This dissertation explores the phenomenology and folk theory of willpower, critically assesses existing scientific theories of willpower that seek to explain the phenomenology and folk theory, and proposes a new scientifically useful theory of willpower. Earlier theories reliant upon such mechanisms or techniques as control of attention, rulemaking and private side bets are shown to be inadequate to explain crucial features of certain behavioral performance deemed to be the exhibition of willpower. This dissertation sets out to a new theory capable of explaining these key features of willpower in terms of a new model of private side bets involving the staking of status ascriptions of strength of will upon the success of the relevant behavioral performances.

The aim of the present paper is to clarify the essential features of the objective list and address consequences of this characterization. The objective list theory is frequently criticized for its rigidity and its inability to accommodate the variety within the human population. However, I argue that the list can be far less rigid than it initially appears; opportunities for variety within the list abound. Further, issues such as having a well-rounded life as opposed to a specialized one are weighed. I argue that one may forego some goods to better achieve or acquire others. Finally, I claim that one need not maximize amounts of goods in one's life to live a good life and that 'satisficing' is an inadequate answer to the maximizing requirement.

A moral dilemma is a situation in which a person cannot avoid acting wrongly. In the first part of the dissertation, I examine the two most important arguments for the possibility of moral dilemmas: the incommensurability argument and the argument from guilt. I argue that neither of these arguments is successful. In the second part of the dissertation, I show that moral dilemmas are a species of moral luck, or moral responsibility for factors beyond one's control. I argue that those who believe in the possibility of moral dilemmas must also accept the possibility of some kinds of moral luck. This result holds even for moral dilemmas secundum quid, or dilemmas that arise only as a result of prior wrongdoing. In the final part of the dissertation, I consider several arguments for the possibility of circumstantial moral luck. I argue that these arguments all fail; however, I acknowledge that there may be other, more compelling arguments for the possibility of moral luck. I conclude by suggesting that the most important objection to moral dilemmas and moral luck is rooted in a concern for justice.

This project is a philosophical analysis of the practice of bioethics consultation---what might be called the philosophy of bioethics. It assesses claims made about the purposes and appropriate aims of the field, in order to establish whether an identifiable conceptual unity underlies the practice. The conclusion is that no such unity exists. The project begins by assessing the history of the field, in the hope that a historical analysis will explain why the field arose at all, which reason could then be used as a basis for claiming a particular purpose for bioethics consultation. However, it becomes clear that history has bequeathed diverse and sometimes conflicting goals to bioethics consultation. History suggests that the field exists both as a service to physicians and as a service to patients, though the interests of these two parties may be in tension. This work also assesses contemporary accounts of bioethics consultation (including the recent Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation ) and shows that they are radically divergent and incommensurable, in addition to often being too vague to guide the practice. An investigation of possible philosophical arguments regarding bioethics consultation also fails to disclose a single coherent foundation for the field. The project ends with a conceptual geography of twelve possible roles a bioethics consultant may play, and finds that though some are in tension, none may be ruled out of court on independent grounds in the absence of an overarching account of the appropriate aims of the field. What this project demonstrates is that there is no conceptual unity underlying the practice of bioethics consultation. Instead, the enterprise must be understood as comprised of a plurality of roles serving a diversity of purposes and a heterogeneity of goods with no single uniting purpose.

Traditional theories of state-sanctioned punishment, specifically retributivism and deterrence, are critiqued from a feminist ethic of care perspective. The argument is made that the integration of care-based reasoning into punishment theory is essential to the development and practice of punishment as a fair and just institution. The argument rests on the premise that the care and justice theories are best understood as complementary, each lending critical contributions to our understanding of fair and reasonable practices. Two sub-theses are developed: the ideal, in which it is argued that care theory gives us reason to re-conceptualize our responses to wrongdoing in ways that are not dependent on punitive measures, and the non-ideal, in which it is argued that care-based reasoning can address some of the shortcomings of traditional theories and practices, particularly those relating to concerns about human dignity and respect, and can provide justifications for improvements.

In this project, I argue that moral complicity is best conceptualized as conduct that expressively aligns one with another agent's wrongdoing. Expressive alignment occurs as a result of one agent expressing a positive desire, attitude, or belief toward another agent's (a primary agent's) wrongdoing. I use William Alston's account of illocutionary acts to elucidate the notion of complicit expression. I go on to argue that causal facilitation can also function as a form of positive expression toward a primary agent's wrongdoing. I then compare and contrast the expressivist account with accounts of complicity put forth by Sanford Kadish, Judith Kissell, and Christopher Kutz. I then argue that the wrongness of complicit conduct stems from the fact that it expresses antipathy and disregard for the moral law. Finally, I use the expressivist account to analyze three different cases of purported complicity: stem cell research, referrals for physician-assisted suicide, and the bombing of Dresden.

Philosophers often endorse the claim that perceptual experience has content. However, the significance of this claim is highly disputed. A particularly central issue is the relationship between concepts and the content of perceptual experience. Accounts of this relationship are largely shaped by a key question; is perceptual content itself conceptual, or is it nonconceptual? In the following thesis, I focus on this debate, and consider arguments in favour of both conceptualism and nonconceptualism. The first chapter lays the foundation for the other two, by developing some general views about perceptual content, and what it means to claim that the content of perceptual experience is either conceptual or nonconceptual. In the second chapter, arguments on behalf of conceptualism are discussed, which largely focus on epistemic issues surrounding perceptual experience. The third chapter discusses the idea that perceptual experience outstrips conceptual resources in various ways. I argue that on the balance of considerations, primarily due to certain ways in which experience is situation dependent, a stronger case can be made for nonconceptualism. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-11-19 19:16:04.362

No description available.

Kant's theory of imagination is deeply imbedded in his other more celebrated views, particularly those in regard to judgment. This does not mean, however, that imagination is insignificant. On the contrary, its pure form, the productive imagination, is the basis for the possibility of aesthetic judgment. Imagination is of two types; reproductive and productive. The reproductive type is limited in its employment to empirical objects, while the productive type is confined to the non-empirical side. The central function of the productive imagination in the theory of judgment is the non-conceptual determination of sensible particulars for judgment. In the case of determinative judgment, productive imagination performs as the schematism, which must be strictly temporal. In reflective judgment, it establishes itself as the finality of the form of the beautiful object, and takes the place of the sensible intuition alongside the understanding for the production of harmony.

Alchemy was probably born in Egypt, sometime during Antiquity. It received the influence of the Greek and hermetic doctrines (Chapter II). The Arab civilisation adopted it and brought it into the Western world. Alchemy quickly developed there, until it became widespread throughout France and the rest of Europe (Chapter III). Alchemy, as it was practised till the Renaissance, was not just the art of transmuting baser metals into gold. It was a philosophy which strove to bring to light the hidden architecture of the whole universe. In fact, the real aim of alchemy was the regeneration of the human soul to its divine condition (Chapter IV). The alchemists concealed in their highly allegorical, cryptic language the fabulous secrets of their Art. In Europe, some adepts started to use the alchemical symbolism in various forms of art (poetry, painting,...) which testify to the mysticism and exaltation of the alchemists (Chapter IV).