The author of this thesis is concerned with the cwrismo &d12;v (separate) status of nou&d4;v (Thought) in Aristotle's De Anima III.4--5 and Metaphysics Λ.6--9, and Hegel's answer to this a ,pori&d12; a (aporia) in his Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie. For Aristotle, nou&d4;v is a pure actuality ( 3 ,n 3&d12;rgei a ) and final cause that cannot directly influence the wide array of Nature's particular determinations. For Hegel, however, Aristotle's nou&d4;v is not purely actual, if actuality refers to a static and separate substance, but is a dynamic activity (Tatigkeit), in which nou&d4;v ' self-referential nature is extended to include the diverse determinations of the Scala Naturae. This absolute character of nou&d4;v ensures the interrelation of all thought-determinations, since these determinations are the manifestation of the ubiquitous activity of Denken's inner self-differentiation. Only by coalescing final and formal causality in Denken can Hegel claim to have overcome the Aristotelian a ,pori&d12; a of the cwrismo &d12;v of nou&d4;v .

Cette thèse propose de faire la lumière sur le débat latent qui sévit entre les projets herméneutiques de Hans-Georg Gadamer et Paul Ricoeur. Elle est divisée en quatre chapitres. Nous commençons par camper les enjeux du débat en confrontant leurs conceptions de l'herméneutique, afin de soulever le problème de l'unité du champ de l'herméneutique contemporaine. Notre propos met ici en relief les traditions philosophiques dont sont issues les conceptions de chacun. Ainsi, nous faisons valoir que l'herméneutique de la facticité de Heidegger est à la source du paradigme dialogique que développe l'herméneutique ontologique de Gadamer. Quant à Ricoeur, nous montrons que le paradigme textuel de son herméneutique méthodologique lui vient surtout de la pratique de l'interprétation en théologie protestante. Le second chapitre s'intéresse au rôle déterminant qu'a eu Hegel pour le problème herméneutique de la conscience historique. Nous faisons valoir que Gadamer "intériorise" la dialectique hégélienne, tandis que Ricoeur y recourt un peu comme à une méthode pour résoudre les conflits d'interprétation. Mais nous montrons que tous les deux renoncent à l'hégélianisme, au nom d'une herméneutique de la conscience historique. C'est ici que s'amorce la position commune à leurs herméneutiques. Le troisième chapitre se penche sur la position de Gadamer et Ricoeur face à l'héritage diltheyien de l'herméneutique. Nous montrons comment Gadamer a élaboré son herméneutique philosophique en critiquant l'historicisme de Dilthey, alors que ce dernier a eu de toute évidence une plus grande influence sur celle de Ricoeur, qui considère que la thèse diltheyienne sur la fixation de la vie dans l'écriture a été fructueuse pour penser l'objectivité propre aux sciences humaines. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre montre comment leurs herméneutiques s'enracinent dans la philosophie pratique et relèvent le défi posé par l'altérité. La comparaison de leur interprétation de la doctrine aristotélicienne de la phronesis nous conduit alors au point de rencontre culminant des deux projets herméneutiques: la similitude entre la catégorie ontologique de l'être-en-dialogue chez Gadamer et la théorie de l'identité narrative chez Ricoeur est à notre avis décisive pour l'unité du champ de l'herméneutique contemporaine.

In this dissertation it is argued that Kant's critique of Leibniz as found in the amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason derives from his theory of reflection. It is argued further that this unfocused and fragmentary amphiboly chapter, which contains the Leibniz-critique, can be seen to have a previously unsuspected unity to it. The keys to perceiving this unity are the appendix's purpose, structure and mosaic composition. The primary purpose of the appendix is not to present Kant's criticisms of Leibniz as is commonly thought, but rather it is to sketch his theory of reflection. Not only is this attested to by Kant himself (A 270/B 326), it is also made evident by the structure of the appendix. Structurally, the appendix is built around an introduction to the operation of transcendental reflection and a discussion of the concepts of reflection, this being the structure of each of the first three sections. By means of each pair of concepts of reflection Kant claims to summarize the basic tenets and origin of Leibniz's philosophy. Kant also claims that Leibnizls whole philosophy rests on one seminal error, which will be shown to be the omission of the operation of transcendental reflection. To be sure, Kant claims Leibniz made a number of other errors, but these various errors all derive from the omission of transcendental reflection. While this omission can be used to explain the other more well-known epistemological mistakes with which Kant charges Leibniz, it is undeniable that there are certain textual difficulties with the appendix. These can be dealt with by the hypothesis that the different sections were composed at different times and than pieced together without detailed revisions. If such a mosaic composition is granted, then some allowance can be made for the noticeable incongruities between these sections and for occasional problematic passages. This does not, however, warrant the claim that the appendix is not properly placed or unimportant. On the contrary, supplemented by clearer statements of Kant's theory of reflection and of his Leibniz-critique, the following interpretation shows that the appendix is properly placed and integral to the primary aims of the Critique of Pure Reason.

C'est suite a notre lecture de Bergson et de Sartre, que le soupcon qui est a l'origine de ce travail s'imposa a notre esprit. En lisant, en effet, ces deux monuiments de la philosophie contemporaine, nous fumes frappe et surpris par des nombreuses similitudes qui emaillent leurs oeuvres en general, et l'Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience et L'etre et le neant en particulier. L'affinite qui existe entre ces deux ouvrages est telle que, par moment, n'eut ete la difference de style--poetique chez Bergson et baroque chez Sartre--on croirait lire un meme auteur. Cette etrange proximite constatee entre les deux penseurs nous etonna. D'une part, parce que ces philosophes n'appartiennent pas au meme courant; d'autre part, parce que Sartre s'est toujours montre hostile a l'endroit de Bergson. Ainsi avons-nous voulu savoir si malgre tout, Bergson n'a pas exerce une influence decisive sur Sartre. Autrement dit, nous cherchions a savoir si, en depit de son dedain pour Bergson, l'auteur de L'etre et le neant n'a pas abondamment puise dans la philosophie bergsonienne; s'il ne prolonge pas, quelque part, la pensee de Bergson; et, finalement, s'il n'existe pas une certaine "communaute d'orientation" entre les deux philosophes. Pour repondre adequatement a ces questions, il nous a fallu les comparer, c'est-a-dire mettre en exergue a la fois ce qui les eloigne et ce qui les rapproche. Comme nous ne pouvions appliquer cette comparaison en considerant tous les concepts qu'ils ont etudies, nous nous sommes donc limite a la notion du temps (dans l'Essai et dans L'etre et le neant). Bref, ce travail est une confrontation historique et critique--autour du concept de temps--a l'issue duquel nous espeions tirer au clair la nature du rapport qui existe entre Bergson et Sartre. Nous sommes arrive a la conclusion suivante: La temporalite sartrienne est certes differente de la duree bergsonienne. Cependant, suite aux nombreux recoupements que nous avons deceles, nous affirmons que Sartre a suffisamment subi l'influence bergsonienne. Son attitude negative a l'egard de Bergson s'expliquerait par des raisons doctrinales et historiques.

This thesis is an exploration of the idea of immediate experience. Three questions are asked: is there Immediate experience, what is immediate experience and what use is immediate experience. These questions are posed in the course of surveying the recent history of immediate experience with a view to rehabilitating it as a means of solving a particular philosophical problem. This problem is the paradox resulting from the fact that knowledge both depends on a dichotomy of 'knowing' and 'object known' (mind and world) and yet is vitiated by it. A synopsis of approaches to the problem of the dichotomy of mind and world is presented and claims about experience in relation to the paradox are examined. Then it is proposed that we should reconsider the theory of immediate experience, incorporating the idea that experience is already conceptually informed. This results in a theory of immediate experience that is conceptualizable, that is constituted of thinkable contents Immediate experience avoids the problems of dualism because it does not involve a dichotomy of mind and world. But once experience is conceptualized into ordinary, discursive experience, it involves a dichotomy so that knowledge is 'knowledge about.' By dissolving the paradox, immediate experience offers a better explanation than a dualistic account. And since immediate experience is conceptualizable, we avoid the criticism that there is no experience without interpretation or a conceptual framework in place.

Cette thèse s'inscrit dans la problématique générale de l'identité personnelle. Plus précisément, elle questionne la fonction du dépouillement dans la perspective d'une réalisation authentique de soi chez Francis Jacques et Paul Ricoeur. Dans le corps de la thèse, l'auteur présente les modèles d'identité de ces deux auteurs selon les thèmes de la question de départ: l'authenticité et la fonction du dépouillement. À cette fin, il analyse certaines dimensions de la pensée de Jacques--ontologie de la relation, personne, individu, solitude, force illocutoire du silence, compétence pragmatique, etc.--et de Ricoeur--visée éthique, distinction de l'idem et de l'ipse, attestation, disponibilité, etc. En conclusion, l'auteur compare thématiquement les deux modèles d'identité afin de faire ressortir leurs points de convergence, de divergence et, surtout, de complémentarité. C'est ainsi qu'apparaissent un tant soit peu certaines forces et limites des deux approches philosophiques.

Ce mémoire de maîtrise démontre l'importance de la qualité dans la philosophie de John Dewey. Nous ne pouvons, en effet, comprendre le rôle des termes comme "valeur" et "expérience", voire même des termes techniques comme "interaction" et "situation", sans d'abord saisir ce que l'on entend par qualité dans ce courant de pensée. C'est Robert Pirsig, auteur de Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance , qui nous lança sur la piste. Pour ce dernier, la qualité est une dimension de notre expérience. La pensée de Dewey témoigne d'une conception similaire, ainsi que d'une préoccupation parente avec le problème du rôle de la qualité dans le monde. C'est parce que nous participons à un monde où la qualité est présente dans l'expérience même que nos choix personnels et sociaux sont susceptibles d'avoir un impact sur notre environnement. Valeur et expérience sont compris alors en termes d'interactions qualitatives dans le monde.

The doctrine of informed consent established a distinctive role for both the doctor and the patient, in the doctor-patient relationship. This doctrine, represented by the compound word "informed consent" placed a duty on the physician to "inform" and gave a specific task to the patient "consent." The physician was required to inform the patient to the extent that a reasonable person in that situation would want to be informed. Then the patient had the prerogative of whether to consent or refuse to consent. However, during the late 1980's and early 1900's different clinical situations arose which could not be accommodated by simply giving patients the right to consent or refuse to consent. Situations developed in which health care professionals wanted to refuse to provide treatment on the grounds that further treatment is medically futile and patients' (and/or their families) wanted to insist on treatment claiming that it was not futile and that it served a genuine purpose. Essentially, the informed consent doctrine provided patients with the "negative right" to refuse treatment. The idea of medical futility revealed the limitations of informed consent by demonstrating that some patients also wanted a "positive right" to demand treatment. After analysing this new phenomenon it appears that it is the most recent manifestation of the age-old debate between professional paternalism and patient autonomy. As a result, this thesis analyses the futility debate and then takes a step back in order to evaluate it from the more general perspective of establishing the legitimate domains of both patient and professional authority. Standard approaches to the futility debate generally argue for unilateral decision making authority for either the patient or professional, concerning futility issues. However, the problem with this approach is that it renders the doctor-patient relationship as a zero-sum game; in other words, if one side wins the other side loses. Alternatively, the focus of this thesis is to propose a model of professional and patient authority which allows each party substantial decision-making authority but is also mutually supportive. Therefore, this new approach to the futility debate, and indeed the doctor-patient relationship in general, is undertaken with the intention of preventing these types of disputes from arising, rather than attempting to resolve the conflict once it is fully developed.

A persisting, unresolved debate in the bioethics literature was the impetus behind this work. The focus chosen was the need for replacement organs for those whose illnesses appear to be related to addiction to alcohol or tobacco. The initial section thus examines the more factual aspects of both addiction and organ transplantation. The history of organ transplantation is explored, focusing particularly on the attempts to frame criteria for reception of the scarce organs, and the concomitant attempts to increase the supply of donated organs; neither issue has been solved, although there is much research being focused on technical solutions in particular, for those awaiting scarce organs. Within the bioethics literature, the issue of criteria for the reception of scarce organs has tended to be viewed as a question of justice. Thus this work peruses the varying conceptions of justice which appear within that literature, in an attempt to ascertain whether their applications have involved differing results for the population in question. In fact, there appears to be little difference in the outcomes amongst those ascribing to one or other of the meta-ethical theories. In contrast to the extensive treatment of issues of justice within bioethics, the concept of responsibility is largely unexamined. This dearth suggested that an historical perusal of the concept of responsibility within a number of the disciplines to which bioethics turns would be appropriate. In the end, the thought of Emmanuel Levinas appeared to offer the most fruitful approach to the topic under consideration. His work appears to be a profound challenge to rethink our relationships to others, as well as our approach to justice. Central to that thought is what Levinas calls the relationship of the one-for-the-other; the philosopher suggests that a response of profound responsibility for the other before one is called forth by the visage of that "wounded" other. The question of justice does arise for Levinas, since in the eyes of the other before one are all the others; thus needs must be weighed and choices made. The benchmark for this justice, however, is the relationship of the one-for-the-other: real justice implies, not a faceless, objectified totality, but an attention to the needs of all---the very antithesis of the utilitarian approach so prevalent within much of North American bioethics. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

The thesis provides an analysis of the metaphysical and epistemological shift from naturalism to mechanism in the seventeenth century, specifically in relation to the human body, and the evolution of the notion of the body-machine in Cartesian philosophy. The thesis starts from the position that Descartes' metaphysical dualism is a fundamental presupposition of both his method and his physics, including his physiology. It supports Jean-Luc Marion's thesis of the 'grey ontology' of the Regulae and argues against the position of Alquie, Gaukroger and others that Descartes' science and metaphysics are distinct aspects of his work, with the latter arriving only after the former had been fully formulated. Then, using Lenoble's thesis that the development of mechanism in the seventeenth century was more a reaction to the naturalism of the Renaissance than to Scholasticism, it traces the rejection of certain 'occult' notions of the Renaissance conception of nature and body, in particular, the notions of world-soul and final causes. It then analyses the application of the principles of mechanism to the human body as elaborated by Descartes in his principal work on the body, L'Homme, and shows how his mechanistic physiology created a rupture not only between mind and body but also between body and nature, resulting in a changed anthropology. At the same time it brings out ambiguities and contradictions inherent in Descartes' mechanistic, explanation of body, particularly in relation to animal perception and sensation; and it shows, further, that his mechanistic explanation relies, in its turn, on 'occult' concepts, in the form of animal spirits and continuous creation, metaphysical supports that weaken the effectiveness of the mechanistic explanation. Finally, the thesis looks at Descartes' notion of mind-body union and, analysing Gueroult's interpretation of the Cartesian position, demonstrates that this notion does not result in a modification of his mechanism of the body. The thesis concludes that Descartes' application of a unified method of science to the human body suffered from an inherent and irreconcilable ambiguity: his mechanistic physiology could not yield an anthropology while, at the same time, his emphasis on mind-body union in his later writings could not yield a science. It proposes a re-examination of mechanistic physiology in the light of other models of mechanism in the seventeenth century (e.g. Leibniz, Hobbes) and a re-assessment of the anthropology displaced by the rupture between body and nature, body and mind.