Naturalizing the Unity of Consciousness: can neuroscience explain a fundamental feature of subjectivity? Martin Vraný Abstract The aim of the dissertation is to analyze the concept of the unity of conscious- ness as an explanandum for natural sciences and assess how good an explanation do leading neuroscientific theories of consciousness provide. The motivation be- hind this project is the idea that it is the unity which poses the greatest challenge for the scientific quest for consciousness. I argue in the Introduction that the reason why some theories of consciousness lead to what Dennett calls Cartesian materialism is precisely because they fail to address the problem of the unity of consciousness. If we had a good understanding of the unity of consciousness and its place in nature, we could more easily avoid the tendency to devise accounts of consciousness that are homuncular in disguise. In chapter 2 I analyze various aspects in which consciousness is thought be unified and conclude that two such aspects are particularly challenging for natu- ralizing the unity and that they cannot be treated separately. They are the unity of conscious contents at a time and the unity in the sense of a single subject having conscious contents and being able to reflect on them. Chapter 3 describes main conceptual and...

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and other people. In this thesis, I present a new paradigm, the Self/Other Differentiation task, which was designed to assess ToM abilities – specifically, the ability to attribute belief states to the ‘Self' and ‘Other' – in typically developed, healthy adults. By focussing on fully developed ToM abilities, we aimed to increase understanding of how the ToM mechanism is structured and functions in everyday life, and how individual ToM components may differentially relate to executive functioning (EF) abilities. The Self/Other Differentiation task is a computerized false-belief task utilizing a matched- design to allow direct comparison of self-oriented versus other-oriented belief- attribution processes. Using behavioural (response times/error rates) and electrophysiological (EEG) methods, the work presented in this thesis provides evidence of a clear and distinct differentiation in the processing of ‘Self' versus ‘Other' perspectives in healthy ToM. We established a key role of perspective-shifting in ToM, which we hypothesize plays a crucial role in day-to-day communications; shifting from the Self-to-Other perspective was significantly harder (longer and more error prone) than shifting from the Other-to-Self perspective, suggesting that the ‘Self' forms the stem of understanding the ‘Other'. EEG analysis revealed these effects were present across fronto-lateral and occipital-lateral areas of the brain, particularly across the right hemisphere in parietal regions. We provide evidence of these features as universal, core components of the ToM mechanism, with data collected from both Chinese and Western cultures illustrating similar patterns of results. Results regarding the relationship between ToM and EF were mixed, with one study finding that affective EF positively correlates with ToM task performance, whilst non-affective EF does not, and a further two studies finding no such differential relationship. The Self/Other Differentiation task provides the opportunity to establish the features of ‘typical' ToM processes in healthy adults, to further our understanding of how the mature ToM mechanism functions.

The present paper critically examines the epistemic status of first-person accounts and first-person methods in Francisco Varela’s research program neurophenomenology, which integrates a phenomenological perspective in cognitive science. The paper also questions Varela’s description of neurophenomenology as an ontological recategorization of nature and a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

My research focuses on the philosophy of imagination. Within the analytic tradition, there recently has been a growing interest in imagination. The current research lies at the crossroads of various sub-disciplines of philosophy, including aesthetics, moral psychology, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. My work joins this choir as a voice from within philosophy of mind. My dissertation addresses two questions within philosophy of imagination. What I call the Relation Question asks what is the proper relation between supposition and imagination, and what I call the Unification Question asks what is the imagination. With regards to the Relation Question, philosophers answer it in one of two ways: either supposition and imagination are distinct mental capacities (what I call two-nature views) or supposition is a kind of imagination (what I call one-nature views). I argue that both views fail to explain all of the features central to the relation. With regards to the Unification Question, many philosophers doubt it has an answer because there is no clear way to unify the disparate activities of imagination. I argue that this skepticism is the result of mischaracterizing the relation between imagining and supposing. Thus, I answer both the Relation and Unification Questions by arguing that both imagining and supposing (as we typically understand these terms) are both instances of what I call the as-if-true attitude. I call this the as-if-true attitude view of imagining. The explanatory payoff of this is that my view can explain all of the features central to the relation without positing two distinct mental capacities (as two-nature views do) and without getting facts about supposition wrong (as one-nature views do). It also gives us a way of seeing how we might unify the different activities of imagination. Finally, I demonstrate that my view has application to what is known in the literature as the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. This phenomenon has to do with competent imaginers failing to comply with invitations to imagine certain propositions. It has been noted in the literature that there is variation to this phenomenon, where some people experience it and some do not. Some philosophers attempt to explain this by appealing to contextual factors. Thus, I call them Contextual Variant Views. I argue that these views fail to account for all of variation. I show that from my as-if-true attitude view comes another view that I call Constraint Variant View. I argue that this view can account for all of the variation of imaginative resistance.

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Theories of Extended Mind have evolved in waves to reach the present state of disagreement with regard to whether or not external artefacts become part of the mind when used for memory purposes. A four-step approach has been used to address and resolve this disagreement. First, a new component for models of mind which provides a saliency function is provided. This saliency function corresponds to computational elements found necessary in large mainframe computer systems for handling rich data environments. Second, there is introduced a Computational Model of Memory containing the new component which models the operation of human memory. The Computational Model of Memory contains four interoperative elements including the new component, short-term memory, long-term memory, and a cross-reference associator. Third, the work of Marcin Milkowski is drawn upon to obtain a general method of assessing a computational model’s well-formedness, and the method is applied to prove the adequacy of the Computational Model of Memory. According to Milkowski’s schema, the model satisfies most criteria for a well-formed computational model, including in particular a separation between conceptual elements of the model, and constitutive elements of the model, which while explicitly related, are required to subsist at separate logical conceptual levels. Fourth, the Computational Model of Memory is applied to outstanding arguments in Extended Mind to clarify and resolve several of these arguments. The model serves to highlight where the nature of the disagreement depends upon a category error of reference, and further resolves a key disagreement by demonstrating that the mind may treat external artefacts as an alternative realizable constitutive element of short-term and long-term memory.

Le sujet du parcours est l'esprit, l'axe de recherche est le concept de causalité. Il s'agit d'abord de relever les déclinaisons de ce concept afin de souligner ces applications dans les travaux des philosophes de l'esprit. Après avoir vu des approches de la causalité (productif et pour dépendance), on parcourt la voie du fonctionnalisme et du physicalisme en philosophie de l'esprit, en voyant les notions de cause et leurs problèmes. On voit aussi d'un point de vue plus empirique la recherche du corrélat neuronal de la conscience. On souligne que la question de la " conscience phénoménale" peut être individuée en tant que problème philosophique et scientifique parce qu'elle s'impose comme inaccessible à une connaissance intersubjective et que le concept productif de cause ne peut pas être appliqué. Le problème principal, c'est la possibilité de détecter une corrélation mais pas un rapport asymétrique de relation causale. En cherchant un point de vue qui part de la conscience et un concept relationnel pour la corrélation psycho-physique (interrelation), on voit les thèses phénoméniste de Mach, de Carnap et de la pensée boudhiste (Ancienne/ Moyen-Age) avec leurs problèmes et leurs intuitions. On peut comprendre que la corrélation ne peut pas être dégagée d'un point de vue métaphysique mais qu'une conception épistémologique s'avère possible. C'est dans la méthode phénoménologique et la recherche neurophénoménologique qu'on peut trouver les moyens concrets d'exploration de la conscience. Cela permet d'appliquer un concept causal actionniste sur le plan épistémique et la notion d'interrelation pour décrire la corrélation psychophysique et son contexte d'individuation. / The debate is on the notions of cause impact on theory of mind and consciousness. First of all, I explore two notions of causality as defined by Ned Hall (2004) : production and dependence, and other related positions among which the actionist theory. After, I see the use of the notion of cause approaches to mind-body problem and to problem of consciousness (functionalism, physicalism and the NCC research) and two experimental examples (blindsight ans neurofeedback), I argue that neither production nor dependence are useful because there is a correlation and not an asymetrical causal relation, but that actionist theory of cause can be a good descriptive approache to our epistemic point of view. After I explore the phenomenalist point of view (Mach, Carnap and the Buddhist philosophy of Middle Age) on consciousness and psychophysical relation and the notions of cause and interrelation. It emerges that an epistemic description is useful and possible. I find in phenomenological and neurophenomenological methods the specific ways to detailing aspects of consciousness and mental phenomena, this allows to apply the actionist concept of cause for the epistemic point of view and to describe the psychophysical relation with the notion of interrelation.

abstract: Users of psychedelic drugs frequently report various types of healing effects after the experience has completed. How these substances actually do the healing work is still being understood. I argue that the phenomenology of the psychedelic experience is relevant to and doing at least some of the healing work. This occurs in part via the phenomenon of transformative experiences. Psychedelic experiences provide insight into first and second order desires of an individual. They alter an individual’s self-narrative and provide an ideal to aim for in addition to the motivation to achieve that ideal. Additionally, psychedelic experiences foster feelings of connection to other people and nature. This heals through altering an individual’s in-group/out-group perceptions and provide a sense of oneness which increases accurate perspective taking. The experience of ego-dissolution had under psychedelics can be compared to the ultimate transformative experience—death—which facilitates the healing process. These experiences promote social healing and serve as a reopening of previously closed possibilities due to trauma or mental illness. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Philosophy 2020

<p>Svest je u poslednje tri decenije postala predmetom multidisciplinarnih studija svesti (consciousness studies), &scaron;to je aktualizovalo značaj konceptualne analize pojma svesti i problema koji se javljaju u različitim istraţivačkim pristupima svesti. Da li različite discipline (pa čak i različiti pristupi u okviru iste discipline) govore uop&scaron;te o istom predmetu? Na &scaron;ta se, na primer, odnose savremene neurolo&scaron;ke teorije svesti, kakav teorijski status ima koncept svesti u okviru funkcionalnih dijagrama kognitivne psihologije, o čemu govore psihoterapeuti kada nagla&scaron;avaju značaj svesnosti u psihoterapijskom procesu ili značaj osve&scaron;ćivanja nesvesnog, &scaron;ta imaju u vidu fenomenolozi ili praktičari kontemplativnih tradicija kada se bave neposrednim iskustvom i na kraju, &scaron;ta pod sve&scaron;ću podrazumevaju različite ontolo&scaron;ke pozicije o odnosu duha i tela? Konceptualna analiza koja je sprovedena u ovom radu ima za cilj pobolj&scaron;anje komunikacije izmeĎu disciplina i lokalizaciju te&scaron;koća koje stoje na putu interdisciplinarnim istraţivačkim projektima.<br />Analitička filozofija duha (philosophy of mind) je u poslednje četiri decenije izo&scaron;trila i locirala problematiku svesti, te razvila novi konceptualni aparat i misaone eksperimente koji omogućavaju preciznije razumevanje ograničenja u poku&scaron;aju prirodnonaučne rekonstukcije pojma duha (mind), kakvu su poslednjih decenija, inače sa velikim uspehom, preduzele tzv. mind sciences (poput kognitivne psihologije, ve&scaron;tačke inteligencije, lingvistike, neuronauke) . U radu autorka pokazuje kako različiti savremeni filozofi ukazuju na distinkcije dva lica svesti i duha &ndash; Dţekendofovo razlikovanje računarskog duha (computational mind) i fenomenolo&scaron;kog duha (phenomenological mind), Blokovo razlikovanje A-svesti (access consciousness) i P-svesti (phenomenal consciousness) i Čalmersovo razlikovanje &bdquo;lakog&ldquo; i &bdquo;te&scaron;kog&ldquo; problema svesti. Dok se, na primer, A-svest, odnosi na svest u smislu pristupačnosti, odnosno dostupnosti odreĎenog sadrţaja (mentalne reprezentacije) u kontroli govora, rezonovanja i akcije, P-svest (fenomenalna svest) odnosi se na činjenicu da svesna mentalna stanja poseduju doţivljajne, kvalitativne odlike, koje su dostupne direktno jedino iz subjektivne perspektive prvog lica. Za ovaj aspekat svesti je filozofija duha uvela tehnički termin qualia (lat. sing. quale) i on čini svest drugačijom od ostalih predmeta istraţivanja u dominantnoj objektivističkoj naučnoj paradigmi.<br />U radu autorka diskutuje problem ontolo&scaron;kog statusa qualia, kao problem u formulaciji materijalističkih teorija duha (teza o identitetu, funkcionalističke i reprezentacionalističke teorije), kao i epistemolo&scaron;ke probleme qualia &ndash; problem spoznajno privilegovanog poloţaja, argument nepotpunog znanja (Dţekson) i problem eksplanatornog jaza (Levajn) i njihove reperkusije za filozofiju nauke &ndash; problem odnosa metodologije prvog i trećeg lica, razumevanja i obja&scaron;njenja, duhovnonaučnog i prirodnonaučnog pristupa čoveku. Iz ovog ugla je u novom svetlu sagledano istorijsko smenjivanje paradigmi u glavnim tokovima akademske psihologije.<br />Sve dosada&scaron;nje strategije eliminacije fenomenalne svesti iz psiholo&scaron;kog i filozofskog diskursa vode produbljavanju jaza izmeĎu sveta iskustva (Lebenswelt, Huserl) i prirodnonaučne slike sveta izgraĎene primenom objektivne metodologije. Psihoterapija je, naprotiv, disciplina koja predstavlja jednu od najvaţnijih spona izmeĎu disciplinovanog pristupa subjektivnom iskustvu i objektivnih naučnih činjenica. Zato je paţnja posvećena savremenom konstitusanju psihoterapije kao naučne discipline, kao i njenom pozicioniranju u odnosu na prirodnonaučnu i duhovnonaučnu paradigmu od osnivanja (Frojdovog osciliranja izmeĎu naklonosti prirodnonaučnom modelu i hermeneutičke prakse), preko niza novina i &bdquo;dekonstrukcija&ldquo; prvobitnog modela kroz njenu istoriju, do savremenog trenda &ndash; neuropsihoterapije, koja poslednjih deset godina uvodi nova saznanja neuronauke u sagledavanje psihoterapijskog procesa i unapreĎenje postupaka. Analizirani su značaj i uloga koju različiti psihoterapijski pravci (klasična psihoanaliza, BT, KBT, uključujući i nove mindfulness pristupe, egzistencijalistički, humanistički i konstruktivistički pravci) pridaju svesti, svesnosti i osve&scaron;ćivanju, te koje značenje ovi pojmovi imaju u svetlu distinkcija na koje je ukazala analiza filozofije duha &ndash; reprezentaciono tj. funkcionalno-kauzalno i fenomenalno. Pokazano je i kako se epistemolo&scaron;ki problemi svesti koji su ranije opisani pojavljuju i re&scaron;avaju u psihoterapiji kao praktičnoj disciplini.<br />Integracija fenomenalne svesti u sliku duha, te povezivanje prirodnonaučnih disciplina i disciplina koje se bave iskustvom i subjektivno&scaron;ču mora da poĎe dalje od konceptualno-logičke analize na kojoj ostaje filozofija duha. Prvi korak na tom putu je razvoj metodologije prvog lica, koja omogućava opis mentalnih procesa i sadrţaja onako kako se oni manifestuju iz ugla svesnog subjekta. Stoga je najpre prikazano &scaron;est metoda prvog lica poreklom iz introspektivne psihologije, fenomenolo&scaron;ke filozofije i budističke kontemplativne tradicije, a zatim sprovedena tematska kvalitativna analiza ovih metoda. Postupkom otvorenog kodiranja izdvojeno je deset dimenzija po kojima su uporeĎivane metode. Ovo eksplorativno istraţivanje omogućilo je precizniji uvid u meĎusobne srodnosti i razlike analiziranih metoda, u njihove moći i slabosti, te strategije unapreĎenja, kao i u mogućnosti saradnje sa metodama trećeg lica. Pokazali smo takoĎe da &bdquo;pogled iznutra&ldquo; moţe da otkrije vaţne odlike svesti i duha koji ostaju netransparentni objektivnim metodama.</p> / <p>Consciousness has become the subject of multidisciplinary consciousness studies in last three decades which revived the importance of conceptual analysis of the concept of consciousness and problems that occur in a variety of research approaches to consciousness. Do different disciplines (and even different approaches within the same discipline) speak about the same subject at all? What are modern neurological theories of consciousness related to, for example, what is the theoretical status of the concept of consciousness within functional diagrams of cognitive psychology, what do psychotherapists talk about when they highlight importance of awareness in a psychotherapeutic process and importance of becoming aware of the unconscious, what do phenomenologists or practitioners of contemplative traditions have in mind when dealing with direct experience and, in the end, what do different ontological positions imply with the notion of consciousness in the relationship between mind and body? Conceptual analysis conducted in this paper aims to improve communication between disciplines and localize difficulties that stand in the way of interdisciplinary research projects.<br />Analytic philosophy of mind has sharpened and located the problem of consciousness in last four decades, and has also developed a new conceptual apparatus and thought experiments that enable more accurate understanding of limits in an attempt of a natural science reconstruction of the concept of mind, which in recent decades, usually with large success, have been undertaken by so-called mind sciences (such as cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience). In this thesis, the author shows how different contemporary philosophers suggest distinctions of two faces of consciousness and mind &ndash; Jackendoff&rsquo;s distinction between computational mind and phenomenological mind, Block&rsquo;s differentiation of A-consciousness (access consciousness) and P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) and Chalmers&rsquo; distinction between &quot;easy&quot; and &quot;hard&quot; problems of consciousness. While, for example, A-consciousness, refers to consciousness in terms of accessibility and availability of specific content (mental representations) in the control of speech, reasoning and actions, P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) refers to the fact that conscious mental states possess experiential, qualitative characteristics, which are directly available only from the subjective perspective of the first person. Philosophy of mind introduced a technical term qualia (lat. sing. quale) for this aspect of consciousness, and it makes consciousness different from other subjects of research in the dominant objectivist scientific paradigm.<br />In this thesis, the author discusses the problem of the ontological status of qualia, as a problem in the formulation of the materialistic mind theories (the thesis of identity, functionalist and representational theories), as well as epistemological problems of qualia - the problem of privileged access, the argument of incomplete knowledge (Jackson) and the problem of the explanatory gap (Levine) and their repercussions on philosophy of science - the problem of the relationship between first and third-person methodologies, understanding and explanation, a human science and a natural science approach to man. The historical succession of paradigms in the mainstream academic psychology has been viewed from this angle.<br />All previous strategies of eliminating phenomenal consciousness from psychological and philosophical discourse lead to deepening of the gap between the world of experience (Lebenswelt, Husserl) and the natural science picture of the world constructed by using an objective methodology. Psychotherapy, on the contrary, is a discipline that is one of the most important links between a disciplined approach to subjective experience and objective scientific facts. That is why attention has been paid to the contemporary constitution of psychotherapy as a scientific discipline, as well as its positioning in relation to a natural science and a human science paradigm since its establishment (Freudian oscillating between the affection to natural scientific model and hermeneutical practice), through a number of novelties and &quot;deconstructions&quot; of the original model through its history, to the modern trend &ndash; neuropsychotherapy which has introduced new findings of neuroscience in understanding psychotherapeutic processes and improvement of procedures in last ten years. We analyzed the importance and the role that different psychotherapeutic views (classical psychoanalysis, BT, CBT, including new mindfulness approaches, existentialist, humanistic and constructivist views) attach to consciousness, awareness, and raising awareness, as well as the meanings of these terms in the light of distinctions identified by the analysis of philosophy of mind - that is, representational, functional-causal, and phenomenal. It was shown how the epistemological problems of consciousness described above occur and get resolved in psychotherapy as a practical discipline.<br />Integration of phenomenal consciousness into an image of the mind, and connection of natural science disciplines and disciplines which deal with experience and subjectivity has to go beyond a conceptual and logical analysis on which philosophy of mind remains. The first step on this road is development of a first-person methodology, which allows a description of mental processes and content as they are manifested from a perspective of a conscious subject. Therefore, the first things presented were six first-person methods originating from introspective psychology, phenomenological philosophy and Buddhist contemplative tradition, and then, a qualitative thematic analysis of the six methods was conducted. The process of open coding singled out ten dimensions by which methods were compared. This exploratory research has allowed for a more precise insight into mutual similarities and differences of the analyzed methods, into their powers and weaknesses, improvement strategies, as well as opportunities for cooperation with third-person methods. It has shown also that &ldquo;a view from within&quot; can reveal important features of consciousness and mind that remain non-transparent to objective methods.</p>

I argue in this thesis that Aristotle’s hylomorphic metaphysics, supported by his theory of causality and his theory of the soul (De Anima), holds the key to solving the problem of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind. A core aspect of the contemporary mind-body problem is the problem of mental causation (how does the mind interact with the body to cause actions in humans). Without mental causation, in the realist sense of the word, it is difficult to see how humans are held responsible for their actions. There have been different approaches to solving the mind-body problem, but each has met with its own set of problems, except, I argue, Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Jaegwon Kim argues that Davidson’s anomalous monism cum supervenience renders mental causation epiphenomenal, and that a mental state is causally efficacious only when reduced to the physical properties. I argue that it is the phenomenal consciousness that accounts for our actions, and while neither Davidson’s nor Kim’s accounts of action can adequately deal with phenomenal consciousness, Aristotle’s metaphysics can. I argue that the ancient and neo-Aristotelian notion of self-knowledge is akin to our contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness and that Aristotle saves the notion of autonomous mental causation through his theory of hylomorphism that holds every substance is a composite of matter (body) and form (soul). My thesis is thus a novel invitation to rethink Aristotle’s psychology and philosophy of mind in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria 2020. / University of Pretoria(Postgraduate Bursary (2017-2018) / Philosophy / DPhil / Unrestricted