The concept of critical consciousness centers on the capacity for involvement in social change efforts. Its development has been the aim of many recent social movements (e.g., the consciousness raising groups of the women's movement). In this work, critical consciousness is defined as the highest level of socio-political-cultural (SPC) consciousness development. SPC consciousness is characterized by the linking of the personal and the political so that structures and discourses of oppression are not only understood but also lead to critical action and transforming relations of domination. Additionally, critical consciousness includes the ability to tolerate ambivalence and conflict as well as the capacity to form group identifications that support critical reflection. While critical consciousness can develop in a variety of settings, it has a historical affinity with liberation education projects, particularly education projects that combine Critical Pedagogy and community engaged learning. Empirical inquiry on critical consciousness development is extremely limited. This dissertation addresses that gap, focusing specifically on the role of emotion and relationality in critical consciousness development. Further, the study offers a feminist critique of the literature, addressing as well the contribution of Community Psychology to conceptualizing critical consciousness. This dissertation analyzes data gathered through the Girl Power Senior Capstone, a course routinely taught at an urban Pacific Northwest public university. The six-hour course lasts for one quarter-term and integrates classroom time with community engagement. A central aim of the course is the development of critical consciousness. Specifically, the research was designed to address the following questions: 1) How are emotionally and relationally significant Girl Power experiences related to SPC consciousness development? 2) What tensions arise between the dominant culture and/or significant others' values and the values of the Girl Power capstone and how do these tensions move individuals toward or away from critical consciousness? The theoretical framework and interview schedule were guided by participant observation of the Girl Power course conducted over an academic term. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with all consenting and available capstone participants (N=10) in the course where participant-observations were carried out. The interviews were transcribed and analyzed based on a modified version of Carol Gilligan's Listening Guide. Two primary themes emerged from the data analysis-- the processes of awakening and sources of dissonance. The first theme relates to the processes of transformation that participants undergo during and following the course. Participants discuss this process as coming to see the world in a new way though their emotional experiences and relations developed in the course. The second theme, sources of dissonance, addresses sources of conflict that emerge as participants undergo this process of awakening. Areas of tension that were particularly salient centered on relationships and experiences in the course. Participants identified experiences in the course that they perceived as contributing in key respects to SPC consciousness. Yet some aspects of change in the course seemed to reflect limiting capacities, including magical thinking, a limited range of critical action strategies, and lack of critical community post Girl Power. The findings from the dissertation can be used to inform the creation and implementation of future projects of critical consciousness development and social justice work more broadly.

Over the past several years I have been on a quest to locate a world beyond the one I’ve been presented. I am interested in the history of atomic particles - like everything that radiates off of a monument (both literally and those things that are metaphorically reified) - invisible things, and the ways in which these things insect beyond our knowledge systems. This inquiry takes many forms. Mine is a conceptually based practice linked to record keeping and time, and the ways in which these concepts find plurality within our culture; or more pointedly, the importance that we attach to “time” and “the record”, as they relate to our “legacies”, “cultures”, or “the canon”; our histories and the ahistorical, the prehistorical, fantasies, the things that never happened but could’ve, imagined futures and parallel universes.

This thesis engages with epistemology???s value problem. That is, is knowledge epistemically preferable to true belief? If so, how is that the case? The issue under discussion is whether epistemic justification can account for a value discrepancy between true belief and knowledge. First of all, the contours of the justificatory landscape are presented???in particular, the division between externalist and internalist styles. The thesis then considers whether solely truth-directed justification (which includes externalism) can possibly account for a value unique to knowledge. The preliminary conclusion is that solely truth-directed justification cannot solve the value problem. A discussion of internalism then ensues. The discussion does not focus explicitly on which benefits internalism may offer in terms of value; instead, the focus is on whether internalism qua internalism can solve the value problem. It is concluded that, if internalism is the sole provider of the value of knowledge (above that of true belief), then epistemology must forgo the belief that knowledge is preferable to a Gettiered belief. I do not accept such a concession; therefore, I reject the thesis that internalism exclusively solves the value problem. Throughout the thesis, the importance of externalism to epistemology becomes apparent. This feature invites a reconsideration of the value of externalism (in particular, of reliabilism). The thesis closes by reconsidering the value of reliabilism and concludes that the value problem can be solved, but only by an appeal to externalist justification.

This thesis is a defence of non-introspective simulationism. It seeks to explain how we acquire everyday behavioural and psychological beliefs (henceforth interpretational beliefs) regarding both ourselves and others. The thesis is in three parts; the first states non-introspective simulationism, the second surveys some relevant empirical findings and shows how simulationism explains (or at least accomodates) these, and the third compares simulationism with rival theories. The two main claims of non-introspecitve simulationism (as defended) are: simulation is central to the acquisition of interpretational beliefs. Introspection has no role whatever. Further central claims are: beliefs about our own currently intended behaviours are acquired by practical reasoning. Other interpretational beliefs are, in various ways, the product of simulation. Simulation requires little if any machinery not already required for practical reasoning. Knowledge of our own psychological states is acquired after and as a result of knowledge of others�. Knowledge of phenomenal states is unnecessary for mastery of folk psychology and the product of dinkum science.

An exploration of self-deception in proslavery arguments in the antebellum South. This work explores how proslavery theorists were able to support slavery despite overwhelming evidence that slavery was immoral. By using non-intentional self-deception, slavery supporters tested their hypothesis that slavery was good in a motivationally biased manner that aligned with their interests and desires.

This thesis presents and evaluates David Chalmers argument that the existence of phenomenal conscious experience constitutes a permanent barrier to the reductive aspirations of a purely materialistic neuroscience. My aim is to defend the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness, and argue that continued research in neuroscience and neurophysiology can result in a successful materialistic or reductive solution to the hard problem of consciousness. My argument against Chalmers is two-fold. First, I challenge Chalmers claim that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical. And second, I argue that his conceivability argument is implausible.

My thesis is about Virginia Woolf’s novels, Mrs. Dalloway, The Waves, and To the Lighthouse. I examine these novels in relation to the theories of Henri Bergson, William James, and Sigmund Freud, and the groundwork of Modernism. I relate Woolf's use of water imagery and stream of consciousness technique to Bergson’s theory of “la durée,” or psychological, subjective time, James’ “stream of consciousness” theory in psychology, and Freud’s theory of the “oceanic” feeling of religious experience.

This thesis presents and evaluates David Chalmers argument that the existence of phenomenal conscious experience constitutes a permanent barrier to the reductive aspirations of a purely materialistic neuroscience. My aim is to defend the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness, and argue that continued research in neuroscience and neurophysiology can result in a successful materialistic or reductive solution to the hard problem of consciousness. My argument against Chalmers is two-fold. First, I challenge Chalmers claim that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical. And second, I argue that his conceivability argument is implausible.

Thesis (M.S.)--Eastern Illinois University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-86).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 244-258).