Abstract Not Available.

The system of logical determinations outlined in Hegel's Science of Logic is capable of further development because it is an aspect of a living process called the Idea. The system does not develop by the addition of new categories of thought, rather it develops when philosophers achieve insights into the nuances in the ways the logical determinations interrelate. Philosophers attain this nuanced knowledge by witnessing the process at work, and by actively analyzing the various experiential events occurring around them.

During the last fifteen years a revival of philosophical interest has gathered strength in the thesis of relativism. It is not uncommon, for example, to find accusations to the effect that Rorty, Putnam, Quine, foucault, Kuhn, Gadamer, Lyotard, Derrida and many others are guilty of propounding relativism. For many people, Derrida's deconstructionsm is a splendid example of the drift towards relativism. The problem, however, is that no one has yet explained in any detail how and why deconstruction entails relativism, and Derrida himself rejects outright the claim that a relationship obtains between deconstruction and relativism. The central goal of this study is to settle this problem by explicating the nature of the relationship between deconstruction and relativism. The object of my research is two-fold. Firstly and most importantly, the thesis will attempt to show that Derrida's deconstructionism does in fact entail an unconstrained version of relativism. To achieve this, I shall examine in some detail the nature of the key terms, such as "differance", "trace," "supplement," etc., that are used by Derrida in deconstructing texts. The nature of these terms, I shall argue, entail a relativistic standpoint. Secondly, the thesis will attempt to show that Derrida's brand of relativism is incoherent. In particular, I propose to examine some of the main arguments and counterarguments in the debate between the proponents and detractors of relativism, and then argue that the common ground argument (which is sometimes also called the common world argument) is effective against Derrida's brand of relativism and, I shall urge, against relativism in general. In summary, I propose to show that by making the connection between deconstruction and relativism, we see more clearly what Derrida's deconstructionism represents, namely, an ultimately incoherent brand of relativism. This approach will go some way towards establishing the claim that the influence exerted by deconstruction on the contemporary intellectual scene is philosophically untenable.

Nous avons cité Alexis de Tocqueville. Ainsi sommes-nous disposés à le recevoir comme maître à penser dans cette recherche. A le suivre autant dans ses méditations que dans ses observations, il nous est donc donné d'apprendre à lire la trame complexe et chaotique de la réalité démocratique, de manière à voir que par-delà la diversité, l'ambiguïté et la contradiction que cette réalité comporte, se déploie une logique unique et commune de sens. Notre thèse aura pour objectif de répondre à la question: quel sens Tocqueville donne-t-il à l'idée de démocratie? Sous quelles formes peut-on la percevoir? Afin d'examiner critiquement ce sens, nous serons conduits, dans cette recherche, par deux motifs. Le premier motif polarise notre intérêt spécial sur la nature de l'idée démocratique chez Tocqueville afin de mieux distinguer ses effets sur les institutions et la culture politique de son époque. Le deuxième motif surgira même de l'ambiguïté et de la contradiction souvent mentionnées par les commentateurs de Tocqueville. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Abstract Not Available.

Isaiah Berlin's notion of value pluralism has traditionally been seen as supportive to liberal political theory. In recent years, however, the idea of an implicit link between pluralism and liberalism has come into question, with some commentators arguing that pluralism in fact presents obstacles to liberalism. In the wake of such criticisms, this thesis proposes a new version of value pluralism, and argues that it is supportive of liberalism. In chapter one, the different strands of pluralism in Berlin's thought are discussed. In chapter two the case is made for "internal pluralism," (the notion that values can come into incommensurable conflict within the self, but not, as Berlin and others believed, on a social level), and how it can support liberalism. Chapter three engages Berlin's critics and arguing that internal pluralism does not suffer from the failings that the traditional notion of value pluralism does.

The central claim of my thesis is that Theodor Adorno's social theory harbours important insights which can bring to light significant deficiencies and weaknesses in the works of contemporary critical theorists. In order to substantiate this claim, I argue that Adorno's philosophical and sociological writings embody a coherent and systematic version of critical social theory. I then attempt to place Adorno's version of critical social theory in critical and constructive dialogue with the successors to the tradition of Frankfurt School critical theory (Jurgen Habermas and Axel Honneth). This is achieved by reconstructing and reinterpreting Adorno's key theses through insights developed in contemporary social theory. Part One demonstrates, firstly, how Adorno's critical social theory developed from out of the problems of the earlier social-theoretic 'paradigms'. In chapter two, I argue that Adorno, in Negative Dialectics, develops a conception of critical theory as a 'critical dialectic of concepts', derived from a synthesis of the Durkheimian sociology of knowledge, and Hegelian dialectic. Chapter three attempts to substantiate and develop this thesis, and also shows how Adorno develops a theory of linguistic reification. In chapter four, I attempt to expound the social theory underlying the philosophical arguments of Negative Dialectics. In Part Two, I deploy the insights derived from the analysis of Adorno's work in order to furnish a critique of Habermas's critical theory, concerned with its failure to develop an adequate critique of class- and group-specific domination (chapter five) and problems stemming from its formal/abstract conception of moral-practical reason (chapter six). I then turn, in Part Three, to the critical theory of recognition. It is argued that, by returning the concept of social struggle to the centre of the analysis, the theory of recognition is able to theorize structures of domination and oppositional praxis far more adequately than the Habermasian account. However, I argue that this theory needs to integrate insights deriving from Adorno's thesis of integration through domination. I argue that the concept of symbolic power provides for a plausible reconstruction of Adorno's integration thesis, by interpreting integration through domination as occurring at the symbolic rather than the psychic level. In the final chapter, I draw upon contemporary social theory in order to furnish an interpretation of Adorno's social theory as articulating a twofold distortion of instrumental reason, which I characterize as a dialectic of increasing integration through domination, and intensifying lifeworld disintegration.

Marcel Gauchet nous invite à penser le mode de rapport au monde qu'instaure l'avènement de l'État. Ce mode tire ses origines de l'époque d'avant la modernité ou l'avènement de l'État. L'État incarne la division, phénomène qui précède l'avènement de l'État dans la forme qu'on lui conaît aujourd'hui. C'est ce mode de rapport qu'il faut donc comprendre et Gauchet ouvre la voie à une analyse fort complexe que nous allons tente de retracer dans cette thèse. Sachant que l'humanité a vécu plusieurs dizaines de milliers d'années, voire même des centaines de milliers d'années sans État, il y a lieu de se questionner sur le sujet. À défaut de comprendre pourquoi l'État est un jour né, Gauchet nous propose une explication historique et philosophique de ce par quoi fut conditionnée la naissance de l'État. Ainsi, l'émergence de l'État est une question intéressante en soi. Mais elle est également pertinente en vue de la compréhension de la pensée de Gauchet, puisque, associant l'avènement de l'État et la division politique, la compréhension du politique passe par l'étude de l'État. À cette problématique, nous avançons comme hypothèse qu'il y aurait une correspondance chez Gauchet entre la naissance de l'État et la révolution de la transcendance. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

The thesis argues for the admission of the scientific knowledge of the sensible reality in the Plotinian philosophy. As such, the thesis is a study in the metaphysics of knowledge. The thesis is constructed in three parts. The first part is dialectical in nature; that is, it is a reasoning which starts from a given, commonly held position in order to elucidate the relative strengths and weaknesses thereof. The point of departure is the test of Enneads V,1 (10),3 on the acts and passions of Soul. The second part is demonstrative in nature; that is, it is a reasoning which is meant to be conclusive of the thesis based upon rational and exegetical deductions. This part of the thesis is based on a study of the test of Enneads III,5 (50). Proceeding, the thesis identifies the mythological figure of Divine Aphrodite with Divine Soul and studies the nature of a priori knowledge. Following, the thesis identifies the mythological figure of Worldly Aphrodite with Mixed Soul and studies the nature of a posteriori knowledge. This section of the thesis includes five steps. The first step introduces the notions of knowledge of the particular and knowledge of the universal common to Aristotle and Neoplatonism. The second step situates the nature of reason to be potential within the historical context of Alexander of Aphrodisias, an Aristotelian well known to Plotinus. The third step posits the difference between potential or implicit knowledge and actual or explicit knowledge consequent to the application of the universal to the particular. The fourth step concerns the teaching on genus and species. Finally the fifth step concerns the subsumptive knowledge of Mixed Soul and the role of the abstract universal in Plotinian philosophy. The third part is apologetic in nature; that is, a defence of the thesis against forseeable objections. A first objection concerns the status of opinative knowledge in the Plotinian philosophy. The second objection concerns the Soul's knowledge in contradistinction to Intellect's knowledge.

W. V. Quine's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's (early) ethical views are compared. The aim of the comparison is to show that despite many similarities between the two philosophers' views, their approaches to the subject are fundamentally different. Underlying the points of affinity are two fundamentally different philosophical temperaments. Both put forward complete philosophical structures with which their ethical views are remarkably consistent; both see everything from their own philosophical standpoint. Accordingly, Quine's naturalistic stance and Wittgenstein's transcendental stance are explored in order to expose the deep differences between their ethical views, despite many seeming similarities. Further, it is shown that their ethical views can only be understood when placed within the context of their respective philosophical frameworks. A comparison of Quine and Wittgenstein on ethics, then, reveals many components of the general philosophical positions of two of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, while clarifying their respective ethical views and the deep differences between them.