In this dissertation I explore how Hegel conceives of the practice of religion. Religion for Hegel cannot be the relationship between humans and a transcendent being, since, as I argue, Hegel's God is not a being of the transcendent sort, but reason as Idea and spirit. Nor does Hegel primarily understand religion as feeling or immediate experience of the divine. According to Hegel, religion involves knowledge of the truth in the form of representation, and I discuss the truths that in his view are common to all religions, as well as the principle that he thinks guides the development of the various determinate religions that culminate in Christianity. But, first and foremost, religion for Hegel is cultus or practice in which a person overcomes her own particularity in a radical manner and identifies completely with the universal, objective standpoint. By overcoming her particularity, the person recognizes that her own interests lack absolute value, and she is willing to abandon them entirely for the sake of what the universal requires of her. The highest form of the cultus for Hegel is full participation in Sittlichkeit, or the social and cultural life of modern Protestant Europe. In the cultus, a person achieves freedom, the goal of religion and the highest value in Hegel's philosophy. I argue that freedom for Hegel is independence vis-à-vis the world in both an active and a passive sense. As active, freedom is the autonomy that a person possesses when she acts rationally or follows the ethical norms that are a necessary moment of being free. As passive, freedom is the independence that a person gains when she is no longer attached to her particular interests and is accepting of circumstances in which her desires are not met. But for Hegel the norms of freedom also allow and require that a person continue to engage fully in the world and actively pursue her own particular interests, since such activities play a necessary role in being free. In my / J'explore dans cette thèse la manière dont Hegel conçoit la pratique religieuse. Pour Hegel, la religion ne saurait être une relation entre un être transcendant et les humains puisque, ainsi que je le démontre, le dieu hégélien n'est pas un tel être transcendant mais plutôt la raison en tant qu'Idée et esprit. Il n'est pas non plus question pour Hegel de comprendre la religion comme le sentiment ou l'expérience immédiate du divin. Selon lui, la religion implique une connaissance de la vérité sous la forme d'une représentation. Mon propos à cet égard est de cerner les vérités qui, de son point de vue, sont communes à toutes les religions, et d'identifier le principe qui, selon lui, préside au développement des diverses religions déterminées qui culminent dans le christianisme. Mais, d'abord et avant tout, la religion est pour Hegel un culte ou une pratique par laquelle une personne surmonte de manière radicale sa propre particularité et s'identifie complètement au point de vue universel et objectif. En surmontant sa particularité, cette personne reconnaît que ses intérêts sont dépourvus de valeur absolue et accepte de les abandonner entièrement pour se soumettre aux exigences de l'universel. Selon Hegel, la forme la plus élevée du culte est une participation pleine et entière à la Sittlichkeit, ou à la vie sociale et culturelle de l'Europe protestante moderne. Le culte permet à celui qui y participe de parvenir à la liberté, but de la religion et valeur ultime dans la philosophie hégélienne. J'argumente que la liberté est pour Hegel une indépendance, tant active que passive, vis-à-vis du monde externe. En tant qu'elle est active, la liberté est l'autonomie qu'une personne possède lorsqu'elle agit rationnellement ou qu'elle se conforme aux normes éthiques qui constituent un moment nécessaire de son être-libre. En tant qu'elle est passive, la liberté est l'indépendance qu'une personne atteint lorsqu'elle s'est$

This thesis attempts to answer the following questions, each of which corresponds, sequentially, to chapter in this thesis: (1) What is the internal composition and the historical contextualization of the 18th chapter of the Qur'an, the Surat al-Kahf? (2) Who is al-Khadir, a figure in the Surat al-Kahf, verses 66-82? How has he been described in Muslim commentary and how has he been analyzed in nineteenth and twentieth century scholarship; and with whom has he been associated and/or identified in such commentary and scholarship? (3) How are probable prototypes or parallels of Khadir portrayed in non-Islamicate documents traceable to before the advent of Islam? (4) What are the characteristics of the association/identification of Khadir with Elijah (Ilyas)?

This thesis takes its starting point from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's insight that in order to make sense of the experience of others, one needs to describe how differences are perceived from the perspective of the subject's own body. This study of intersubjective interactions is approached from what I call a 'broad phenomenological' point of view. 'Broad phenomenology' encompasses (i) a more traditional and ontological notion of phenomenology (as read through Merleau-Ponty's writings), (ii) a rereading of this phenomenology through a feminist lens (notably through Luce Irigaray's work), and (iii) a contemporary cognitive scientific notion of embodied cognition. These three approaches have in common that they are concerned with the lived experience of particular, embodied persons who are dynamically related to the world and to other persons within this world. I present a phenomenology of difference that is also a phenomenology of birth, volatility, and implication. Taking my lead from Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and contemporary feminist thought, I argue that through encountering others we are both actively shaping and passively undergoing a continual transformation. In addition, by analysing Merleau-Pony's notions of 'flesh' [chair] and 'divergence' [écart] together with Heidegger's 'abyss' [Abgrund], I uncover an ontological birthplace of intersubjectivity that can no longer be characterised by categories and oppositions. Instead it is a place of radical openness and interbeing [interêtre]. This does not imply that the intersubjective relation is always friendly and safe. On the contrary, the exchange between subjects is volatile and thus it is always open to re-volution. / Le point de départ de cette thèse est l'idée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty qu'afin de comprendre l'expérience des autres, nous devons décrire comment les différences sont perçues à partir de la perspective du corps propre du sujet percevant. Le point de vue de cette étude des interactions intersubjectives est ce que nous appelons 'phénoménologie au sens large'. Cette 'phénoménologie au sens large' inclut (i) une notion plus traditionnelle, ontologique, de la phénoménologie (telle que lue à travers Merleau-Ponty), (ii) une relecture de cette phénoménologie à travers une lentille féministe (notamment à travers l'œuvre de Luce Irigaray), et (iii) une notion contemporaine, cognitive et scientifique de la cognition incarnée. Ces trois approches ont en commun d'avoir pour sujet l'expérience vécue de personnes incarnées particulières qui sont en rapport dynamique avec le monde ainsi qu'avec d'autres personnes au sein de ce monde. Je présente une phénoménologie de la différence qui est également une phénoménologie de la naissance, de la volatilité et de l'implication. Prenant comme point de départ Husserl, Merleau-Ponty et la pensée féministe contemporaine, je défends la thèse qu'au travers de nos rencontres avec autrui nous formons activement ainsi que subissions passivement une transformation continue. De plus, en analysant les notions merleau-pontienne de 'chair' et d' 'écart' avec la notion heideggérienne d'abysse [Abgrund], nous découvrons un lieu de naissance ontologique de l'intersubjectivité qui ne peut plus être caractérisé par les catégories et les oppositions ; il est plutôt question d'un lieu d'ouverture radicale et d' 'e

Humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters can overwhelm the capacity of local and national agencies to respond to the needs of affected populations. In such cases, international relief organizations are frequently involved in the provision of emergency assistance. Health care professionals play a key role in these interventions. This practice environment is significantly different from the context of health care delivery in the home countries of expatriate health care professionals. Clinicians who travel from a developed nation to a resource-poor setting where a humanitarian crisis has occurred experience a shift of professional, social, cultural and regulatory environments. In this dissertation I examine the ethics of health care practice in humanitarian work. I evaluate the literature of global bioethics, global health ethics and the ethics of humanitarian assistance, and consider the contributions of various ethics frameworks and normative approaches. I also develop a set of questions to guide health care professionals as they address ethically complex issues arising in clinical practice during humanitarian crises. In the empirical component of this research program I use Interpretive Description methodology to examine the moral experience of health care professionals in humanitarian relief work, and clinician experiences of resources and constraints for addressing ethical issues in humanitarian settings. Building upon the inductively derived findings, I argue for strategies and approaches that humanitarian organizations, project teams, and health care professionals can adopt to respond to the ethics of this field of practice. I also provide a critical review of Interpretive Description methodology. The research presented in this dissertation makes an important contribution to the ethical analysis of health care practice in humanitarian work. / En contexte d’urgences humanitaires et de sinistres naturels, la capacité des agences locales et nationales à répondre aux besoins des populations affectées est lourdement entravée. Dans ces situations de crise, des organismes internationaux d'aide humanitaire sont souvent impliqués pour offrir leur assistance. Les professionnels des soins de santé jouent un rôle important dans ces interventions. Ces contextes singuliers de pratique pour ces professionnels de la santé expatriés diffèrent beaucoup de l’environnement familier dans lequel ils évoluent dans leur pays d’origine. Les cliniciens qui sont transportés d’un pays développé à des régions dévastées par des crises humanitaires vivent des changements d’environnement professionnel, social, culturel et juridique souvent drastiques. Dans ce projet de thèse, j'examine l'éthique de la pratique en santé dans des zones de crises humanitaires. En premier lieu, j’effectue une recension critique de la littérature consacrée à la bioéthique globale, à l’éthique de la santé globale et à l’éthique humanitaire en vue d’identifier la contribution de certains modèles éthiques et d’approches normatives sur les problèmes qui me préoccupent. Je développe également une série de questions destinée aux professionnels de la santé pour les aider à mieux analyser la nature des enjeux moraux auxquels ils sont confrontés, de même que pour orienter leur processus décisionnel face aux dilemmes rencontrés. Le volet empirique de ce programme de recherche examine l’expérience morale des professionnels des soins de santé en contexte de travail humanitaire, ainsi que les expériences des cliniciens des ressources et des contraintes pour aborder les enjeux moraux en situation de crise humanitaire. Je propose des stratégies et des approches que les organismes humanitaires, les équipes locales d’intervenants, ainsi que les professionnels de la santé peuvent développ

The exploitation of participants is a significant problem in biomedical research, especially in the developing world. However, there is a gap between this problem and the theoretical literature on exploitation. This thesis will attempt to bridge it, considering Wertheimer and Sample’s theories. Whereas Wertheimer holds that exploitation is merely an unjust distribution of the “social surplus” arising from a transaction, Sample, whose approach this thesis endorses, construes exploitation as a lack of respect for a person’s true value. This thesis will show that codes of ethics with legal force take a Wertheimerian approach, and that the aspirational codes, which insist that research respond to local health priorities, are more Samplian. Finally, it will argue that the current system of research funding and oversight cannot guarantee that research is responsive to the needs of the developing world and thus fails to prevent exploitation. / L’exploitation des sujets est un problème important dans la recherche biomédicale, surtout quand elle est menée dans les pays en voie de développement. Ce mémoire tentera d’appliquer la littérature théorique sur l’exploitation à ce problème, prenant en compte l’œuvre de Wertheimer et de Sample. Tandis que Wertheimer estime que l’exploitation n’est qu’une injustice dans la répartition du « surplus social » résultant d’une transaction, l’approche de Sample, dont ce mémoire approuve, envisage l’exploitation comme étant un manque de respect pour la valeur réelle de la personne. D’ailleurs, il démontrera que les codes d’éthique qui ont force légale ont tendance à être en accord avec Wertheimer, mais que ceux qui sont plutôt aspirtionels incarnent certaines exigences d’inspiration Samplienne, par exemple, que la recherche réponde aux besoins de la communauté où elle est menée. Enfin, il démontrera que le système actuel de surveillance de la recherche ne peut pas garantir que cette condition soit respectée.

No description available.

A review of the literature in environmental philosophy reveals a certain tension between what we might call science-based and experience-based approaches to environmental ethics. The main trend of thought here follows seminal figures like Aldo Leopold and Holmes Rolston III by generally looking to the sciences for disclosing value in nature, particularly ecology and evolutionary biology. However others, such as David Abram and Jack Turner, worry that scientifically disclosed nature is in itself too distancing, objectifying, and abstract to engender any real care for nature and instead emphasize direct, embodied experience with actual wild places, hence the label eco-phenomenology. The former top-down approach starts with the mind, knowledge, and scientific concepts while the latter bottom-up approach starts with the body and its immediate sensory participation with concrete nature. Although I make several points on the virtues and shortcomings of both approaches my general suggestion is this: a science-based and experience-based environmental ethic are not competing but are complementary and mutually enriching, that is, the two can and should be put together. Both camps fail to see that a scientific or phenomenological perspective is by itself inherently limited and incomplete, only disclosing part of nature and thereby missing its full importance. I show how an integrated approach is able to overcome such limitations by disclosing whole-nature.

Patricia Churchland is a professor at the University of California and is a philosopher and cognitive scientist with special knowledge of the neurosciences. Neuroscience in her opinion is relevant to solving the problems posed by philosophy in the field of the mind/body problem. This has given rise to the creation of neurophilosophy, a new sub-discipline in philosophy. Patricia Churchland has a fixed direction in her agenda that is directed at proving that the mind is nothing but neurological activity. Neuroscience in her opinion will in the long run solve the mind/body problem and at the same time eliminate folk psychology. The basic theme in her thought is that there is no non-physical mind but that mind must be explained on the basis of physical activity. She employs the notion of neural activity as foundational to the mental activity of the brain that is then responsible for the mind. The problem of how neurological activity can give rise to the non-physical mind (thought, reason, and so forth) remains however unanswered. Although her work has caused widespread commentary, critical evaluation on deeper levels has not received the attention it warrants. The following study is an attempt in this regard. For this purpose I have used the following philosophical tools: ideology analysis, metaphor analysis and analysis of âkey formulasâ (logosemantic analysis). The result of this analysis points to a one-sidedness in Patricia Churchlandâs approach to the mind/body problem, while neuroscience and eliminative materialism is pushed to its limits. In this study the abovementioned tool-analysed results have also been compared to the views of other well-known thinkers in the field. Lastly I have included some of my own ideas on future prospects for research on mind and consciousness.

Over the past two decades the field of âphilosophy of filmâ has become increasingly concerned with the self-reflective question of what constitutes the relationship between film and philosophy itself. This study proposes and explores a unique âdeep-structureâ perspective on their relationship. It engages particularly with the question of âphilosophy in filmâ â that is, the ability of film to embody philosophical thought â from within the theoretical framework of Discourse Archaeology (DA), a theoretical system researched and taught at the Department of Philosophy, UFS. Certain assumptions that are at work within DA are explored in order to present an original and illuminating ground-perspective on how film and philosophy meet. Detailed analyses will illustrate how grounding concepts, identified by different sub-theories of DA, represent constitutive deep-structure âspacesâ within which film and philosophy interact in a variety of ways. While current approaches to this question tend to lack the meta-philosophical leverage which this question requires, DAâs systematic theories of philosophical discourse (and by implication philosophical âmomentsâ in any other discourse, like film) are illuminating âtoolsâ which allow the film-philosopher to deal with these two kinds of discourse in the same unifying terms. The study is conducted through five extensive case studies of how different DA sub-theories could be applied in probing the deep-structures that allow philosophy to be âinâ a film. The main analyses are of The Man who shot Liberty Valance (John Ford 1962), Brokeback Mountain (Ang Lee 2005), Modern Times (Charles Chaplin 1936), Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Michel Gondry 2004) and The Matrix (Andy and Larry Wachowski 1999). The DA sub-theories that are employed in analysis are Macro-motive theory, a theory of logosemantics (âKey theoryâ), a figurative semiotics (or âMetaphor theoryâ), a theory of ethical âposturesâ and a theory of ideology. In an attempt to investigate different theoretical avenues and possibilities, each chapter of analysis examines a particular sub-theory and has its own unique exploratory aims and procedures. Yet, to anchor this study in an active and ongoing debate, each of the analyses (apart from that of Brokeback Mountain) also seeks to establish some form of dialogue with Thomas Wartenbergâs analyses in Thinking on screen: Film as philosophy (2007). Apart from offering new perspectives on âphilosophy in filmâ, four of the case-studies could therefore also be seen as âDA-repliesâ to aspects of Wartenbergâs work on exactly the same films.

The function of this thesis is to establish that a certain type of basic epistemological position, concentrating attention on the notion of truth involved, implies certain definite limitations on the further development of this type of position. The plan followed is to outline the argument in general terms in Chapter One, then, to bring home the point in a specific context, I describe (Chapters Two and Three) the relevant position taken by C. I. Lewis, in the first two books of his "An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation". [...]