Virtually all treatments of Nietzsche's political thought today are concerned with its posthumous appropriation. The principal imperative guiding my work, conversely, is to situate Nietzsche's political thought in relation to the political issues, critiques and movements of his own period. I begin with a polemic of efforts in contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy to interpret Nietzsche's philosophy as essentially consonant with liberal democratic pluralism. In opposition to this view, I advance the proposition that the foundation of Nietzsche's political thought is the conservative or aristocratic liberal critique of democratic society found in Alexis de Tocqueville, Jacob Burckhardt and Hippolyte Taine. I subsequently demonstrate, however, that Nietzsche radicalizes this critique insofar as he takes as absolute what its proponents merely take for the potential dangers of democracy, advocating its subversion, containment or manipulation through the figures of the free spirits and the philosopher-legislators. I argue that Nietzsche is engaged in class warfare and that he is ultimately committed to the reversal of the process of democratization and the laying of the groundwork for an alternative aristocratic ideal of political organization which he sees as a condition for the production of the exemplary human being. I conclude that Nietzsche's radicalization of the aristocratic liberal critique is primarily informed by a reading of Machiavelli's The Prince which allows Nietzsche to think in terms of political control techniques and a spectral-syncretic or perspectival art of governance. Given this, I argue that Nietzsche's political thought may be more accurately situated in relation to the anti-liberal and anti-democratic neo-Machiavellian elite theorists of his generation like Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, and to the founders of mass psychology such as Gustave Le Bon. All continue the aristocratic liberal critique but radicalize it in supporting the idea of the manipulation of mass behavior through elite leadership. This conclusion is directed at those, in particular, who would argue that Nietzsche most closely resembles the anarchists of his period.

My thesis is concerned with the efficacy of Habermas' critical theory as an articulation of emancipatory interest, by way of critical diagnosis of social reality, which will make the ideal of free society possible. In his earlier theory of communicative action, he introduced a distinction between "the lifeworld" (the sphere of communicative interaction geared toward understanding) and "systems" (the spheres of strategic action steered by media of power and money). On this model, the pathologies of modern society were understood in terms of the colonization of the lifeworld by the systems, and emancipation was understood as preventing this colonization. In his recent works, however, this older model is seen as unable to account for legitimate power: i.e., it is unable to explain how citizens can convert their communicative understanding developed in the lifeworld into government policies. This leads Habermas to redefine the possibility of free society, emancipation, in terms of legitimate lawmaking. The turn to legal theory in Between Facts and Norms is anchored in the concept of modern law, which is situated between the lifeworld and system and as such is said to mediate between the two. Legitimate lawmaking is understood as the result of institutionalized procedures of public deliberation, which convert citizens' practices of self-determination, in the form of communicative and participatory rights, into the binding decision of political power. I will argue that the constructed concept of law, as what brings the insight of moral norms to bear upon the context of practical life, sits uncomfortably between the lifeworld and system. By aligning so closely the concepts of legitimate law, communicative power, and political system, Habermas' new approach fails to ensure emancipation since it legitimizes the political power as exercised in liberal-democratic states. I contend that the critical thrust of Habermas' theory can be regained by borrowing from the insights of postmodern political theory. Specifically, I will draw upon Foucault's analysis of power, which goes beyond the limitations of the consensus/coercion model of Habermas' view, and Derrida's deconstruction of law, which recovers the critical distance between the utopian ideal of justice and the real-existing political system.

This doctoral dissertation is a study of Nietzsche's views on morality in order to assess his contribution to moral philosophy. Towards this end, it examines Nietzsche's understanding of morality as well as the scope of his attack. I then offer a reading of Nietzsche's critique of morality, arguing that he rejects morality insofar as it functions within society to preserve the 'herd' at the expense of 'higher types' whose flourishing resides elsewhere. In short, I claim that Nietzsche rejects morality insofar as it proves inimical to the flourishing of these 'higher types'. I also claim that Nietzsche is more than a mere critic of morality, and that his fundamental 'ethical' preoccupation with exemplary individuals is what motives his critique, and forms the basis of his affirmative ethic of human flourishing. Moreover, I contend that Nietzsche defends his positive morality by presenting the character of Zarathustra (Thus Spoke Zarathustra), and later himself (Ecce Homo) as exemplars of human excellence who must rely on their ability to convince others performatively, rather than by means of discourse, or argumentation. Ultimately, I conclude that Nietzsche's ethics does not fit comfortably within the moral tradition as he is an opponent of deontological ethics, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics despite certain affinities with the latter. This fact does not detract from the rich contribution that Nietzsche makes to moral philosophy as bode critic and champion of an affirmative ethic.

This work examines core assumptions of the rationalism that underlies liberal political theory by placing it against the background of a dramatic historical phenomenon---genocide. An attempt is made to draw on historical accounts of two genocides to develop a critique of liberal political theory as it has been articulated during the latter years of the 20th Century by John Rawls. Ultimately, this thesis attempts to sort out the conceptual problems arising at the junction point of normative and descriptive theories of politics and argues that the basic elements of both kinds theories would benefit greatly from closer attention to history. The first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the ways in which political reason can be adapted to the needs of state and suggests that there are problems associated with the attempt to universalize the notion of human rights across a community of nations lacking the basic contextual requirements for rights. Chapter two considers the uncomfortable fit between political structure and value in liberal political theory. It argues that the administrative structure of states now exists as an important part of contemporary formal reality and thus ought to be a critical element in any serious study of politics. An argument begins here that works towards the final conclusion that states constitute an arena within which individualist and collectivist values collide. The third chapter examines the relationship between liberal values and rationality. It includes a technical discussion of Max Weber's theory of rationality but limits the discussion to political applications. This chapter raises a series of questions about the concept of rationality used in the construction of political theory. Chapters four, five and six examine the complications that arise when a liberal perspective is taken to issues of ontological existence, community values and the powers inhering in states to shape identity frames in the interests of administrative efficiency. This leads into a more technical discussion of rationality as represented in the theories of John Rawls and Alan Gewirth that is contained in the seventh chapter. Chapters eight and nine are devoted to discussions of elements of the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide respectively. Both examples are used as a means of illustrating the complex power relations arising out of the various forms of collective agency needed to sustain state sovereignty and which complicate political theory far beyond the explanatory power of liberal rationalism. The examples are used to argue that theories based on notions of disassociated rational persons just fail to support their normative conclusions. The final chapter argues for a re-examination of the way in which political theory is read and suggests that liberal theory, in particular, tends towards abstraction in ways that limit its usefulness as either explanatory or normative theory.

Notre travail doctoral s'articule autour de deux questions: comment la pensée de Berkeley, qui semble en accord avec celle de la majorité des penseurs des Lumières sur un certain nombre de points bien précis (distinction entre qualités premières et secondes, primat de la sensation, nominalisme affirmé, etc.), a-t-elle été perçue par ceux-ci comme l'antithèse même de leur projet épistémologique? Pourquoi l'immatérialisme berkeleyen a-t-il été confondu durablement avec une position solipsiste, que l'on qualifiait d'égciiste au XVIIIe siècle, l'égoïsme revenant à se penser seul existant? Très vite, nous nous sommes rendu compte que le traitement de ces deux questions pouvait avoir une répercussion majeure sur l'image que nous nous faisons aujourd'hui des Lumières et qu'il impliquait une relecture d'ensemble du XVIIIe siècle par le biais d'une mise en rapport serrée avec le scepticisme, et plus particulièrement avec l'immatérialisme qui, en tant que perçu comme solipsisme, semblait fournir une clef d'interprétation féconde. Ce qui explique le plan d'ensemble suivi, organisé autour d'une histoire du scepticisme, de la Renaissance au début du XVIIIe siècle, suivie d'une histoire de l'immatérialisme, qui s'échelonne de la première réception de Berkeley (en gros de 1710 à 1730) à la fin du siècle des Lumières, l'Académie de Berlin pour la Prusse et l'Idéologie pour la France marquant la fin de notre enquête. Au terme d'une telle étude, nous pensons être parvenu à faire ressortir dans toute son étendue et sous ses différentes formes le scepticisme des Lumières, qui se construit autour d'un refus du pyrrhonisme absolu qui dénie toute existence au monde extérieur et d'une acceptation du scepticisme comme outil méthodologique permettant aux penseurs des Lumières de construire une science des phénomènes sans doute incertaine, mais néanmoins ayant tous les caractères d'une forte probabilité et sujette à amélioration continuelle. Par là, une autre vision du XVIIIe siècle nous paraît avoir été acquise, sans doute moins flamboyante mais également plus objective.

Cette thèse vise en premier lieu la compréhension et l'analyse de la conception de l'individualisme chez Charles Taylor. L'individualisme constitue sans équivoque le mode de vie privilégié des sociétés occidentales. Or, il est souvent perçu comme une cause de la fragmentation sociale et de l'isolement des individus. Il fait l'objet d'analyses sérieuses parmi les penseurs éthiques et politiques modernes. L'originalité de la pensée de Taylor, philosophe canadien de renommée internationale, réside principalement dans un idéal d'authenticité qu'il voit à la source de l'individualisme moderne. Il propose en fait une redéfinition de l'individualisme, un individualisme authentique , qui jette selon lui les bases d'un nouveau modèle de société. L'objectif de ce mémoire consiste donc dans un premier temps à analyser le plus fidèlement possible la conception de l'individualisme authentique chez Charles Taylor, pour en comprendre l'origine historique d'une part et les implications sociales possibles d'autre part. Dans un deuxième temps, ce mémoire démontre comment l'éthique de l'authenticité constitue la pierre angulaire de la pensée taylorienne, et ce au plan moral, politique et religieux, démonstration qui ne semble pas avoir été faite jusqu'à présent.

This dissertation is a systematic study of Wittgenstein's ideas on non-significant propositions, specifically tautologies, mathematical propositions, scientific laws in the Tractatus, grammatical propositions in the Investigations, and Moore-type propositions in On Certainty . My aim is to show that these propositions are closely connected. I take Wittgenstein's discussions of them to be a theme developed both in the early and later periods of his philosophy. His idea is that since such propositions cannot be properly regarded as empirical or true or false, they are radically different from propositions that are. He sees the conflation of these two kinds of proposition as a major source of philosophical illusions. For this reason, it is important for him to clarify the logical status of such nonsignificant propositions.

Dans les Principes de la philosophie du droit , Hegel s'intéresse au problème de la pauvreté. Nous verrons dans cette thèse que le philosophe analyse le développement de la paupérisation comme un phénomène inhérent à la société civile. Nous nous intéresserons aussi aux effets que la pauvreté a sur la personne et également à ceux qu'elle a sur la société civile elle-même. Nous constaterons que Hegel ne semble pas offrir de remède à la pauvreté et nous nous interrogerons pour savoir si la raison de cette irrésolution n'est pas due à une conception capitaliste de la propriété privée, qui l'empêcherait de remettre en question la société civile. Pour cela, nous nous attacherons aux interprétations divergentes de Marcuse, de Harris et de Rose. Nous prendrons enfin position vis-à-vis de cette question pour montrer que Hegel n'est pas un défenseur acharné de la propriété dans sa forme bourgeoise et que ses développements sur la corporation dans les Principes de la philosophie du droit laissent entrevoir une solution au problème de la pauvreté par un changement d'esprit au coeur même de la société civile.

Abstract not available.

Can we distribute resources such that nearly all people can carry out their life plans? By sheer luck, some people happen to be naturally endowed, and their talents make them well off. Others, by brute bad luck, find themselves being naturally disadvantaged or less talented, and these conditions make them worst off. How can the frustrating and devastating situation of the latter group be remedied? John Rawls, a prominent contemporary liberal egalitarian, thinks that a fair distribution of wealth can be achieved if people choose his two principles of justice. With the two principles in operation, Rawls maintains, people can retain their basic liberties while committing themselves to social duties, duties that require them to assist the least fortunate members of a well-ordered society. Rawls thinks that liberty and equality are reconcilable in his theory. I trace the background to Rawls in Rousseau and Kant, and show how liberty and equality must be understood and significantly interconnected. The present work is primarily a critique of Rawls' theory of justice in regard to its position on the distribution of wealth, that is, Rawls' principle of distributive justice. My purpose is to show that Rawls' principle does not go far enough in the needed direction of redistribution, to provide what disadvantaged people genuinely require as a matter of fairness and actual opportunity; and further that this limitation in Rawls' position on economic distribution works to undermine Rawls' principle of equal liberty, as it applies in the real world. I also show that Rawls' critics, such as Nielsen, Sandel, Nozick, van Parijs, Dworkin and Kymlicka fail to provide a preferable solution to the problem of the distribution of wealth. I make a case for a commitment to the extensive redistributive tax measures needed to insure truly universal education as the condition of equal opportunity. I argue that this proposal is, in fact, consistent with egalitarians' aim to achieve equality, and consistent with Rawls' equal opportunity principle. Although Hegel has hardly figured as a model for egalitarians in the history of political philosophy, I argue that he is a model for egalitarians, and that he offers a preferable solution to the antinomies of contemporary thought. This means that he is a potential interlocutor in these contemporary debates. The central claim which I try to establish is that the Hegelian concern to reconcile individual freedom with new forms of community is germane to his vindication of economic rights. To put my point another way, I argue that contrary to the liberals' formalistic preoccupation with rights, interests, and rational preferences, Hegel correctly urges us to return to the sort of full-bodied philosophical anthropology that can specify the fundamental moral, economic, and political needs of human beings.