One fundamental difference between the epistemic views of Locke and Leibniz as represented in Leibniz's New Essays on Human Understanding concerns the issue of innate ideas and knowledge. In countering Locke's arguments that innate ideas and/or knowledge are neither necessary nor even possible, Leibniz offers a defense of the doctrine which evidently presumes that Locke's objections are the result of a misapprehension. Once properly understood, Leibniz suggests, the doctrine of innateness reveals itself to be not only reasonable but indeed absolutely necessary to accounting for our knowledge. Leibniz's arguments are not, however, as compelling as he would perhaps like; indeed, certain critics have argued that due to the manner in which he expresses his views--as separate responses to each of Locke's objections, rather than as straight treatise--Leibniz fails to display a coherent theory of his own. The complexity of Leibniz's views and their ties to his metaphysics render their case against him even stronger. Contrary to the views of these critics, there does exist in Leibniz's thought a coherent theory of innateness. Leibniz's innate speculative truths, with which critics have generally been concerned, are explicated in terms of reflection upon the enduring properties of the soul. There also exists in Leibniz's system an analogous realm of innate moral knowledge, which is also worked out in terms of reflection. This interpretation of Leibniz's theory makes possible a meaningful comparison between his views and those of Locke. The substantial differences between the two systems can be traced to differences in the epistemic questions with which they were concerned. While Locke is concerned with explaining the psychological apprehension of truth, Leibniz's focus is with truth's ontological structure.

As the title indicates, this thesis is a critical exposition of Armstrong's theory of universals. But at a deeper level it is also an argument against one of the main tenets of traditional realism since Plato: the claim that the nature of physical properties, and objects in general, are ontologically independent of any mind or belief system. Armstrong's attempt to argue for a non-relational immanent realism epitomizes this claim. Armstrong's main argument for his position is an indirect one. He argues for the untenability of all theories opposing his and then attempts to show how his theory does not suffer from the same problems. Against theories opposing his (all forms of nominalism and transcendent Platonic realism) he puts forth four arguments: (1) the relation-regress, (2) the object regress, (3) the thought experiment, and (4) causality. These are all various attempts to show that nothing external to an object is relevant to the nature of the object. Against (1) and (2) I argue that the regresses are not infinite and that even if they were they would not be vicious. Concerning (3) and (4) I argue that Armstrong sets up a straw man and that therefore these two arguments are just irrelevant to his general claim. The conclusion then is that he has not given us any reason not to believe that there is no mind-dependent element in ontology. The site having thus been cleared, I then give positive reasons for believing that there are mind-dependent components in ontology. These reasons come mainly in the form of examples for which Armstrong's theory cannot account. My primary examples are artifacts. There seems to be a certain mind-dependent element in the nature of artifacts even though they are external to us. My argument then basically is a challenge to Armstrong's theory and to any realistic theory that holds the claim in the first paragraph above: give an account of artifacts without invoking mind-dependent elements. My claim is that these elements are universals, so they are abstract and multiply exemplifiable, but they depend upon us and they are neither immutable nor external.

Non-standard scales for fundamental measurements obtained by a change of operation of concatenation satisfy the axioms in the same manner as standard scales. One possible change of operation for length measurement is from linear juxtaposition to rectangular juxtaposition. Some argued that the choice between standard and non-standard scales can be guided by no other reason but simplicity of science and convenience. Non-standard scales for length measurement however, would require either change of laws, or introduction of a universal force or a change of all other scales which would preserve the laws, and a complicated practice which consists of many partial measurements that affect the precision of measurement. The set of permissible scales for length measurement divides naturally into two subsets: symmetric and asymmetric scales. The set of permissible scales can be reduced to the symmetric scales by either adding an axiom or by stating a symmetry requirement as a law dictated by the nature of the magnitude under consideration (length).

Theories of practical rationality which are based upon the concept of the maximization of preference satisfaction are open to criticism on the grounds that they alienate the agent from his actions, and from the source of his actions in his moral emotions. This general analysis of rational motivation can be further supported by a close analysis of the rational strategy known as "precommitment". Ordinarily taken to exemplify an ideal strategy of rational maximization, upon closer inspection the rational motivation involved in precommitment is typically not maximization of preference satisfaction, nor should it be. These arguments show that the agent would be better off in terms of preference maximization if he believed some other theory of practical rationality. If the preference satisfaction model recommends some other theory of practical rationality, then it no longer directly provides the agent with reasons for action, in which case it no longer serves as a theory of practical rationality at all.

More than any other philosopher Bertrand Russell is thought to have refuted the Absolute Idealism of Francis Herbert Bradley. He is supposed to have done this by showing that Bradley's doctrine of internal relations is contradictory and inadequate. In this thesis I reexamine the controversy between Russell and Bradley concerning the doctrine of internal relations in an attempt to determine whether Russell did, in fact, refute Bradley. In the first chapter I show how Bradley's internal relations reside on the level of understanding which is between the level of feeling and the level of the Absolute. In the second chapter I show how Bradley himself rejects the whole level of understanding including both internal and external relations as mere appearance. He does this primarily by showing that relations have what I call a "dual nature" which means that they must be but cannot be both unifiers and constituents of complexes. In the third chapter I show how Russell's understanding of relations emerged from his belief that the structure of language parallels the structure of extra-linguistic reality and that Russell also discovers the dual nature problem. In the fourth chapter I examine Russell's powerful arguments against internal relations and conclude that they are effective. Russell's and Bradley's arguments, however, show that external relations, which are necessary for Russell's own pluralism, are also impossible due to the dual nature problem. It seems that Russell rather than Bradley is refuted. In the fifth chapter I consider whether any contemporary writers have identified and solved the dual nature problem. Both Alvin Nelson and Timothy Sprigge have distinguished between what they call the "holistic" and other interpretations of internal relations. I show that neither Nelson nor Sprigge captures Bradley's meaning and that the problem remains unsolved. In the last chapter I present the outlines of a solution which is suggested by the dual nature problem itself. In this solution properties are unifiers and relations are "diversifiers" and a theory of levels or types is required. In the end it is not clear that even this solution solves the dual nature problem.

Two conceptually distinct accounts of intrinsic value tend to dominate moral and value theory. One is the view, held prominently by J. S. Mill, in which intrinsic value is that which is valued as an end, rather than as a means to some further end. The other conception, advanced by G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross, holds intrinsic value to be the value something has in itself by virtue of its own intrinsic nature and independently of all other values and objects. In this essay, I present criticisms of each view and provide, in their place, an alternative conception of intrinsic value that avoids the failings of these prevailing accounts. This essay's account is independent of the particular valuations of persons, thus avoiding the criticism against the view represented by Mill, but remains relationally tied to persons, unlike the Moorean conception.

Ethicists have discussed many different aspects of the difficult decisions parents face concerning when and how to conceive children. However, the perspective of those who will be most dramatically affected by conception decisions, namely, the children who will be brought into existence because of those decisions, has been underrepresented in the ethical dialogue. The scarcity of scholarship that takes the possible child's perspective into account is largely due to the work of philosopher Derek Parfit. Parfit has argued that it is impossible for a child to be negatively affected by the decision to conceive her as long as her life is worth living because if a different conception decision had been made, the child never would have existed at all. This unintuitive conclusion has deterred many philosophers from exploring the implications of conception decisions for possible children in any significant way. However, in my dissertation I show that Parfit's conclusions can be avoided and the effect of conception decisions on a possible child's well-being can and should be taken into account. My purpose was to define and defend a child-centered ethical appeal to be taken into account in the consideration of conception decisions. The dissertation has three specific objectives: (1) To develop a view of what parents owe their children from a moral standpoint. I propose accounts of the interests of children and of the obligations of parents; (2) To demonstrate that this account of parental obligations applies to the decision to conceive a child in spite of Derek Parfit's objections. I show where Parfit's arguments are problematic and demonstrate that his conclusions are therefore unwarranted. I suggest that a slightly modified understanding of the concept of harm can make the idea of conception as a harm philosophically coherent; and (3) To demonstrate how the inclusion of a child-centered appeal yields more satisfactory ethical analyses for cases involving the decision to conceive. In essence, the arguments laid out in this dissertation open conceptual space for the inclusion of a child-affecting perspective in ethical analyses of conception decisions. The appeal I propose is a step toward filling this new space.

Moral integrity has been a long-standing focus of philosophy. Attention has been on the integrity of individual persons understood as the state in which persons' actions are well-focused and guided by persons' moral commitments. Although other interpretations of integrity have been offered, the etymology of 'integrity' suggests that coherence is a critical element. Here I argue that certain types of institutions can have moral integrity. It is important to recognize this dimension of social reality in order to give a complete account of institutions and their moral obligations. Without an appreciation of moral integrity we cannot recognize an agent's actions as having a purpose and we cannot understand it as having particular moral obligations. Moral integrity is a distinctly moral, not legal, property. Institutional moral responsibilities cannot be reduced to their legal obligations. I make four central claims in this study. First, I argue how the concept of integrity should be understood. Second, I make the ontological claim that institutions have an identity that cannot be fully reduced to their constituent individuals without loss of meaning such that the properties institutions bear are not reducible fully to the those individuals. I also recognize that institutions depend on their constituent individuals for their ontological status. Third, I show that one predicate institutions can bear is moral responsibility, which is distinct from legal responsibility. Fourth, I show that because of their unique ontology, institutions can come to possess and lose their moral integrity in a way distinct from how individuals do so. Institutional integrity is a social phenomenon that cannot be understood independently of the individuals associated with institutions but it also cannot be understood exclusively in terms of the integrity of the individuals associated with them. Many of the traditional implications of understanding an agent to be morally responsible are unavailable when the agent is an institution: An institution cannot feel remorseful, for example. This study explores the extent to which we can hold that institutions are morally responsible, the senses in which moral responsibility can be attributed to institutions, what is entailed in holding institutions morally responsible, and how we can understand institutional moral responsibility.

The first part of this dissertation focuses on Leibniz's very concept of harmony independently of its various applications. I argue that an examination of the relevant texts reveals that harmony is not merely an ontological notion, but that it is also epistemological. The key to understanding Leibniz's concept of harmony, I argue, is through his nominalist theory of relations, and its connection to his doctrine of distinct vs. confused cognition. In the second part of the dissertation, I examine Leibniz's theory of a harmony between the ideal realm of mathematics, and the concrete realm of nature. I argue that this harmony explains, according to Leibniz, the universal applicability of the principle of continuity, a principle which lies at the core of his account of the laws of motion, and his adoption of the Neoplatonic and Christian Aristotelian doctrine of a "Great Chain of Being." The third part turns to an examination of the harmony of efficient and final causation. Many commentators assume that for Leibniz final causation is applicable only to the metaphysical level of monads, while efficient causation is operative solely at the physical level of phenomenal bodies. I argue against this assumption that both types of causation are operative at each ontological level. In part four, I examine Leibniz's theory of the harmony of nature and grace, a harmony directly associated with his moral philosophy and his theory of natural retribution. I argue that while Leibniz's philosophy contains the metaphysical doctrines sufficient to account for how virtuous acts reward themselves naturally, it provides little support for the claim that vicious acts generate their own punishment. The dissertation concludes in part five with a discussion of the significance of the concept of harmony for the history of philosophy. I also argue that the previously examined pre-established harmonies are parts of a metaphysical system best understood, not as a series of harmonies operating in isolation from one another, but as a series of harmonies some of which are nested in others.

In this thesis I argue for a novel interpretation of Book II, Chapter xxvii of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding according to which Locke's theory of identity is taken to be an Aristotelian four-causal theory. On this interpretation, we are the same person as anyone who efficiently causes us to remember being them. More particularly, two diachronically distinct persons x and y are the same person just in case either x causes y to remember being x or y causes x to remember being y; and two contemporaneous persons x and y are the same just in case for all diachronically prior persons z, z causes x to remember being z if and only if z causes y to remember being z. While this interpretation suffers from the drawbacks that Locke nowhere articulated such a view and had a well-known antipathy for scholastic notions generally, I argue that it has certain advantages. In addition to being at least consistent with Locke's dicta on causation, it is both formally and substantively adequate. Moreover, it reflects Locke's unconscious enmeshment in scholastic notions, and is useful as a heuristic; it sheds light on some of the more obscure aspects of the text (e.g., §12 and the concept of "man"). I conclude with the hope that future research will provide even more support for this novel interpretation.