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Re-thinking the extended mind : moving beyond the machineryO'Regan, John January 2010 (has links)
Proponents of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) argue that the mind literally extends into the world because mental states literally extend into the world. But the arguments presented in favour of these claims are compatible with a much weaker conclusion, expressed as the Extended Machinery of Mind Thesis (EMMT) that secures only the extension of the enablers of mental states. What is required is a mark of the mental that can settle the constitutive versus enabling issue. Both sides of the debate accept non-derived content as a necessary condition on a state‘s being mental but this cannot settle the constitution versus enabling issue, meaning the debate has stagnated because there are no decisive moves left to make. Thus, the strongest move for the EM theorist to make is to reject non-derived content as the mark of the mental and seek an alternative. Because enactivism rejects the representational view of mind then if it can be made to work as an account of mentality it offers promise with regard to the formation of a new mark of the mental on which a genuinely interesting EMT can be based.
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McDowell's oscillation, objectivity and rationalityGarner, Stephanie January 2010 (has links)
Mind and World is written in a Wittgensteinian spirit. It is a work whose aim is to address a specific philosophical discomfort. John McDowell diagnoses a tension between the urge for what he describes as 'minimal empiricism' and its apparent impossibility. Minimal empiricism is defined as the idea that constraint is exercised on our thought by the world through experience. In his view, minimal empiricism stands in tension with the fact that conceptually unstructured impressions can have no rational bearing on our beliefs and judgements. This tension forces an oscillation between two equally unattractive positions: the Myth of the Given and coherentism. McDowell's aim is to dissolve this apparent tension which he sees as resting on the more basic assumption of a dualism between reason and nature. Through his invocation of 'second nature' he aims to present a naturalised Platonism in which man's occupation of the space of reasons can be seen as an aspect of his animal nature, not as something essentially alien to us. The thesis starts by outlining McDowell's attempt to escape the oscillation he detects between the Myth of the Given and coherentism. In Chapter One, the content of Mind and World is briefly laid out. The underlying dualism of reason and nature on which the oscillation is said to rest is considered and the resources he employs in his attempt to escape it discussed. These resources include his metaphysical rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. The second chapter reinforces the first by isolating and defining a number of key concepts in McDowell's picture. The material discussed here is largely drawn from works other than Mind and World. Three key assumptions are isolated: the rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding, the de re nature of singular thought and the fully conceptual nature of experience. These assumptions are shown to play a pivotal role in his philosophy by considering his work on Aristotle and Descartes. McDowell aims to provide a 'therapeutic dissolution' of the oscillation between the Myth of the Given and coherentism. In order to be successful it must meet (at least) three criteria which emerge from his writings. These criteria are discussed alongside attempts by other philosophers to escape the oscillation that McDowell detects. The third chapter develops, in broad outline, the argument of the thesis. Two lines of thought are traced from the three central elements of McDowell's view identified in the second chapter. The first stems from his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding, whilst the second arises from the object-dependence of singular thought. The picture in Mind and World incorporates what Julian Dodd has termed a 'modest identity theory of truth'. Put simply, an identity theory states that facts are true propositions, and the theory is modest if facts are taken to be composed of senses. McDowell himself explicitly accepts that his picture is committed to a modest identity theory, though its exact nature is unclear from his writings. McDowell's semantic externalism appears to provide an account in which singular senses are object-dependent. Thoughts are composed of these senses, and so are dependent on objects in the world for their content. One would expect that facts too (which are true possible thoughts) would be object-dependent. After all they are composed of object-dependent entities, namely senses. Such a position encourages the idea that objects are explanatorily independent of facts. In Kit Fine's terminology, propositions about objects 'ground' propositions about senses. However, this idea stands in tension with McDowell's rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. He claims that the world is composed of facts and that reality does not exist beyond the conceptual realm. Such a position suggests that objects exist only derivatively from their role in facts: "objects figure in the world by figuring in facts, which are true thinkables" [McDowell (1999a) p94. My italics]. In other words, that propositions about facts 'ground' propositions about objects. Since 'grounding' is an asymmetric notion, there is a tension in McDowell's picture which needs to be resolved. Chapter Four examines McDowell's Kantian account of objects. Objects are derived from facts. McDowell is not committed to a substantial semantic externalism in which, when we investigate whether our terms have a reference, we look at the world to see whether there is an object corresponding to our sense of the term. Instead, McDowell's semantic externalism is truistic: once a sense appears in a fact, no further questions can be asked about the reference of the term. The sense's figuring in a true possible thought ensures that there is a reference. There can be no sense without reference because objects are derived from facts (which are true possible thoughts). The conception of objects that McDowell offers, however, fails to sustain important common-sense realist intuitions. Looked at as an account of empirical objects (rather than formal objects, such as mathematical ones), there are deficiencies which can be brought out. His account can be challenged on the grounds that it is unable to allow that sapient and sentient environments have a common ontology. The discussion is framed as a dialogue between a common-sense realist and a McDowellian thinker. This provides for responses to the reasoning to be considered at every appropriate point. These responses are, in the end, not sufficient to allow his account to meet the realist intuitions. He has therefore failed to provide an account based on mere reminders of common-sense truisms. His account of objects is revisionary and must be either replaced or defended by positive arguments. The quietist's claim that only negative arguments are needed to defend his position is undermined once the position abandons common-sense realism. In Chapter Five the focus shifts back to the overall argument laid out in Chapter Three. It might be thought that McDowelPs particular conception of objects is a peripheral error. If this were the case, since his basic account has not been shown to abandon common-sense realism, his revisionary conception of objects could simply be dropped. This line of thought is countered. I present the arguments of two commentators to show the strength of my objection. Mark Sainsbury argues that McDowell should not maintain a substantial form of semantic externalism if he stands firm to his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. Ruth Millikan argues that McDowelPs commitment to a substantial form of semantic externalism stands in tension with his account of sense, which is a central element in his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. The tension which concerns these commentators needs to be addressed. The conception of objects considered in Chapter Four is required. It provides McDowell's explanation of how his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding is consistent with his semantic externalism. The final chapter concludes the argument of the thesis. It is shown that McDowell's theory (as it stands) fails to meet his therapeutic aspirations. In particular he has failed to meet two of the three therapeutic requirements attributed to him in Chapter Two. His conception of objects is revisionary and his picture does not avoid the appearance of an insurmountable problem in world-directed thoughts. Its failure to provide for common-sense realism means that he can no longer avail himself of the quietist strategy which disavows the need to provide positive arguments for its conclusions. Therapeutic dissatisfaction with his picture is the result. The argument of this thesis is then located within a broader philosophical landscape.
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Doxastic spaces : a new approach to relational beliefs and unstable neglectRook, Dane January 2015 (has links)
This thesis introduces and explores a novel construct for studying human beliefs in social science: doxastic spaces. These flexible analytical devices are demonstrated as capturing three key properties of beliefs which are difficult to depict through other formats: the relational, relative, and reflexive properties of beliefs. The doxastic-space paradigm developed by this thesis is likewise shown to enable new and insightful theories about belief formation and change. Two such theories cultivated herein are quantized evidence theory (QET) and entropy-based social learning (EBSL). These theories prioritise not only the evidential bases of beliefs, but also the cognitive limitations on memory and attention that people face in constructing and updating beliefs about their worlds. Such bases and limitations underscore not only the role that context has to play in sculpting beliefs, but also the reciprocal function of beliefs in helping to determine and demarcate context. Part of that context is discussed as being other people relevant in social judgment and learning situations. And interplay between beliefs and context is used to aid explanation for unstable tendencies in neglectful cognition. The work mixes theoretical and empirical investigation of the doxastic-space framework, and suggests that it may serve social science by working to not only forge deeper comprehension of belief dynamics but also to operate as a platform for interdisciplinary exchange.
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Can phenomenology determine the content of thought?Forrest, Peter V. January 2015 (has links)
This thesis is about consciousness and representation. More specifically, the big picture issue in the background throughout is the relationship between consciousness (or "phenomenology") and representation (or "intentionality") in the life of the mind. Phenomenology and intentionality are inarguably the two central topics in philosophy of mind of the last half-century. The question of phenomenology is, "how can there be something it feels like, from a subjective viewpoint, for a physical being to experience the world?" The question of intentionality is, "how can something physical, such as a brain state, be about, or represent, some other thing out in the world?" Not too long ago, the majority opinion was that these two questions addressed two essentially independent domains. However, in recent years the views of many philosophers have swung dramatically in the opposite direction. An important theme of analytic philosophy of mind in the last decade or two has been the exploration of the groundbreaking idea that these two domains might be fundamentally linked in previously unrecognized ways. Perhaps phenomenal properties are reducible to certain kinds of intentional properties. Perhaps the mind's non-derivative intentionality is grounded in phenomenology. Perhaps we should think of phenomenology and intentionality as "intertwined, all the way down to the ground" (Chalmers 2004, 32). This thesis addresses one crucial question within this larger framework: whether, and how, thoughts are phenomenally conscious. Thoughts are an important test case for theories about the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality, because they have long been considered paradigmatic intentional states, in contrast to perceptual and sensory experiences, which are paradigmatic phenomenal states. While there is something it is like, from the inside, for an individual to undergo a perceptual experience such as an olfactory experience of roasted coffee beans, by contrast entertaining a thought might seem to lack such a distinctive qualitative "feel". The thought is clearly intentional: it involves carrying informational content about objects and properties in the world. But is there also something it is like for a subject to experience thinking itself? To answer this question in the affirmative is to accept the existence of a phenomenology of thought, so-called "cognitive phenomenology" (CP). The literature on this topic so far has focused primarily on the question of whether CP exists. Here I will focus on the subtly different, and largely neglected, question of whether a kind of CP exists that is able to determine thought's intentional content. Many proponents of CP seem to be motivated by the hope that it can, since they believe that in the case of other conscious states, the phenomenology accounts for the intentionality. However, in what follows I argue that this ambitious project is doomed to fail, because CP is not suited to determine the intentional content of thought.
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Affective perceptionTaylor, Richard James January 2010 (has links)
This thesis aims to present and defend an account of affective perception. The central argument seeks to establish three claims. 1) Certain emotional bodily feelings (and not just psychic feelings) are world-directed intentional states. 2) Their intentionality is to be understood in perceptual terms: such feelings are affective perceptions of emotional properties of a certain kind. 3) These ‘emotion-proper properties’ are response-dependent in a way that entails that appropriate affective responses to their token instances qualify, ipso facto, as perceptions of those instances. The arguments for (1) and (2) appeal directly to the phenomenology of emotional experience and draw heavily from recent research by Peter Goldie and Matthew Ratcliffe. By applying Goldie’s insights into the intentional structure of psychic feelings to the case of emotional bodily feelings, it is shown that certain of the latter—particularly those pertaining to the so-called ‘standard’ emotions—exemplify world-directed intentionality analogous to the perceptual intentionality of tactile feelings. Adapting Ratcliffe’s account of the analogy between tactile feelings and what he terms ‘existential feelings’, it is argued that standard emotional bodily feelings are at the same time intrinsically intentional world-directed perceptual states (affective perceptions) through which the defining properties of emotional objects (emotion-proper properties) are apprehended. The subsequent account of these properties endorses a response-dependence thesis similar to that defended by John McDowell and David Wiggins and argues that tokening an appropriate emotional affective state in response to a token emotion-proper property is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for perception of that property (Claim (3)). The central claim is thus secured by appeal both to the nature of the relevant feelings and the nature of the relevant properties (the former being intrinsically intentional representational states and the latter being response-dependent in a way that guarantees the perceptual status of the former).
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Essays on the perception, representation, and categorisation of colourDavies, Will January 2012 (has links)
This thesis develops and explores a constitutive approach to colour vision, which serves as an alternative to the standard experiential view of colour vision operating in the philosophy of colour. The approach seeks to describe the nature or essence of colour vision qua psychological kind. I argue that it is constitutive of colour vision that an organism possesses the ability to achieve colour constancy. An important feature of my account is that colour constancy is characterised as the ability to discriminate differences in surface reflectance properties across changes in illumination conditions. This differs from the standard ‘appearance invariance view’, which characterises colour constancy by appealing to the phenomenology of apparent colour. I consider an important objection to the appearance invariance view posed by the argument from illumination, which might also seem to carry over to the reflectance discrimination view. The objection is based on the claim that in standard cases of colour constancy the phenomenology of apparent colour is partly illumination-dependent. I argue that the reflectance discrimination view is perfectly able to accommodate this point. As a case study in applying the constitutive approach to illuminate the distinctive nature of colour vision, I argue that a vivid feature of our ordinary experience of colour known as categorical perception should be dissociated from our colour vision abilities. Although colour ontology often is not at the forefront of discussion, these constitutive theses support the ontological view of colour known as reflectance physicalism. I critique the argument from colour similarity, which many take to pose the greatest threat to reflectance physicalism. The thrust of the argument is that colours phenomenally appear to stand in similarity relations that do not correlate with the similarities that are evident among reflectance properties. This argument lacks much force, however, as it fails to acknowledge the extreme context sensitivity of similarity and the presentation sensitivity of our knowledge of similarities.
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Development of inhibition as a function of the presence of an intentional agentUnknown Date (has links)
This thesis examined the developmental differences in inhibition and theory-of-mind of 4-8 year olds as a function of the suggested presence of a supernatural agent. All children played four games designed to assess their current level of inhibition and theory-of-mind performance; Children in the experimental condition, only, were also introduced to an invisible Princess Alice and were told that she was watching during the games. Following these measures, all children engaged in a resistance-to-temptation task to determine any differences in inhibition resulting from Princess Alice's suggested presence. I found that children exhibiting a well-developed theory-of-mind were more likely to express belief in Princess Alice than were children lacking this cognitive ability. This research provided support that cognitive maturity, rather than immaturity, may be necessary for children to express belief in novel supernatural agents, and highlighted the importance of context as a mediating factor in children's behavioral inhibition. / by Ashley King. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2009. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2009. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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The effects of predatory status on developing understanding of mental state functioning subsequent to deathUnknown Date (has links)
Bering and colleagues (2004, 2005) reported that the expectation that conscious
mental states cease with the onset of death (discontinuity reasoning) emerges
developmentally, and discontinuity reasoning for some states (emotions, desire,
epistemic) remains lower than for others (psychobiological, perceptual). Cormier (2005)
reported very similar findings for the context of sleep and proposed a modular
explanation of these effects (“intentional persistence”) and suggested that intentional
persistence represents an evolved adaptation designed to maintain vigilance and
behavioral preparedness while in the presence of animals of ambiguous agency status
(e.g., death, sleep, hibernation, feigned death). The current study extended this line of
research to realistic animal characters. Although results revealed patterns of discontinuity
reasoning and intentional persistence that were consistent with those of previous studies,
the prediction that intentional persistence would be more pronounced for predators was not fulfilled. A newly proposed evolutionary product, “Cooptation,” was introduced to
further explain the results. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2014. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection
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Mindful life or mindful lives? : exploring why the Buddhist belief in rebirth should be taken seriously by mindfulness practitionersLucas, J. January 2018 (has links)
This thesis will explore whether those interested in Buddhist practices such as mindfulness but who approach such practices from a broadly secular perspective can be offered reasons to take rebirth seriously as an afterlife possibility. It will begin by exploring some of the history of mindfulness and its adoption from Buddhism to show how foundational cosmological elements such as rebirth have been side-lined as part of a wider movement to bring Buddhism in line with modernist, particularly scientific, discourses. The thesis will investigate the philosophical principles behind the Buddhist multi-life perspective in order to see whether arguments could be rallied in defence of it. This will involve focussing specifically on the argument in defence of rebirth offered by Dharmakīrti and show how its premises draw from philosophical principles adopted by the earliest Buddhist philosophical systems. Dharmakīrti’s argument will be examined within the context of contemporary philosophy of consciousness where philosophers such as Evan Thompson and Galen Strawson have challenged the view that consciousness could arise from entirely unconscious factors. This challenge aligns with a key premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth as well as Buddhist Abhidharma principles. Arguments against the emergence of consciousness from unconscious factors strengthen the case for claiming that consciousness cannot simply appear at the beginning of life and disappear at death. Whilst supporting Strawson’s arguments, the thesis will ultimately reject his claim that an individual consciousness could be constructed from, and ultimately collapse into, multiple consciousnesses. From here it will be argued that conscious experiences arise as part of an unbroken stream that can neither arise from nor collapse into rudimentary factors that are devoid of the distinctive characteristics of consciousness. The argument will conclude by suggesting that the stream of consciousness involves an inseparable capacity for retention and recall. This capacity provides the possibility for the sort of psychological continuity between lives that, within traditional Buddhist cosmology, allows an ordinary being to cultivate the extraordinary personal qualities of a Buddha.
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Linking inhibitory control and theory of mind to social behavior in young children. / Social behavior / Linking inhibitory control & theory of mind to social behavior in young childrenJanuary 2005 (has links)
Choy E Hang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-99). / Abstract in English and Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.2 / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.4 / Chapter CHAPTER I: --- INTRODUCTION --- p.7 / Theory of Mind Hypothesis --- p.7 / Executive Dysfunction Hypothesis --- p.10 / Inhibitory Control --- p.12 / The Present Studies --- p.15 / Hypotheses --- p.17 / Chapter CHAPTER II: --- STUDY 1 --- p.18 / Method --- p.19 / Participants --- p.19 / Materials --- p.19 / Measures --- p.20 / Procedures --- p.23 / Results --- p.25 / Examining Hypothesis 1 --- p.21 / Examining Hypotheses 2 and 3 --- p.28 / Discussion --- p.35 / Chapter CHATPER III: --- STUDY 2 --- p.38 / Method --- p.39 / Participants --- p.39 / Materials --- p.39 / Measures --- p.40 / Procedures --- p.44 / Results --- p.45 / Examining Hypothesis 1 --- p.48 / Examining Hypotheses 2 and 3 --- p.48 / Discussion --- p.52 / Chapter CHATPER IV: --- STUDY 3 --- p.55 / Method --- p.56 / Participants --- p.56 / Materials --- p.56 / Measures --- p.57 / Procedures --- p.61 / Results --- p.62 / Examining Hypothesis 1 --- p.64 / Examining Hypotheses 2 and 3 --- p.64 / Discussion --- p.76 / Chapter CHAPTER V: --- GENERAL DISCUSSION --- p.78 / Conclusion --- p.82 / REFERENCES --- p.83
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