That an interest in philosophy is displayed in any work interpreting the thought of a philosopher, cannot be denied. To pay attention to the words of the thinkers of the past, to reflect upon the meaning of their utterances, is this not the mark of a genuine desire to understand what is essential in philosophy, in short, to think? However, the suspicion arises that an interest in philosophy does not yet guarantee that we grasp its authentic meaning; for interest nowadays is directed towards that which is merely "interesting", i.e. that which May soon be dismissed as indifferent in order to make room for something else equally insignificant.

The topic of thesis was not selected at random. In the last two years or so I have become increasingly interested in that broad complex of problems traditionally grouped together under the name of the 'Mind - Body' problem, and have become increasingly convinced that the solution of this problem is one of the most exciting, and certainly one of the most difficult, problems confronting modern science.

I argue that contemporary philosophy of language in the analytic tradition rests on two fundamentally wrong assumptions: empiricism and externalism. After I show why these two assumptions are incorrect, I turn my attention to biological rationalism. Biological rationalism—a research program inspired by the work of Noam Chomsky—is committed to nativism and internalism. I believe biological rationalism provides the best framework to achieve a genuine understanding of language. I try to show this by considering the biological rationalist answers to major problems in philosophy of language. / Je soutiens que la philosophie du langage telle qu’élaborée dans la tradition analytique contemporaine repose sur deux hypothèses erronées: l’empirisme et l’externalisme. Après avoir démontré que ces deux hypothèses sont incorrectes, j’examine le rationalisme biologique. Le rationalisme biologique—un programme de recherches inspiré par les travaux de Noam Chomsky—repose sur deux idées directrices: l’innéisme et l’internalisme. Je crois que le rationalisme biologique offre le meilleur cadre afin d’obtenir une compréhension réelle du langage. Je cherche le démontrer en examinant les réponses qu’apporte le rationalisme biologique à certains problèmes majeurs en philosophie du langage.

Happiness (sa'a>dah) materializes as the ultimate goal of man in Abu> Nas}r Muh{ammad b. Muh{ammad b. T{arkha>n al- Fa>ra>bi>'s Maba>di' A<ra>' Ahl Al-Madi>na Al-Fa>d}ila (Principles of the Views of the Citizens of the Best State). But happiness, i.e., happiness in this life and happiness in the afterlife, is only attainable by the virtuous citizen. The prevailing academic vision of Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City essentially can be placed into two categories: either it is an ideal as found in Plato's Republic or it is an actual city that has been founded or will be established at some time in the future. The difficulty with both of these interpretations is that they limit who can attain happiness. I will argue that we must examine Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City in a different light. I will show that Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City is comparable to the Plotinian World Soul in which it is the genus of all souls and it is the place to which all souls strive to return, and there attain happiness. As a result, it can be argued that Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City is a city that exists in the intelligible world; it contains both citizens that reside within the city and citizens that reside in the material world. Through a comparison of Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City with the Plotinian World Soul, we shall see that Fa>ra>bi>'s Virtuous City is not unlike Aurelius Augustine's City of God, which is also a city that exists in the intelligible world, and has citizens within both this city and here on earth. By comparing the relevant texts of Plotinus, Augustine, and Fa>ra>bi>, it becomes possible to illustrate how Fa>ra>bi>, like Augustine, utilized the Plotinian Triple Hypostases (The One, Nous, and the World Soul) in order to answer the ultimate questions: Why does man desire happiness? How does man attain this happiness? And most importantly, where can man attain this happiness? / Fa>ra>bi> tells us that only virtuous citizens will achieve happiness. This leaves us with unanswered questions. If all souls derive from the Virtuous City, then why do they not all return? What defines a virtuous citizen? How does one become a virtuous citizen? These are questions that must be answered in the material world, by us, Fa>ra>bi>'s readers. Fa>ra>bi>'s Al-Madi>na Al-Fa>d}ila, like Augustine's De Civitate Dei, clearly outlines a specific system of knowledge and a specific way of life; in this way, both Fa>ra>bi> and Augustine provide the criteria by which human beings can become virtuous citizens and citizens of the City of God. Plotinus' concept of the undescended soul may also provide us with another way of looking at these virtuous citizens and citizens of the City of God, in that these citizens become aware of the higher part of their soul and assimilate themselves to the intelligible world. These citizens must live in the material world, i.e., in the non-virtuous cities and the City of Man, but they too can be citizens of those cities that exist in the intelligible world. Fa>ra>bi> and Augustine leave us with a choice to make: of which city will we become citizens? / Le bonheur (sa'a>dah) apparaît comme l'objectif ultime de l'homme dans (Maba>di' A<ra>' Ahl Al-Madi>na Al-Fa>d}ila) Idées des habitants de la cité vertueuse de Muh{ammad b. Muh{ammad b. T{arkha>n al-Fa>ra>bi>. Mais le bonheur, c.-à-d., le bonheur dans cette vie et le bonheur dans la vie après la mort, est seulement possible pour le citoyen vertueux. La vision courante de la cité vertueuse de Fa>ra>bi> propose essentiellement seulement deux catégories: ou c'est un idéal comme trouvé dans Le République de Platon ou c'est une cité réelle qui a été fondée ou qui sera établie à un moment donné dans l'avenir. La difficulté avec tous les deux interprétations est qu'ils limitent le nombre dé ceux qui peuvent atteindre le bonheur. Pour cette raison, je soutiendrai que nous devons examiner la cité vertueuse de Fa>ra>bi> dans une lumière différente. Je montrerai que la cité vertueuse de Fa>ra>bi> est comparable à l'âme du monde de Plotinus dans laquelle c'est le genre de toutes les âmes et c'est l'endroit auquel toutes les âmes tâchent de rentrer: l'atteindre fait le bonheur. Ainsi, on peut soutenir que la cité vertueuse de Fa>ra>bi> est une cité qui existe dans le monde intelligible; elle contient à la fois les citoyens qui résident dans la cité et aussi les citoyens qui résident dans le monde matériel. Par une comparaison de la cité vertueuse de Fa>ra>bi> avec l'âme du monde de Plotinus nous verrons que la cité vertueuse de Fa>ra>bi> n'est pas différente de la cité de Dieu de Aurelius Augustine; ça aussi est une cité qui existe dans le monde intelligible, et qui a des citoyens et dans cette cité et ici sur terre. En comparant les texts justicatifs de Plotinus, Augustine, et Fa>ra>bi>, il devient possible d'illustrer comment Fa>ra>bi>, comme Augustine, a utilisé les Hypostases Triples de Plotinus (L'un, Nous, et L'âme du monde) afin de répondre aux questions finales: Pourquoi l'homme désire-t-il le bonheur? Com / Fa>ra>bi> nous indique que seulement les citoyens vertueux réaliseront le bonheur. Ceci nous laisse avec des questions sans réponse. Si toutes les âmes dérivent de la cité vertueuse, alors pourquoi ne font-elles pas toutes le retour? Que définit un citoyen vertueux? Comment fait un devenu un citoyen vertueux? Ce sont ces questions qui doivent être adressées dans le monde matériel, par nous, les lecteurs de Fa>ra>bi>. Al-Madi>na Al-Fa>d}ila de Fa>ra>bi>, comme De Civitate Dei de Augustine, décrit clairement un système spécifique de la connaissance et une mode de vie spécifique; dans cette façon, Fa>ra>bi> et Augustine fournissent les critères par lesquels les êtres humains peuvent devenir les citoyens vertueux et les citoyens de la cité de Dieu. Le concept de l'âme non descendue de Plotinus peut-être nous fournit une autre façon ère de regarder ces citoyens vertueux et ces citoyens de la cité de Dieu, par laquelle, ces citoyens se rendent compte de la partie plus élevée de leur âme et s'assimilent au monde intelligible. Ces citoyens doivent vivre dans le monde matériel, c.-à-d., dans les cités non-vertueuses et la cité de l'homme, mais ils peuvent eux aussi être les citoyens de cette cité qui existent dans le monde intelligible. Fa>ra>bi> et Augustine nous donnent un choix á faire: de quelle cité devenons-môns des citoyens? fr

Any philosophical position can be approached in two different ways which may be termed the historical approach and the analytical approach. While dealing with a certain philosophical doctrine, we may put the main emphasis on tracing its sources and comparing the doctrine with others known in the history of philosophy. On the other hand, it is possible to direct our attention mainly towards a critical analysis of the notions and propositions on which this philosophy is based, and to examine them without being much interested in the historical aspect of the problem.

Following Kierkegaard's hint respecting the importance of his earlier life, Chapter l of this thesis surveys his childhood and youth with a view to the assessment of its significance for certain important elements in his philosophy and, more specifically, for his understanding of the process of self-realization. The purpose of the historical sketch in Chapter II is to exhibit the continuity of the concern for self-realization or individuation in recorded philosophical and religious reflection.

Impressed by the accomplishments of mathematics and physics during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Kant was prompted to ask whether metaphysics might not profit from a consideration of at least the methods adopted by these enquiries. In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason he cites the experiment of Copernicus' in which, by reversing the habitually conceived relation between the earth and the other planets, this scientist was able to render a more exact explanation of their respective activities. On the analogy of such a procedure, Kant asks how it would be in metaphysics if instead of our assuming, as he claims had been done in the past, that all knowledge depends wholly on its abject, we assume the reverse relationship, and investigate the possibility that abjects depend in certain respects upon our knowledge. [...]

Jose Ortega y Gasset stands foremost in contemporary Spanish philosophy, both as regards his stature as a philosopher and as an influence upon his generation in Spain and in Spanish-speaking countries. Born in Madrid on May 9, 1883, son of Ortega y Munillo, the famous Spanish journalist, he received his first studies at the Collage of Jesuits in Miraflores and at the Central University in Madrid. A remarkably able and precocious student, in 1904 he presented his doctoral dissertation, El Milenario ("The Millenium") to the University of Madrid, thereby obtaining his Ph.D. degree.

The thesis offers a reconstruction of Plotinus' reading of the Theaetetus, and it presents an account of his epistemology that rests on that reading. It aims to show that Plotinus reads the Theaetetus as containing two anti-sceptical arguments. The first argument is an answer to radical scepticism, namely, to the thesis that nothing is apprehensible and judgement must be suspended on all matters. The second argument is an answer to a more moderate form of scepticism, which does not endorse a universal suspension of judgement, but maintains nonetheless that scientific knowledge is unattainable. / The first chapter opens with a reconstruction of Plotinus' reading of Theaet., 151e-184a, where Socrates examines the thesis that knowledge is sensation in light of Protagoras' epistemology. In this chapter it is argued that Plotinus makes a polemical use of the discussion of Protagoras' epistemology. Plotinus takes Plato to show that Protagoras' views imply radical scepticism; and he attack the Stoics' epistemological and ontological commitments by arguing that they imply Protagoras' views, and thus lead to radical scepticism, too. / The second chapter examines Plotinus' interpretation of the ontology of the Timaeus. In Theaet., 151e-184a Plato shows that Protagoras' epistemology leads to radical scepticism by arguing that it implies an allegedly Heracleitean conception of the sensible world. Plotinus maintains that in the Timaeus Plato offers an alternative to Protagoras' and Heracleitus' ontology. This alternative conception of the sensible world provides some of the premises on which Plotinus builds his interpretation of Theaet., Part I, 184b-187a. / The third chapter reconstructs Plotinus' reading of Theaet., 184b-187a. In this chapter it is argued that Plotinus takes the discussion of sensation at Theaet., 184b-186b 11 to remove the threat to knowledge that is presented by radical scepticism, while he reads Theaet., 186b 11-187a as presenting an argument against the more moderate forms of scepticism described above. The third chapter also offers an overview of Plotinus' reading of the Theaetetus in its entirety and it suggests that this dialogue for Plotinus represents a Platonic exercise in Socratic dialectic that aims to prepare the student for the dialectic of the Sophist. / Cette thèse reconstruit la lecture plotinienne du Thééthète, et elle présente une analyse de l'épistémologie de Plotin qui s'appui sur cette lecture. Le but de ce travail et de montrer que Plotin identifie dans le Thééthète deux arguments contre le scepticisme. Le premier argument est une réponse à une forme de scepticisme radicale, c'est-à-dire à la thèse selon laquelle rien n'est connaissable et le jugement doit être suspendu sur toute chose. Le second argument est une réponse à une forme plus modérée de scepticisme, qui n'appui pas une suspension du jugement universelle, mais maintient quand même qu'on ne peut pas atteindre la connaissance. / Le premier chapitre reconstruit la lecture plotinienne de Theaet., 151e-184a, où Socrate analyse la thèse que la connaissance est sensation à la lumière de l'épistémologie de Protagoras. Dans ce chapitre on observe que Plotin emploie à des fins polémiques la discussion de l'épistémologie de Protagoras. Plotin pense que pour Platon l'épistémologie de Protagoras implique un scepticisme radical, et il attaque l'épistémologie et l'ontologie des stoïciens en essayant de démontrer qu'elles impliquent la position de Protagoras, si bien qu'elles aussi amènent à une forme de scepticisme radical. / Le deuxième chapitre analyse la lecture plotinienne de l'ontologie du Timée. Dans Theaet., 151e-184a, Platon montre que l'épistémologie de Protagoras amène au scepticisme radical en soutenant qu'elle implique une conception du monde sensible de type héraclitéen. Plotin soutient que dans le Timée Platon présente une alternative à l'ontologie de Protagoras et d'Héraclite. Cette nouvelle conception du monde sensible fournit des prémisses sur lesquelles Plotin construit son interprétation de Theaet., 184b-187a. / Le troisième chapitre reconstruit la lecture plotinienne de Theaet., 184b-187a. Dans ce chapitre on suggère que Plotin voit dans Theaet., 184b-186b un argument qui vise à éliminer la menace d'un scepticisme radical, et qu'il voit dans Theaet., 186b 11-187a un argument qui vise à réfuter une forme de scepticisme plus modérée, telle que celle décrite en haute. Le troisième chapitre présente aussi une vision d'ensemble de la lecture que Plotin fait du dialogue et il suggère que ce dialogue pour Plotin représente un exercice de dialectique socratique qui prépare le lecteur à la lecture du Sophiste.

Human interventions have resulted in striking changes to the global climate. I work from the understanding of anthropogenic climate change as the product of 250 years of emissions brought about through industrialization and continued by our fossil fuel economies and lifestyles. The instrumentalism of such activities can be traced back to our modern metaphysic, where inanimate matter becomes object and falls away from man, the knowing, active subject. In this thesis, I specifically address how this division of passive object from active subject pervades our understanding of climate and conditions the ethics of our human responses to climate change. I argue that our current frame of thinking about climate that I term climate-facing mischaracterizes climate and our position in it: climate-facing is inaccurately dualistic, separating climate from human life when the two are mutually constitutive and when other, nonhuman forces are also involved. Instead of climate-facing, I propose that we reimagine climate-as-assemblage, that is, as an ongoing, interactive process of co-fabrication that incorporates both humans and nonhumans. I draw from vital materialist Jane Bennett to explore the concept of assemblage, and I offer an indication of what this reconceptualization would look like for climate. Climate-as-assemblage brings to light numerous and diverse nonhuman forces, or actants, and taking these seriously requires a reconceptualization of agency that can be broadly disseminated across these instead of restricted to human subjects only. This revisiondistributive agencyfits particularly well with climate, and I indicate how it might guide us on questions of climate engineering. I suggest that we should consider scholarship and action that complement climate as assemblage and that align with an ethic of distributive agency as we proceed in our relations with climate.