Against non-analytic naturalism and quietist realism, I defend a robust form of non-naturalism. The argument proceeds as follows: In the face of extensional underdetermination, quietist realism cannot non-question-beggingly respond to alternative accounts that offer formally identical but substantively different interpretations of what reasons are. They face what we might call the reasons appropriation problem. In light of this problem, quietists ought to abandon their view in favor of robust realism. By permitting substantive metaphysical claims we can then argue, based on reasonhood being a relation, that reasonhood is an abstract universal. If reasonhood is an abstract universal, then we can non-question-beggingly assert that the counting in favor of relation is a general kind or genus. This poses a dilemma for non-analytic naturalists: either they need to give the same reductive analysis for epistemic and practical reasons, or they can give a different analyses by treating epistemic and practical reasons as a species of the larger genus. However, the former looks extensionally implausible epistemic reasons are not desire-based and the latter entails that the reduction, via a violation of irreflexivity, fails to ground reasonhood. Naturalistic reductions of the normative, accordingly, face a damning dilemma. We should, in the face of this argument, thus accept a robust form of non-naturalist realism.

<p> We should reject presentism as the most intuitive theory of time. Prima facie, presentism might seem intuitive due to our perception of time. However, if presentism accurately represents the metaphysics of time, then presentism entails some counter-intuitive results regarding events, truths about the past, and temporary intrinsics. I argue that presentists can only allow for the present to be instantaneous, and then only at the cost of losing events as ontological entities. I argue that an ersatz B-series of times is viable only at the cost of losing the special metaphysical status of the present. Finally, I argue that the claim that propositions are true simpliciter is inconsistent with the claim that propositions are not eternally true. Given these problems, we can see that presentism has some strongly counter-intuitive entailments.</p>

In this project, I combine theoretical resources from metaethics and philosophy of language with contemporary issues in critical philosophy of race. Drawing from these literatures, I examine the nature of racial norms by developing a non-ideal, situated, and intersectional approach to second-personhood. Second-personhood, as I propose in the first half of the dissertation, serves two explanatory functions with respect to the nature of racial norms. First, second-personhood highlights how manifestations of moral and political agency are embedded in interdependent forms of I-you and we-you relationships. Second, with respect to language, second-personhood provides an account of how speech acts, when understood as a subset of embodied action, come to bear normative force. These features of second-personhood then undergird the three distinct sites of analysis that I examine in the latter half of the dissertation. There, I propose that we can examine collective, interpersonal, and personal levels of racial discourse to see the functioning of racial norms through second-personhood.

Rawlsian political liberalism is often rejected by feminist philosophers on the grounds that it reinstates a problematic public/private divide and includes sexist comprehensive doctrines as reasonable. My dissertation reclaims a revised version of Rawlsian political liberalism for feminist objectives. Using children who are raised in accordance with sexist comprehensive doctrines as a test case, I investigate the permissible limitations for reasonable pluralism. In the first half of my dissertation, I investigate challenges posed to Rawlsian stability and civic education. I argue that Rawlss aim of making reasonableness broadly inclusive for political purposes is in tension with his goal of using reasonableness to delineate the scope of liberal legitimacy. To resolve this tension, I suggest that we separate liberal legitimacy from reasonableness. I then broaden the analysis by exploring the implications of the bifurcation of reasonableness for both feminism and political liberalism. I argue that the resulting theory is a defensible version of political liberalism that serves some crucially important feminist aims without becoming a comprehensive feminist theory.

In this dissertation, I respond to the feminist critique of traditional theories of autonomy, which revolves around the charge that such theories are too individualistic. Feminists argue against the liberal atomism that they see at the center of traditional autonomy theories. Their resulting theory of relational autonomy is meant to remedy that traditional theories of autonomy posit an individualistic conception of both the self and autonomy. Instead, feminists have argued for a theory of autonomy that takes account of the ways in which persons are irreducibly social, and the ways in which autonomy itself is only possible within certain types of social relationships. I separate the feminist charges against liberalism from the feminist charges against traditional autonomy, since it is at least prima facie possible to consider personal autonomy separately from political autonomy. I thus isolate the feminist critique of liberal atomism from the feminist critique of individualistic autonomy. The first chapter examines the feminist critique of liberalism to determine why it is that the charge of liberal atomism continues to stick, even though it has been clearly established by both feminist and mainstream liberals that liberalism is not guilty of such a charge. While I do not provide a full defense of liberalism, I do argue that such a defense is possible, and possible in a way that upholds feminist goals. Having separated the critiques of liberalism from the critiques of traditional autonomy, the rest of the dissertation focuses exclusively on the autonomy debate. I present an argument against the most robustly relational feminist accounts of autonomy those which accept a relational account of both the self and autonomy. I argue that, although such theories are explicitly designed to vindicate the normative commitments of feminism, their implications yield unwelcome results from this very same feminist perspective. I then present my own procedural account of autonomy. Because it is not constitutively social, it is unlikely to be characterized as a relational account at all. I argue, however, that it is this very feature which allows my account to vindicate the feminist normative commitments espoused by constitutively relational accounts.

<p> In this thesis, my aim is to weaken and dismantle two powerful objections to the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument. The first objection arises from causal closure principles. While there are many types of causal closure principles, causal closures principles hold that the universe is causally closed and that all physical effects have, at least a sufficient, physical cause. Given causal closure, we would not need to appeal to an immaterial entity, such as God, to explain the material universe. I hold that using causal closure principles against the cosmological argument is problematic, because we have insufficient reason to endorse causal closure principles. The second objection I will address is Hume's objection that the material universe can be the necessary being that is referred to in the Cosmological Argument, and, thus, God is unnecessary. I hold that if the material universe is necessary then it also needs to be eternal. Given that the material universe is made up of contingent entities, there are a number of logical and conceptual difficulties with the material universe being eternal.</p>

Since its 1929 publication, philosophers have been more or less unsure what to make of Heideggers Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Although it wielded more than its fair share of influence over the course of the twentieth century, its chief interpretive claims are mostly untenable today. Of course, it has always been recognized that the book was never intended as a straightforward piece of Kant interpretation. But neither does it appear to be a reliable presentation of Heideggers own thought. The result has been that, for all its influence, Heideggers book has fallen into a kind of academic limbo, a concern for neither scholars of Heidegger nor scholars of Kant. My goal is to help return to Heideggers reading of Kant its provocative power. I do so by means of a conceptual genesis of Heideggers reading of Kant that takes both thinkers, as far as possible, on their own terms, but includes an investigation into why Heidegger was so convincedfor a few decisive years, at leastthat he had to be able to find in Kant a precedent for his own path of thinking.

An agrarian model of farming is one that places emphasis on the realization of a multi-faceted notion of health, one encompassing the cultural, ecological, and moral health on the farm and in farm communities. As a means to recovering such health, Wendell Berry proposes the conversational approach to farming. While the idea that a farmer can engage in a conversation with nature is intriguing, there are lots of ambiguities revolving around what this actually means. If the conversational approach leads to agrarian health, its dimensions must be made clear. In this thesis, I offer one account by which to understand Berrys proposal. My argument begins in chapter two, where I identify three impediments to the conversational approach: objective science and reductionism, arrogance, and abstract language use. Next, in chapter three, I turn to Christopher Prestons view of epistemology; it can account for the embodied skill set acquired by means of the conversational approach. Despite this, however, Preston poses a challenge to what he calls the conversation metaphor. In chapter four, I respond by embracing what Jim Cheney and Anthony Weston refer to as an ethics-based epistemology. This ethics-first approach not only shields the conversation metaphor against Prestons criticism, but it also provides insights into the pre-requisite values for participating in Berrys conversation. Drawing from Cheney and Weston, I develop the notion of conversational etiquette, focusing particularly on how it counters the impediments of arrogance and reductionism. Because the conversational etiquette of agrarian farmers is rather mature, they are offered instruction from their embodied, sensual experiences in the world. I, therefore, claim that agrarian health can be realized by means of the conversational approach insofar as human practice makes clear that nature is a conversational partner. By attending to our embodied existence in the world, we can again participate in Berrys conversation, employing the practices necessary to agrarian health. Doing so is the difference between defending nature and allowing for its further exploitation; it is the difference between living a life of virtue and living one that continues to be diminished. Nature speaks. Listen.

Ecological restoration is defined by the Society for Ecological Restoration (SER) as the process of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged or destroyed (9). In practice, restoration typically involves the removal of pollution, human-made structures (like dams or roads), invasive species, and other impediments to ecological health. Removing the sources of ecological impairment is coupled with the reintroduction of flora, fauna, and the physical structures that are necessary for healthy ecosystem function. The potential for restoration to dominate nature is a concern of environmental ethicists. In theory, domination might stem from the technology used in restoration or the presence and expression of human intentions and ideals. But are such concerns apparent in restored sites? Theoretical concerns about domination of nature and other issues in restoration must be grounded in the realities of ecological restoration as it is practiced. Connecting theory to practice allows us to better understand how the concerns of the philosopher can be perceived and addressed by the practitioners of restoration. I argue that the ethics of care, and my care perspective that I develop, provide unique insights into the issue of domination in restoration. I apply the relational context and alternative perspectives on autonomy, the self, and universal versus contextual moral principles that care brings to the issues in restoration. In doing so, I argue that my care perspective gives a better account of ecosystem autonomy (as it relates to domination), questions the ecosystems as moral entities with a unified set of interests, and a way to understand partiality or favoritism as a morally acceptable way to make difficult decisions in restoration.

In this dissertation, I argue that an account of epistemic injustice sensitive to interlocking oppressions must take us beyond injustice to human knowers. Although several feminist epistemologists argue for the incorporation of all forms of oppression into their analyses, feminist epistemology remains for the most part an anthropocentric enterprise. Yet insofar as a reduction to animal irrationality has been central to the epistemic injustice of both humans and animals, I propose that in addition to axes of gender, race, class and sex, feminist epistemology must register the animal-human dichotomy as a fundamental driving mechanism inherent in epistemic injustice. From the perspective of a truly liberatory epistemology, I thus argue for an expanded account of epistemic injustice that is both 1) sufficiently attentive to the way injustices to human knowers continue to rely on animal oppression and 2) that accommodates epistemic injustices against animal knowers.