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The underlying raison d'etre of the work is that, despite the large amount of scholarship which has gone into the analysis and criticism of the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce in the past thirty-five years, commentators have inadequately perceived--and at times denied--the relationship of Peirce's pragmatic theory of meaning to the other basic elements of his epistemology. This study attempts to rectify this oversight by exposing the logical interdependence of the core concepts of that epistemology--that is, Peirce's notions of meaning, truth, and reality--within a distinctive pragmatic framework and showing the manner in which his two main doctrines concerning the nature and limitations of human knowledge, fallibilism and critical common-sensism, fold neatly into that framework. The study consists of three distinct but intimately related phases. First of all, there is the tracing of the roots of the pragmatic theory of meaning and the Peircean notions of truth and reality (Chapters I through III). The central contention developed in this phase is that Peirce's idiosyncratic conceptions of truth and reality are built into the theory of meaning and that all three of these elements of his epistemology derive their character from the neo-phenomenalistic perspective which serves as their matrix. The second phase (Chapter IV) extends this unifying analysis to the doctrines of fallibilism and critical common-sensism. It is therein shown that both of these doctrines are implicit in the assumptions upon which the interrelated views of meaning, truth, and reality are founded. Taken together, the first two phases of the study build a new case for assigning the label "pragmatism" to the main body of Peirce's epistemology, rather than restricting it (in the traditional manner) to his criterion of meaning. In the final phase of the study (Chapters V and VI) the findings of the earlier pages are reinforced and accorded additional depth by exploring the relevance of Peirce's unified epistemology to two issues of moment in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, namely, the confirmability of empirical hypotheses and the doctrine of theory-dependent meaning.

A number of proposed theories of tort liability are "monolithic" in that they seek to explain tort liability by focusing on a single element or concern of the tort situation. Four different monolithic theories of tort liability will be discussed in this work: personal moral culpability liability; strict or absolute liability; liability based on utility and, more specifically, economic liability; and liability based on reciprocity of risk between the parties. The narrow scope of each of these theories renders them susceptible to both internal and external criticism--they are, variously, internally inconsistent and incoherent and they lead to unacceptable results in tort decisions. Liability based on a standard of reasonableness which permits and requires a consideration of a variety of individual and community interests in making a tort decision is to be preferred to any of these monolithic theories. A theory of liability based on reasonableness is in accord with and serves to correctly explicate the majority of decisions in reported tort cases. Furthermore, a theory of liability based on reasonableness dispels the supposed antithesis between liability with fault and strict liability.

The right to privacy is presented as a right to a state of non-intrusion in the control an individual has over personal information, and the means of access to such information. This account of the right helps to show that the Warren and Brandeis account of the right to privacy in torts is best seen as presenting the right as simply one of the cluster composing the right to be let alone, not as simply identifying the two. The state of non-intrusion account is shown to be justified by reference to the respect for, and recognition of, the nature of persons as separate moral entities. That the right is justified in this manner indicates the attempts in the legal literature to tie the legal right to privacy to already established concepts in the law, both tort and constitutional, is wrong-headed. Rather, many of the already established legal concepts can be shown to arise from concerns for privacy. Since the right to privacy as defined above draws its justification from the feature of persons as separate moral entities, accounts of the right as a derivative right, where derivative is taken to mean either the rights in the cluster are not sui generis or that the right is only justified in reference to other goods or values, are seen to be in error. This justification also plays an important role in indicating accounts of this right as a property right suffer from a deficiency so severe such accounts must be rejected. A property right account simply cannot capture adequately the import of such a justification. Such an account also clearly precludes the possibility the right to privacy is an autonomy right. There is simply no reason to think invasions of privacy significantly restrict one's range of significant choice. These considerations lead to the proposed account of the right as specified above, an account which is a natural extension of exclusive access and selective disclosure accounts.

In this dissertation I attempt to devise a satisfactory general principle for moral decision-making. I assume such a principle would give complete and consistent directives; it would give intuitively sound directives; and its fundamental aim would be the maximization of the good, or utility. Future generations provide a test of principles of moral choice. For a sound principle should accommodate choices affecting all people at all times. But attempts to accommodate choices affecting future generations under a general principle of moral choice have led to two paradoxes: the paradox of future generations and the mere addition paradox. The principles of total and average utility both give complete and consistent directives in all cases, including those where future generations are concerned; but both have counter-intuitive implications. Total utilitarianism must be rejected, for it implies the "Repugnant Conclusion," i.e., that for every large population with an excellent quality of life there is an enormous population with a wretched quality of life but more utility which it is better to bring about. The principle of average utility, however, can reply to the major objection against it, that it forbids adding people who lower the quality of life. It seems, prima facie, to be the comprehensive principle we seek. But utilitarianism faces two great problems. First, it justifies any means to the end of utility maximization. Second, suppose we define utility as personal preference satisfaction. Then according to utilitarianism the good simply consists in preference satisfaction and the right in maximizing preference satisfaction. But the satisfaction of some preferences is intuitively bad. Neither the problem of justifying bad means to a good end nor the problem of bad preference satisfaction can be solved within a utilitarian framework. But a principle of moral choice which gives priority to the satisfaction of certain preferences, designated under moral contracts as rights which we have a duty to respect, over the maximization of general utility will give satisfactory results in all cases where utilitarianism gives counter-intuitive ones. The principle of average utility can be retained as a moral remainder rule.

Whenever we make a claim about a fictional entity, we seem to embroil ourselves in familiar problems of reference. This appearance is misleading, because what a sentence is about bears a greater resemblance to a Fregean sense than to a reference. All previous attempts to define 'about' consist of two approaches: (1) "metalinguistic" theories of 'about', proposed by Ryle and Carnap, which fail to counterexamples wherein transparent contexts generate paradoxical consequences; and (2) "semantic" theories of 'about' proposed by Putnam and by Goodman, which fail to counterexamples wherein no term refers to that which the sentence is about. An untried alternative is to replace 'S is about k ' with 'S is about k for person p '. Clearly, such a definition need not confine itself to sentences, but may apply to works of art as well. A detailed examination of how one actually goes about arguing to an audience that some work of art W is about some topic, yields a definition that approximates normal usage, yet avoids many problematic notions, such as 'beliefs', 'ideas', and 'intentional states'. Necessary and sufficient truth conditions for 'W is about k for p at time T' turn out to include as major elements (1) a causal chain leading from W to a set of "explicit thoughts" and dispositions, and (2) the lack of an "aesthetic environment" which excludes W.

This study provides a moral justification of the family as a child-bearing and child-rearing institution by arguing that procreation may entitle parents to their children. It begins by observing that the belief that parents have such a right is deeply ingrained in the laws and customs of Western civilization but that at present we have no satisfactory theoretical explanation of this belief; and it further underscores the need for such an explanation by pointing to the conflict between a commitment to equal opportunity and the family. Part I first considers the historical arguments philosophers have made on behalf of the family and shows why they fail. It argues that (1) the traditional property argument fails because it interprets parental rights in terms of an absolute property right which is incompatible with the child's rights; that (2) natural affection fails because some parents abuse their children and because adoptive parents may display "natural affection"; and that (3) the best interest of the child fails because it cannot provide parents with a unique claim to their children. It then develops the property argument in a new and fruitful way. By replacing the traditional concept of an absolute property right with the modern "bundle of rights" analysis of property, it provides a means of analyzing parental rights in a way that prohibits abuse and is therefore compatible with the child's basic rights. Finally, it examines entitlement theory and argues that, since procreation satisfies its conditions, parents who adequately care for their children are entitled to them. Part II examines the nature of the parental entitlement claim. It argues for the rights necessary for paternalistic agency, interprets them according to a standard analysis of ownership, and concludes that a parental right to rear the child according to parental values is consistent with the child's rights. Next it argues that, in excluding others, parents incur a special obligation to do as much as they reasonably can for their child. And finally, it places things in a historical context, argues against an interpretation of parental obligation in terms of needs, and shows how the theory might work in practice.

Power, according to Spinoza, is God's essence. Hence understanding Spinoza's thoughts about power will help us understand Spinoza's God. Since Spinoza's metaphysics is the foundation for his ethics, this understanding will provide insights into the latter as well. I begin by examining Spinoza's interpretation of Descartes. This has God outside the universe recreating it each moment; otherwise it would cease to exist. Spinoza concludes that all events exist solely through God's power; neither minds nor bodies have power of their own. In other words, Spinoza's Descartes is an occasionalist. I then argue that the primary difference between Spinoza's God and Descartes' God is that Spinoza places God's power inside the universe, rather than outside. Spinoza's God is an immanent creative power: a power in all things which continually creates them, keeping the universe itself from disappearing. Next I explain why Spinoza thinks the existence of motion in the universe follows from God's power. Spinoza believes modes in extension are only differentiated by their motion. God's power necessarily creates infinitely many modes. Therefore, there must be motion. Next I argue that God's attributes include infinite powers of thought and of extension. Individual beings are finite modifications of these powers. This metaphysics is extended into Spinoza's ethics, showing that it is a system which describes how we share in God's power and how virtuous behavior increases our power, thereby increasing our joy. Then a discussion of power in Spinoza's epistemology shows that ideas are not conceived by him as inert, but as acts of understanding, which strive to maintain themselves in our minds and cause other ideas to follow from them. This leads to an examination of ways in which an individual person, by increasing knowledge of the passions that afflict him or her, is supposed to gain power over them. The concluding chapter speculatively ties the earlier discoveries to other important aspects of Spinoza's metaphysics, striving toward a more comprehensive understanding of Spinoza's God.