This dissertation explores the works of W. V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It provides a detailed and comprehensive discussion of their distinct conceptions of philosophy. It shows how Quine is involved in a scientific philosophy aimed at the discovery of truth and explanation. It also demonstrates how Wittgenstein's critical approach attempts to dissolve philosophical problems and theories. The main purpose of this work is to explain how a proper understanding of each philosopher's framework of study, is crucial to the understanding and criticism of their respective philosophical ideas. The only way to properly refute Quine's theories is to evaluate them in a scientific framework. Any other interpretation could change his intention and weaken his arguments. Similarly, the only way to refute Wittgenstein's claims is to interpret them in everyday language. However, this is not to say that either view can be refuted. It is simply to point out that any attempt to oppose Wittgenstein's claims from a scientific viewpoint, or Quine's from a non-scientific perspective, will be flawed since it is contrary to the way in which each view was conceived.

The metaphysical root of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus represents a departure from a pervasive philosophical assumption found originally in Plato's Meno. This departure is directly inspired by a critique of the Meno found in the works by Soren Kierkegaard written under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus. The central implication of Kierkegaard's influence for Tractatus interpretation is that thought---or thinking---referred to in the Tractatus of necessity extends beyond the limits of language. There are at present two competing interpretative readings of the Tractatus in the literature. One reading---referred to as the "Standard" reading since it is propounded by almost all notable Wittgenstein scholars, e.g., Pears, Hacker, McGuinness, Anscombe, Rhees, Malcohn---has it that the "mystical" sections of the Tractatus must be, to some degree, taken seriously. The other reading---a "New" reading advocated most prominently by Winch, Diamond, and Conant---argues that the Standard reading is self-contradictory in that it maintains that the limits of language and those of thought are the same while it simultaneously maintains that there is a sort of Mystical residue left over even after the Tractatus has (according to the dictates of section 6.54) been "thrown away". The New reading sees Wittgenstein's point as being precisely that there is no such left-over residue and that we must accept this. Both readings are however incorrect in regard to Wittgenstein's view of limits in the Tractatus. While the New reading takes somewhat seriously the influence of Kierkegaard on the Tractatus, it asserts that a Kierkegaardian influence bolsters the New reading's view of the mystical as well as its view that language and thought share the same limits in the Tractatus. The opposite is in fact the case. Das Mystische corresponds to Kierkegaard's "absolutely unknown" that language---but not thought---runs up against as a limit. Wittgenstein himself alludes to this correspondence in conversation with members of the Vienna Circle in 1929. As such, if the influence of Kierkegaard is to be seen in its proper light, the problem is not with the Standard reading of Das Mystische, but rather with the view that the limits of thought and language in the Tractatus are the same. For Kierkegaard, unless thought extends beyond the limit of language there is no conceivable nexus for the subject or the divine. This is precisely his critique of Plato's Meno in Fragments. That this view is also the bedrock of the Tractatus' metaphysics is what the present thesis argues is the proper "Kierkegaardian reading" of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.

Citizenship in liberal democracies has, until recently, been theorized as conferring equal legal status on all citizens irrespective of their race, religion, ethnicity, culture or language. While much discrimination and unequal treatment existed in practice, the theory was that all citizens should be treated equally, exactly the same, regardless of their individual characteristics; the state should be neutral in dealing with its citizens. In recent years, political theorists such as Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Yael Tamir, J. Raz, Iris Marion Young, and Anne Phillips have challenged both the practice and theory of the traditional view of citizenship. They argue that state neutrality has not been the case in actual practice; states discriminate in favour of dominant cultures. Furthermore the say such neutrality is, for a variety of reasons, impossible They also argue that it is not desirable even in theory. An individual's culture is essential to their being and deserves to be positively recognized by the state. This thesis argues that, while there are problems with the traditional view of a difference-blind citizenship and the idea of the neutral state, the philosophical arguments put forward by the critics are untenable. These arguments, and the political policies their implementation would entail, pose insurmountable problems for democratic deliberation and fail to take account of possible empirical results. The traditional view of citizenship and state neutrality can be rethought and implemented in what is called "the indifferent state"---a state which, while indifferent to its citizens' culture, religion etc., is not indifferent to the impact that these may have on the instantiation of such traditional liberal political values as equality and autonomy. The thesis concludes with three case studies which illustrate the differences in approach between the traditional view of citizenship, the view of the critics, and that of the indifferent state.

Cette thèse est un essai de réception critique, d'un point de vue théologique, de trois versions contemporaines du procéduralisme: celle de John Rawls, de Jürgen Habermas, mais surtout celle de Jean-Marc Ferry. Si d'un côté, l'éthique sociale théologique chrétienne a fait un large accueil aux thèses communautariennes/contextualistes venant de la philosophie morale et politique, d'un autre côté, le procéduralisme, tant dans la version de John Rawls que celle de Jürgen Habermas, a été reçu beaucoup plus critiquement en raison notamment du rôle réduit attribué aux ressources normatives de la religion dans l'élaboration et la validation des normes communes de l'action. Pourtant, compte tenu des caractères de démocratisation, de sécularisation et de pluralisation des sociétés occidentales, il nous semble que le procéduralisme offre un modèle plus apte pour honorer, à la fois, la prétention à la validité des ressources normatives religieuses et les caractères fondamentaux des sociétés en question. Une analyse critique des procéduralismes rawlsien et habermassien sert d'entrée en matière à notre étude. Ces approches ont comme problème principal de reléguer en touche les ressources normatives des traditions religieuses. Chez Rawls, que ce soit dans la position originelle ou dans le consensus par recoupement, il y a limitation de l'apport des traditions religieuses dans à un rôle d'arrière-plan dans l'élaboration des normes communes. Les traditions religieuses ne peuvent espérer mieux que de jouer un rôle de caution de normes--en l'occurrence, les principes de justice--communes par ailleurs déjà légitimées par la procédure. Reste le procéduralisme de Jean-Marc Ferry qui se veut plus sensible au rapport entre raison et religion que l'éthique habermassienne et qui, potentiellement, intégrerait les ressources contextuelles de sens--dont les ressources religieuses--, contra Rawls. Faire la genèse de la notion de reconstruction nécessite d'en retracer la généalogie. Ferry étant un commentateur de Habermas, c'est en repérant une faille dans la théorie des activités rationnelles de Habermas que Ferry est amené à se démarquer du philosophe allemand. Si le geste généalogique met en relief la filiation critique de Ferry par rapport à Habermas, le geste systématique accentue le caractère d' Aufhebung de la reconstruction par rapport à l'argumentation habermassienne. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

L'objectif de ce mémoire est de reconstruire l'essentiel de l'éthique déontologique de Karl-Otto Apel à la lumière de la question de la motivation. C'est à partir de la théorie du développement de la conscience morale du psychologue Lawrence Kohlberg que nous abordons cette recherche. Kohlberg représente en effet une véritable référence pour l'éthique du discours et l'éthique de la responsabilité développées par Apel, et c'est à partir de son ontogénèse que ce dernier entreprend de reconstruire, à son tour, une phylogénèse qui retrace l'évolution morale des civilisations. De plus, en prenant conscience des limites de la raison quant à la possibilité de répondre à la question «pourquoi être moral?» et en développant un stade 7 métaphysico-religieux, Kohlberg a suscité chez Karl-Otto Apel une réflexion qui l'a conduit à élaborer, à son tour, un stade 7 qui entend répondre à la même question mais d'une manière strictement rationnelle. L'analyse comparative de ces deux stades nous conduira à proposer une interprétation originale du 7 e stade de Karl-Otto Apel et par le fait même de vérifier la pertinence de la réponse qu'il apporte à cette question de la motivation.

The aim of this thesis is to study a dispute between J. L. Austin and A. J. Ayer, and in so doing consider the relevance of a linguistic investigation for philosophy. The dispute is confined for the most part to Austin's criticisms of the sense-datum theory, particularly as it has been supported by the argument from illusion, in Sense and Sensibilia (S&S) and Ayer's reply to these in "Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory?" (ARS). The argument from illusion is a traditional philosophical argument whereby incidents of non-veridical perception, e.g., the partly immersed stick that looks bent, are taken to support the claim that we do not (directly) perceive material objects, but must perceive something else, i.e., sense-data. In S&S , Austin contends that the argument is typically philosophical because it over-simplifies and misrepresents the facts of ordinary language and normal perception. In ARS, Ayer replies that the argument is essentially philosophical because it is logical and not factual: it shows that the truth of a material object statement is never entailed by the truth of the experiential statement upon which it is based. The Austin-Ayer dispute is best characterized as a clash of philosophical vision, that is, as a conflict about the proper aim and method of a philosophical investigation, and the role of an "analysis of language" for philosophy. This thesis, then, sets out (a) to describe the philosophical vision of Austin and Ayer, (b) to show how the criticisms that are offered by each philosopher are informed by their respective philosophical viewpoints, and (c) to establish that each philosopher presupposes the legitimacy of his own method in criticizing the other. As a result, (d) the arguments that each philosopher makes in defence of his position are seen as begging the question by presuming the validity of the claims that they must establish.

Cette thèse traite de la conception épicurienne du bonheur, constitué d'un équilibre entre l'état de plaisir et l'activité philosophique. Le premier chapitre examine la question de l'état qui accompagne le bonheur épicurien: le plaisir. Cependant, la conception hédoniste ne peut pas plus résoudre le problème du lien entre le plaisir et l'excellence, que celui entre le plaisir et la vérité. Le second chapitre, en définissant la philosophie comme thérapie de l'âme, montre comment l'activité philosophique fait partie de la conception épicurienne du bonheur. Cependant, la conception eudémoniste du bonheur épicurien ne peut pas expliquer pourquoi la disposition de l'âme est l'élément le plus important du bonheur épicurien. Le troisième chapitre montre comment, en regroupant les deux dimensions du bonheur épicurien: l'état et l'activité, il est possible de résoudre ces tensions, tout en permettant d'éclairer adéquatement le concept épicurien du bonheur.

This thesis explores the question of scientific realism. It proceeds by first providing an historical examination of the history of the debate in recent decades that has led to scientific realism replacing logical empiricism as the received view of scientific theories. Van Fraassen's proposed replacement "constructive empiricism" is examined and found to be an inadequate replacement. However, it is made clear that his critique of realism is valid. Recent post-van Fraassen positions are then examined in order to develop a plausible solution to the realism debate. The thesis focuses in particular on "deflationary approaches", those positions that eschew global solutions to the debate that are supposed to apply to the whole of science. A solution is proposed that draws features from recent "deflationary" approaches to the realism question. The normative methodological role of the deflationary approach is then defended from the claim that no interpretative, normative or methodological role is left for such a position. An illustration of the utility of the approach is demonstrated through a case study of the methodological role that the realism question has played in the field of quantum mechanics.

L'erreur du vingtième siècle a été de croire que l'on devait dissocier le politique de sa dimension éthique. On a donc cherché la transcendance ailleurs: dans un enchaînement au corps ou à l'idéologie. On a voulu dépasser l'humain en le replongeant plus profondément dans son être, avec les conséquences désastreuses qu'une telle approche a pu engendrer. Pour Lévinas, il est temps de pénétrer le politique de la préoccupation éthique; au nom du refus de la violence totalitaire, c'est la justice envers l'Autre, et non pas l'anonymat d'une raison impersonnelle, qui doit guider nos esprits et inspirer nos actions. Ainsi, proposant une réflexion s'ancrant dans la responsabilité infinie envers autrui, altruisme propre à l'enseignement du Premier Testament, Lévinas est généralement considéré comme un penseur de l'éthique. Et pourtant, reconnaît l'auteur, l'Autre n'est jamais seul: le sujet aperçoit dans les yeux d'autrui un tiers qu'il doit également servir. Il doit alors étendre à tous son dévouement absolu, il doit comparer les incomparables. Le politique chez Lévinas est précisément cet espace de questionnement où se pose la double exigence d'une responsabilité infinie envers l'Autre absolu et la présence d'un tiers commandant le même dévouement. Le politique n'est donc pas absent de la philosophie lévinassienne, mais il émerge de l'éthique et doit en tout temps demeurer subordonné à son exigence. Est-ce à dire qu'il ne constitue qu'une catégorie de l'éthique? Certes le politique est issu de l'éthique et orienté vers l'horizon de sa justice, mais étant une contrainte inéluctable de ce monde que l'humanité doit assumer seule, il est simultanément séparé de l'éthique. Le politique, chez Lévinas, est à la fois dépendant et indépendant de l'éthique.

The following doctoral dissertation constitutes a conjoint analysis of the workings of scepticism as contained within Hegel's and Whitehead's respective and contrasting philosophies of 'process'. In it, I hypothesize that for these speculative thinkers, scepticism may be described as the 'mover' of philosophical, religious, and scientific endeavour. Part One of the thesis focuses on Hegel's 'initially-idealistic' standpoint of Absolute Idealism as contained in the Logic. I find that for him, scepticism is to be defined as the recognition and negation of finitude. Drawing from Hegel's general distinction of Ancient and Modern forms of scepticism, I argue that scepticism is representative of the moment of 'cancellation' implicit within the dialectical progression of the logical Concept (Begriff). Subsequently, I trace the role of scepticism as the recognition of finitude with respect to the unfolding of Hegel's criterion of truth characteristic of Absolute Idealism, namely, within the process by which the dialectical opposition of 'idealism' and 'realism' is worked out. Part Two concerns Whitehead's 'provisionally-realistic' philosophy of Organism as advanced in Process and Reality. I elucidate the fact that for him, scepticism is the main contributor to the problem of the radical 'bifiurcation' of actualities. Following from an elucidation of the interplay between his ontological principle and the principle of relativity, as well as an analysis of his three modes of perception, I propose that Whitehead's notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum signify the workings of scepticism. In carrying out this interpretation, I show that 'negative prehensions' constitute the means by which the extensive continuum is divided by the organism, and are the efficient element in the creativity of organisms. And, I trace both the 'realistic' and 'idealistic' activities of 'negative prehensions' with respect to his descriptions of the unfolding of the creative processes of organisms. Part Three of the dissertation focuses directly on the ramifications of accepting my initial hypothesis that, in speculative philosophy, scepticism is described as the 'mover' of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavour. I advance an overall synopsis of the nature and function of scepticism in, and in light of, my study of speculative philosophy. Lastly, I offer a critical response to the radical 'instrumental' scepticism predominant in our era, from both Hegelian and Whiteheadian perspectives.