Zugl.: Osnabrück, Univ., Diss., 2006

Doctorat en Langues et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

A partir de 1919, Heidegger élabore plusieurs projets temporels grâce à une phénoménologie herméneutique caractérisée par la fonction méthodique de l’indication formelle, dont la dernière communication date de 1930. Dans ces projets, on trouve à plusieurs reprises la notion de répétition. Plusieurs commentateurs considèrent Kierkegaard comme source de la répétition heideggérienne tandis que d’autres se réfèrent à Nietzsche. Heidegger emploie le terme Wiederholung, Kierkegaard la notion Gjentagelse, et Nietzsche les notions Wiederkehr, Wiederkunft et Wiederholung. L’expression précise « répétition du possible » se trouve dans certaines œuvres des trois penseurs, et s’insère dans des projets temporels différents. La possibilité, en dehors de sa signification modale, décrit depuis Aristote un caractère de l’étant, en corrélation avec le phénomène fondamental qu’est le mouvement. Tant Kierkegaard que Nietzsche, et par la suite Heidegger, ont abordé la question de la mobilité comme thème fondamental dans leurs recherches, pour promouvoir la possibilité en tant que possibilité. Chez les trois penseurs, répétition n’est pas itération, ni retour de la même facticité empirique, mais répétition de la possibilité. Par l’expression « répétition du possible », il s’agit de décrire un mouvement temporel, accordant un sens spécifique au passé, et même à l’histoire. Ce mouvement temporel non objectivable, précède nécessairement le temps uniforme linéaire qui a déterminé la conception classique du temps depuis Aristote. Nécessairement mien, et à la fois continu et discontinu, ce mouvement qui, par son essence ne se manifeste que rarement, tient ensemble passé et futur autour de l’instant privilégié. L’instant, lié à la possibilité d’une décision qui ne se réfère pas à l’attente devant la réalisation des possibilités quotidiennes, a pour enjeu l’entièreté de la vie, visant la transformation de la vie et la constitution de l’homme. De cette manière dans différents projets chez les trois penseurs, la répétition et l’instant font entrer en jeu la question de la liberté. La conceptualité, ce qui revient à dire, la méthode de cette pensée temporelle, s’avèrent tellement importante, de sorte que cette pensée devient accessible grâce à une communication « indirecte » qui demande une contribution essentielle du lecteur. Le travail envisage l’affinité des trois penseurs tant à travers le caractère indirect de la communication de la temporalité que la tâche d’assumer le passé. / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

My dissertation draws upon ancient political philosophy (Plato and Aristotle) and 20th century hermeneutic thought (Heidegger and Gadamer) to argue that our judgment and understanding is always “situated” within a world, or horizon, shaped by the projects, practices, and traditions in which we are engaged. This means that judgment never starts from scratch. The exercise of judgment, in evaluating competing arguments in politics or law, in trying to understand a philosophical text, in deliberating about how to act in this or that circumstance, is always informed by preconceptions and commitments that we have not justified in advance. In this sense, our judgment is always “prejudiced.” But contrary to a familiar way of thinking, the prejudicial aspect of judgment is not some regrettable limitation. Certain prejudices, I argue, can actually enable good judgment rather than hinder it. The primary goal of the dissertation is to clarify the concept of prejudice and to draw out its implications for politics, ethics, and philosophy. What does it mean to reason from within the world? What room does such reasoning allow for human agency and political reform? By drawing upon Heidegger’s notion of “Being-in-the-World” and Gadamer’s notion of “horizon,” I develop the idea that our life circumstance is an intelligible perspective that informs our deliberation and judgment. Moreover, our life perspective provides the basis for a kind of situated agency. After elaborating the situated conception of understanding, I show that it is implicit in Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom (phronesis) and in Plato’s notion of dialectic. My goal is to bring out a link that is often overlooked between their philosophy and 20th century hermeneutic thought. By reading each in light of the other, we gain a deeper understanding of what it means to reason from within the perspective of our lives.

protein chemistry, unnatural amino acids, chemical biology, proteomicsThe foundation of political societies is a central theme in Rousseau's work. This is no surprise coming from a man who was born into a people who had their own celebrated founder and foundations, and immersed himself in the writings of classical republicans and the quasi-mythical histories of ancient city-states where the heroic lawgiver played an important and legitimate role in political foundations. However, Rousseau's propositional political writings (those written for Geneva, Corsica, and Poland) have been accused of being unsystematic and running the spectrum from conservative and prudent to radical and utopian. It is this seeming incongruence which is the subject of this thesis. In particular, it is argued that this confusion is born out the failure to recognize a systematic distinction between "founding" and "re-founding" political societies in both the history of political thought, and Rousseau's own work (a distinction in Rousseau which has rarely been noted, let alone treated to a study of its own). By recognizing this distinction one can identify two Rousseaus; the conservative and prudent thinker who is wary of making changes to established political systems and constitutional foundations (the re-founder), and the radical democrat fighting for equality, and claiming that no state is legitimate without popular sovereignty (the founder). In demonstrating this distinction, this thesis examines the ancient concept of the lawgiver, the growth and expansion of the idea leading up to the eighteenth century, Rousseau's own philosophic writings on the topic, and the differing political proposals he wrote for Geneva, Corsica, and Poland. The thesis argues that although there is a clear separation between these two types of political proposals, they remain systematically Rousseauvian.

No description available.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

No description available.

No description available.