabeth January 2011 (has links)
No description available.
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On "Thinking Outside the Box"Jia, Han 01 January 2017 (has links)
This paper examines a computational account about higher-level creativity proposed by Margaret A. Boden, a female psychologist and philosopher. She uses an interesting computational concept the “conceptual space” – known as “the box” in our everyday language – to measure levels of creativeness and to explain how higher-level creativity is achieved.
In this paper, I mainly seek to look into detail and analyze her answers to the following two questions: “What does Boden mean by the ‘conceptual space?” and “How is it possible to think outside of the ‘conceptual space?”
To that end, I have researched papers that commented on Boden’s computational account, and have come up with hypothetical cases to flesh out my arguments and to appeal to the readers’ intuitions.
The conclusion of this paper is that the knowledge of yourself being inside particular boxes and the knowledge of what limits and potential a given conceptual space has are neither sufficient nor necessary for producing the kind of rule-breaking “outside-the-box” ideas, but the idea of a “conceptual space” remains useful in evaluating the quality of ideas after their generation.
The philosophy of creativity is such an intriguing topic to me – we all value creativity as a society and have put “outside-the-box” type of thinking on the pedestal since the age of Plato. Yet when we think more about the idea of “outside-the-box” thinking, much ambiguity arises. This topic greatly sparks my interest in the philosophy of mind, and through research and self-introspection, I have not only learned more about the concept of creativity, but also discovered more about my own thinking style.
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On the Explanatory Limits of Concepts and Causes: Intentionality, Biology, and the Space of ReasonsAtytalla, John 19 July 2019 (has links)
In Mind and World John McDowell argues that our attempts to understand how it
is that our thoughts are rationally answerable to the world are in vain. Whether one
takes Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology or Phenomenology to be capable of answering this question, such attempts are, he claims, merely a consequence of failing to see that they are already gripped by a picture of the world which precludes the possibility of such answers. In particular, he suggests that if we render Nature as that which is circumscribed by the intelligibility of the natural sciences, we leave no room for rationality conceived of in terms of the spontaneity and freedom that Kant associated with it. While McDowell claims to be a `quietist' who is not putting forward his own theory of mind, he is, at the very least, suggesting a theory of nature, one which he dubs `liberal' insofar as it suggests that we widen the scope of nature so that it can be hospitable to the normative features of thought.
This thesis will propose a theory of mind which attempts to show how the causal,
normative, and phenomenological can be seen as continuous features of the natural world. It demonstrates that a careful appraisal of causal or scientific accounts of intentionality can be made compatible with McDowell's commitment to the normativity of thought. By revealing that a biological account of the mind, suitably expanded to include an account of history as a Dynamic Ecological Milieu, generates biological interrogatives for the human organism, we can show that the normative manifests as an emergent property of the nomological. This allows second nature to retain its sui generis status while being continuous with the causal descriptions of first nature. This thesis will also draw from the Phenomenological tradition, as a means of critiquing McDowell's account of “the Myth of the Given" and his rejection of pre-conceptual content. In particular, it will follow Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus in affirming that we should view experience, not in terms of that which provides epistemic foundations, but as the domain of pre-reflective embodiment. This is essential to showing how the biological sciences can inform us about the causal background which makes embodied coping so unreflectively natural. Furthermore, phenomenology has provided a means of engaging with the biological sciences in a non-reductive way, as is evidenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's The Structure of Behavior and the more recent neurophenomenological tradition which is largely inspired by his work. Finally, by drawing on these resources, the desideratum of
this thesis is a scientifically informed understanding of what McDowell calls “second nature" and “the space of reasons" in terms of what I have called “biological interrogatives" and the “phenomenology of epistemic agency".
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Voice and uncertainty : processes of voice in artists' nonfiction moving imageMann, Lyndsay January 2017 (has links)
Voice is an inconstant yet constantly performative material; it is our internally-housed, liminal technology. ‘Processes of voice’ is the term I develop throughout the text of this thesis to articulate materialities of voice and methods of address within processes of practice in artists’ moving image that ‘give voice’ to material and non-material forms. I interrogate this in relation to key concepts in Philosophy of Mind to address the complex ways in which bodily skills and action inform perception and thought to explore an account of perception and process in relation to voice. I examine the liminal, inconstant, and uncertain in subjective experience, and the ways in which this is extended into the social through a politics of embodied practice harnessed in moving images. I make a case for the uncertain I-voice, which engages the fully embodied and openly subjective, to challenge established narratives and conventions of address, and the power and knowledge dynamics that structure them. I come to focus on the uncertain acousmatic I-voice in moving image, which through its presentness, intimacy and acknowledgement of uncertainty relinquishes the acousmêtre’s threat of control to share a liminal territory of destabilized authority with the viewer. This is also explored in and through my own moving image work, A Desire For Organic Order (2015), a single screen video, which contributes to the overall thesis.
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Phenomenon and Abstraction: Coordinating Concepts in Music Theory and AnalysisHansberry, Benjamin Konrad January 2017 (has links)
This dissertation explores the habits of thought that inform how music analysts conceptualize the music they study and how this conceptualization affects the kinds of claims they make and the discursive practices adopted to express them. I aim to clarify these issues in music-theoretical conceptualization with an eye toward mediating analytical disagreements by tracing the influence of two types of concepts used in contemporary music analysis. I differentiate what I call theoretical concepts, which refer to abstract, theoretical objects, from phenomenal concepts, which refer to elements of felt, musical experience. Drawing on theories of concepts from philosophy of mind, I argue that these concepts have a complex structure, featuring both a reference and mode of presentation. The musical concept Dominant, for instance, might be used as a phenomenal concept, referring to the conscious experience of hearing a dominant, or it might be used as a theoretical concept, referring to a kind of abstract object, presented as either the triad the leads to the tonic or the triad built on scale degree five. In analysis, the kinds of concepts that analysts use will determine the scope of their analyses as well as define what sorts of critiques are best deployed against them.
I explore four different ways that these conceptual types are used. These case studies include conceptually simple theories that attempt to foreground one type of concept or another (from the formalized model proffered by Eugene Narmour, to the drawing-analyses of Elaine Barkin) as well as more common analytical strategies that rely on both kinds of concept in concert, such as Schenkerian analysis and transformational and neo-Riemannian theory. I enrich my study of analytical approaches with insights drawn from my own analytical practice, including a wide range of styles and composers (though foregrounding the complexity of tonal analysis especially) and close readings of various authors in different analytical traditions. In general, I am concerned less with testing the soundness of any given approach than with understanding what ways of conceptualizing music underlie them and how analysts coordinate these concepts in practice. I find that while most approaches rely on both types of concept in some combination, their differences come in the roles these concepts play in analytical methodology and the degree to which each type of engagement is foregrounded in practice.
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Pursuing Natural Unity, Consciousness IncludedCox-Rubien, Rowen 01 January 2019 (has links)
An ontological exploration of consciousness and how it is related to the body and other aspects of physical reality. Framed by David Chalmers' conception of "The Hard Problem", we begin from a physicalist perspective to discuss the problem of mental causation, which is the inquiry of how the mind communicates and interacts with the body. From here we examine the employment of identity reduction to functionalize and therefore physically explain mentality. We find that reductionist methods, the backbone of scientific investigation, do not work to explain conscious experience, because conscious experience is not quantifiable--it is qualitative. Thus we are left with looking for alternatives to our physicalist world-view in order to explain consciousness's place in reality. Perhaps a major conceptual revolution of how we see and understand the world is on the horizon that will allow us to finally explain consciousness.
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