Abstract Not Available.

Le but de cette these est l'evaluation de differentes tactiques pouvant etre adoptees dans la resolution des conflits profonds. On se demandera jusqu'ou peut aller la raison dans ces entreprises et quelles sont les options qui restent apres l'epuisement des moyens rationnels. La position rationaliste, qui propose des regles pre-etablies a la resolution de differends, sera comparee avec une methode plus souple, qui prefere s'en remettre a l'examen approfondi de chaque cas afin de decouvrir les moyens uniquement appropries a chaque situation particuliere. Une evaluation de differentes techniques d'argumentation logique sera suivie de l'expose de cas de dilemmes. Enfin, une analyse de la facon dont une solution peut etre envisagee dans chaque cas sera presentee.

Abstract Not Available.

In this thesis I have presented the central passages of the 'Critique of Teleological Judgement' which outline Kant's view of final ends. In Chapter 1, I considered physical ends which Kant equates with organisms. I outlined his distinction between such ends and machines, namely the sense in which the parts of an organism are reproductive of the other parts, while in a machine they are not. In the second chapter, I went on to consider Kant's rejection of dogmatic teleology by way of his many examples. Following this, I explained Kant's understanding of extrinsic finality as a relationship of proximate use. In Chapter 3, I described Kant's argument against any organism, understood as a physical being, acting as the ultimate end of nature. And finally, in the fourth and final chapter of exegesis, I outlined Kant's assertion that the final end of creation is the group of individual moral rational beings. In the fifth chapter, I sought to offer an environmental assessment of Kant's views as representative of the humanist tradition. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

In my thesis I propose a new interpretation of Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. I claim that this Book must be read in the light of the Introduction to the Treatise. Thus, my interpretation revolves around Hume's intention of creating a new system of the sciences on the basis of his science of man. In this thesis I pay close attention to the following subjects: the analysis of the 'vulgar'; Hume's discussion about the impact of predispositions on our ideas; the distinction between the concept of causation and the process of causation. Finally, I discuss Hume's position on the question of the simplicity and complexity of ideas.

Une nouvelle problematique emerge en cette fin de XXe siecle: celle de la fondation d'un ordre nouveau de civilisation reposant sur les possibilites nouvelles decoulant des progres permis par le liberalisme. Un defi majeur emerge alors: celui de penser l'evolution de la societe industrielle avancee dans une optique qui reconcilierait progres social et bonheur, societe et individu. La pensee d'Herbert Marcuse s'inscrit dans le contexte de ce defi. La presente recherche etudie la tentative marcusienne de resolution du conflit entre l'universel et le particulier. L'interrogation generale la sous-tendant est la suivante: y a-t-il tension, reconciliation ou contradiction entre l'individu et la societe dans la pensee de Marcuse? Et plus precisement encore: dans quelle mesure Marcuse, en etablissant l'individu comme sujet de la liberte, parvient-il a reconcilier l'individu et la societe dans une theorie de la liberation?

In its simplest form, this thesis is an attempt to clarify, interpret and defend the nature of the Hegelian dialectic--especially as it is articulated in the Science of Logic. This thesis does not ally itself with any picture of the dialectic as a constraining, oppressive structure, rather it suggests that the dialectic be read more as a dynamic process; an open-ended movement that has, in a certain sense, already anticipated and accounted for many of the objections brought against it.

Thomas Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" got people to pay attention to tradition in science. This thesis considers how what Kuhn says about paradigms is closely linked with the idea of science as involving tradition. Kuhn takes paradigms to be a source of coherence in scientific traditions and the carrier of them, i.e., in normal science traditions are embodied in paradigms and hence maintained by them. I argue that when Kuhn emphasizes the priority of paradigms, he is actually emphasizing the role of tradition in normal science. I suggest that Kuhn's discussion about the priority of paradigms not only shows that he emphasizes the role of tradition, it also clarifies how traditions are formed and changed. Kuhn's work is often taken as the basis for resisting the rational view of science. His "incommensurability thesis" and "community authority thesis" are viewed by people, such as Feyerabend, as implying science is arational of irrational. They suggest that in science there is only replacement of paradigms, not the continuation of tradition. To better understand Kuhn's view about tradition, I argue that we need to understand his views about practice, rule, and theory. Comparing Kuhn's and Wittgenstein's views, I argue that Kuhn holds that practice and rules stand at the same level. Thus when Kuhn emphasizes the priority of paradigms, what he wants to say is that paradigms are more binding and more complete than any set of rules for research that could be unequivocally abstracted from them. For Kuhn paradigm changes are caused by the discovery of new facts and the invention of new theories together and this takes time. Thus, when the old tradition gives way to the new one, many concepts and ideas of the old tradition will inevitably be retained. Moreover, during the change of tradition, the old tradition plays a role in the formation of the new one, a point that Kuhn overlooks. In addition, a change of tradition in the development of science usually appears as a change of a small part of science while the main part of it continues as before. I examine how tradition plays a role in scientific discovery and justification. I first clarify the understanding of the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. What Kuhn should have said, I believe, is that just as in normal science scientists use solutions to typical problems as paradigms and solve new problems by imitating the way in which typical problems were solved, so they use paradigms of individual sciences as examples of inquiry and deal with crises in scientific revolutions. I argue that the process of the establishment of a new tradition is a rational process. In addition to these arguments, I argue against Kuhn's"community authority thesis". I point out that for Kuhn community authority does not come from or represent tradition, rather, it seems to be independent of traditional authority, even to be definitive of tradition. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Abstract Not Available.

Abstract Not Available.