This thesis is essentially an attempt to grasp the nature of Hegel's logic as a whole. In my first chapter I consider what Hegel is trying to accomplish in the logic. Here we see that Hegel's logic is not only a science of thought but a metaphysics as well. In my second chapter I examine Hegel's famous dialectical method by criticizing two previous interpretations of this method and by arguing for a third interpretation. In my last chapter I develop an interpretation of logical necessity by considering Hegel's comments on this topic as well as his discussion of the concept of necessity at the end of the "Doctrine of Essence".

In 19th century Anglo-American political philosophy, one finds an important debate concerning the nature, source and limits of rights. Two of the dominant views here were the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill and the rights-based political thought of Herbert Spencer. While there are significant differences between them, both arguably reflect a perspective that is both liberal and individualist. A response to these views--one that is sometimes taken to be fundamentally incompatible, if not entirely incommensurable, with the Anglo-American liberal tradition--is found in British idealist political thought. The most developed statement of this is, arguably, that of the British philosopher and social reformer, Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923). Bosanquet argues that, to provide an adequate account of the nature, source and limits of human rights, one must abandon many of the individualist assumptions of his contemporaries. The question I address, then, is whether Bosanquet's theory of rights is a plausible response to (if not also more adequate than) the 'liberal individualist' views of Bentham, Mill and Spencer. In other words, does Bosanquet address the problems that he finds in these liberal individualist accounts of rights and does he provide a plausible alternative to them? My focus here is primarily, but not exclusively, historical. Moreover, I argue that a complete account of Bosanquet's theory of rights requires an elaboration of the "metaphysical theory of the nature of social reality"--"the social ontology"--on which it is based. Thus, in order to answer the question motivating this study, not only do I discuss Bosanquet's theory of rights in relation to the problems in the views of his contemporaries, but also show how it is related to his more general metaphysical concerns. In Chapter 1, "The Foundation of Rights in 'Theories of the First Look'," I set the stage for my reconstruction and presentation of Bosanquet's theory of rights. In Chapter 2, "Bosanquet's Theory of Rights," I reconstruct Bosanquet's theory of rights and respond to a number of criticisms directed directly to it. In Chapters 3 and 4, I provide and discuss what seem to be the key elements in the 'ontological' or 'metaphysical' background to Bosanquet's position. In the concluding chapter, "Bosanquet's Theory of Rights: An Assessment" (Chapter 5), I show how Bosanquet's view avoids or responds to the problems he has identified in the theories of rights of Bentham, Mill and Spencer. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

This dissertation is concerned with the foundations of ethical decision-making. It argues that a study of Bernard Lonergan's works on the human good can lead to a heightened awareness of what it means to take responsibility for our being responsible. Just as Lonergan suggested that we turn to the subject and pay attention to how we know in order to understand what we know, so this dissertation attends to how we make decisions. In so doing, responsible decision-making is understood not as one discrete act, but as a process that includes a series of evaluative operations. The dissertation explains Lonergan's levels of the good, and on that basis identifies and explains a structure of three evaluative operations--desiring, deliberating on possibilities, and evaluating/judging the preferability of possibilities for action--which are parallel to Lonergan's three cognitional operations of experiencing, understanding and judging. From there, the study asks whether the three evaluative operations ought to be distinguished from their cognitional counterparts. The question is addressed by noting how Lonergan distinguished levels of operations and/or levels of consciousness. The conclusion is that the same arguments that Lonergan used to identify cognitional operations and cognitional structure can be used to identify evaluative operations and evaluative structure. From there, one of the hallmarks of Lonergan's approach to ethics is considered: namely his claim that values are apprehended in feelings. Lonergan's treatment of value judgements is discussed. A similarity to Kantian ethics is adduced by claiming that the rationality that Kantian ethics grasps is the need for sustainable systems. This same emphasis can be found in the works of Kenneth Melchin. Given that this approach is conspicuously at odds with the positivist position on the irreducibility of the good, the differences between that position and a Lonerganian approach are discussed, the conclusion being that a Lonerganian approach has stronger empirical grounding that the positivist approach. A clarification is then made concerning the supposed virtual unconditionality of value judgements. In contrast to the claims of many Lonerganian scholars, it is argued that this is not an apt way of characterizing value judgements, nor was it favoured by Lonergan. Lonergan's work on self-transcendence as the criterion of the good is then studied. Self-transcendence is explained precisely in the ways that each level of operations sublates previous levels of operations. Two topics of special concern to Lonergan are then reviewed in the light of evaluative structure: bias is explained in terms of getting the order of sublations "wrong"; and conversion is explained in terms of getting the order of sublations "right." The dissertation concludes with an exploration of Lonergan's and Frederick Crowe's explanation of an above downwards dynamism operating in human development. The conclusion applies the dissertation's findings to debates between deontologists and teleologists, arguing for the complementarity of the approaches as well as their inadequacy. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

This exploration of the virtue of accurate self-appraisal in great people as seen by some philosophers argues that a justified belief in one's fundamental superiority need not entail arrogant or egotistical behaviour towards others, but can harmonize with marked tendencies to respectfulness, generosity and understanding, although not with moral permissiveness. Even if accurate self-appraisal means thinking oneself basically better, this virtue can be consistent with social dispositions that contemporary egalitarians admire. The proposal to interpret humility as accurate knowledge of one's merits comes from current writers who reject any merit in humility's more traditional associations of self-effacement. The new humility, they claim, can apply to those preeminent in any field, who keep their exceptional merits in perspective in spite of recognizing them. This self-restraint is attributed to an underlying assumption that all persons have equal worth or rights. The thesis disputes the adequacy of this account by noting that moral virtues themselves can be regarded as merits of unrivalled importance and that, with regard to their distribution, people are basically unequal. Consequently, humility in highly moral people might be better seen as a kind of accurate self-estimate that balances an assumption (the more conscious, the better) of human equality with an equally crucial awareness that one's moral character and concomitant judgments are basically superior. The assumption of equality is claimed to be (1) fully compatible with the belief in personal superiority and (2) not the sine qua non of moral decency in social relations. Aristotle's megalopsuchos, or "great soul," and Spinoza's good person, while not egalitarians, know themselves morally preeminent, yet both possess many still admirable beliefs and traits. The same applies to one interpretation of Nietzsche's noble soul. These thinkers suggest the compatibility of self-preference with respectfulness towards all--sometimes especially towards the weakest--people. Kant's egalitarian view downplays any notion of personal superiority, but not convincingly. Aquinas suggests a tension between humility and moral competence in worldly dealings, but only because he tries to uphold the Aristotelian great soul while not jettisoning the recurrent Christian motif of self-denigration.

Abstract Not Available.

Notre etude d'histoire de la philosophie sur le dialogue de Descartes, La recherche de la verite ..., analyse, a partir des expressions "desir de connai tre" et de "curiosite", les conditions de la mise en branle de la recherche de la verite, aspect peut analyse, de la pensee de Descartes. Proposant une reinterpretation des bornes du desir de connai tre, ce texte de Descartes organise l'economie de l'activite theorique et interprete moralement la connaissance. Le moment du desir est mediatise par la methode fondee sur la lumiere naturelle de la raison et la notion transcendante de verite. Par une foi esperante en la pure rationalite depouillee des appareils culturels et scientifiques qu'on lui propose, l'individu doit surmonter la crainte du dessaisissement de ce qu'il tenait pour sa connaissance curieuse, renoncer a son mauvais infini, sa pseudo-totalite scolastique ou erudite, et accepter de retrouver l'activite de sa propre capacite de jugement.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide an accurate, concrete and complete account of the human body in St. Thomas's mature texts in order to show that St. Thomas ascribed to the human body a rich and important causality which contributes positively to human existence. As St. Thomas inscribes his anthropology in an Aristotelian framework, a first section (Chapters 1 and 2) is devoted to an examination of Aristotle's views on matter and the body. The second section is, then, devoted to the human body in St. Thomas's anthropology. Chapter 3 examines St. Thomas's general anthropology from the 'viewpoint of soul', outlining his adoption of Aristotle's hylomorphic theory as regards human beings and paying particular attention to points on which his analysis differs from that of Aristotle. Chapter 4 sets forth the methodology we employ in our examination of the human body in St. Thomas's philosophy. Before studying the human body from the 'viewpoint of body', we first address, in Chapter 5, the issues of human individuation in St. Thomas's philosophy and of Aquinas's views on the elements. In regards to the question of matter being the principle of individuation, we argue that St. Thomas distinguishes two sorts of 'individuation' and that, although materia signata is the cause of our being unum de numero (which is one kind of 'individuation'), it is not the cause of our being unum numero (esse being the principle of this kind of 'individuation'). Regarding elemental change and the composition of the elements, we show that, according to St. Thomas, elements are composed of substantial form and prime matter, that their changes are not accidental but substantial (i.e., involve generation and corruption) and that the qualities or powers of a corrupted element remain virtually in the composite. Chapters 6-8 then study the human body from the 'viewpoint of body', examining the causality of matter in each level of life: vegetative (Chapter 6), sensitive (Chapter 7) and intellective (Chapter 8). At the vegetative level, the role of matter in generation, nutrition and growth is discussed, as is St. Thomas's doctrine regarding the necessary qualities of the human body. In Chapter 7, the causality of matter in sensation is examined in regards to (a) organs and faculties; (b) the exterior senses (of which the sense of touch is primary and, for this reason, will be the focus of our discussion); (c) the functions of the human heart with respect to our vital operations, movement and erect position; (d) the interior senses and their relation to the structure of the human brain; and (e) appetites and emotions. The final chapter, Chapter 8, then examines the causality of matter at the level of intellective life. There we show that the human soul requires matter (more precisely, a human body) to acquire knowledge, exercise its acquired knowledge and to make particular decisions. As St. Thomas's views regarding the nature of man and the causality of matter have important implications for the separated state of the soul and, also, as regards the resurrection of the body, we discuss these implications, examine the consistency of St. Thomas's position with the assumptions of his anthropology and his theory of knowledge and argue that causality he ascribes to the material dimension of human beings is truly significant, extending even to our final beatitude. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Abstract Not Available.

L'etude porte sur la notion de connaissance habituelle definie par Locke dans An Essay Concerning Human Understanding; elle compare le probleme souleve par Locke a une question semblable examinee par Descartes dans les Meditations metaphysiques et elle analyse la critique formulee par Leibniz dans les Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain. Tout comme l'argument cartesien de l'existence d'un dieu bienveillant, le principe lockien de l'immutabilite des rapports entre idees ne reussit pas a proteger la memoire contre les critiques sceptiques. Ce probleme met en evidence les limites de la conception intuitionniste de la connaissance partagee par Locke et Descartes, mais il permet aussi de montrer que le scepticisme de Locke a l'egard de la memoire est plus nuance qu'on a pu le croire. De plus, l'etude aborde brievement la conception leibnizienne d'une "memoire immediate" et elle l'applique au cogito cartesien.

Abstract Not Available.